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emerged in the years since passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. Although some
interested parties and some governmental agencies have welcomed these guidelines,
none of them ever has had the force of law. This article analyzes the origins of
guidelines, the various governmental documents and court rulings that reference the
guidelines, and the substantive content of the guidelines themselves to demonstrate
that in fact the guidelines bear little relationship, if any, to the law offair use. The
guidelines are negotiated resolutions of conflicts regarding fair use, and yet they are
often presented as standards to which one must adhere in order to remain within the
law. This article further analyzes the guidelines from a conceptual perspective and
finds that the process of developing the guidelines gives them the appearance of a
normative quality, while the portrayal of the guidelines as formal standards
sanctioned by authoritative structures gives them the appearance of positive law.
These qualities are merely illusory, and consequently the guidelines have had a
seriously detrimental effect. They interfere with an actual understanding of the law
and erode confidence in the law as created by Congress and the courts. Because
pressure to develop additional guidelines appears inevitable, this article identifies
deficiencies in the guidelines of the past and concludes with recommendations for
improving the processes for, and the outcome of, future efforts to development new
guidelines that interpret and apply the law offair use.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Early fair-use guidelines failed to reflect accurately the law or to embody
workable standards, yet they have persisted as models for a new generation of
interpretations applicable to the extraordinary demands of digital technology.'
The newest incarnations of guidelines perpetuate deficiencies of the past and
create new hazards for copyright owners, users, and anyone else seeking to
understand the law.2 Guidelines also have been the source of misconstructions of
fair use in judicial rulings. This article will scrutinize the origins and application
of the various guidelines from the past to reveal the limits and weaknesses of
these standards of fair use. This analysis will also posit an innovative legal
construct to underscore the deficiencies of formally recognized guidelines3 and
1 Gregory K. Klingspom, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair
Use Guidelines, 23 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 101, 101 (1999) ("Yet, despite this criticism,
guidelines have remained a preferred method of applying the Copyright Act (or related
regulation) to new technologies not envisioned by the drafters of the 1976 revisions.); DanThu
Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 169, 198 (1998)
(CONFU Guidelines are "modeled after the 1976 Fair Use Guidelines, also known as the
Classroom Guidelines"). Future guidelines appear to be imminent, if not inevitable. See infra
note 520. A central point of this article is that new guidelines can avoid the pitfalls and
problems of the past, but only if the process of development is greatly revised. See infra Part VI
of this article.
2 Kym Carrier, Note, Right of Publicity: Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Association, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 159, 171-73 (1998) (demonstrating confusion over the
concept of guidelines, this article uses the word "guideline" in reference to the factors in the
fair-use statute itself).
3 The guidelines addressed in this article are significantly different from the many other
"guidelines" that exist in other areas for the law. For example, judges apply "federal sentencing
guidelines" in criminal cases and use guidelines to help determine the "best interests of the
child" or the appropriate award of child support in family matters. See generally Marsha
Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1999); Debra H.
Lehrmann, Who are We Protecting?: An Analysis of Law Regarding the Duties of Attorneys
and Guardians Ad Litem, 63 TEx. B. 123, 126 (2000) ('Tese guidelines are not meant to
contravene state law, but to fill in gaps where they exist"). The U.S. Department of Justice uses
guidelines to examine whether corporate mergers may violate antitrust standards. The fair-use
guidelines generally differ in at least two respects. First, except for the CONTU Guidelines,
they are drafted by interested parties who have chosen to participate in the effort. Guidelines for
other applications are usually drafted by appointed or invited experts, or they are developed and
issued by commissions or agencies authorized to implement the law. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
COMPETTION, U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HORiZONTAL MERGER GuIDEINEs [with
April 8, 1997 Revisions to §4 Efficiencies] (1992), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
Second, guidelines in other areas of the law are often specifically authorized by law, such as the
sentencing guidelines. Federal statutes provide for the development of the sentencing
guidelines, and a duly appointed commission creates them with judicial oversight. See Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest,
17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1988) (noting that these guidelines have mandatory authority and
were developed by a statutorily established commission). See also Stephen Breyer, Justice
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the pitfalls of accepting them as an adequate measure for understanding the law.
Finally, this article closes with suggestions for better comprehending the nature of
guidelines and for developing improved guidelines in the future.
For more than twenty years, various "official" guidelines have offered to
define or at least explain the practical scope of fair-use law.4 The best-known of
Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 CRIM. JUST. 28, 28-35 (1999). The
guidelines in some other areas of the law are also different in that they often are indicators to
decision makers about the law, but usually do not purport to have legal force or create the
appearance of setting a definitive legal standard. See generally SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., A
PRAcrmONER's GUIDE TO THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANITrRUST MERGER GUIDELINES (1997).
4 This article will focus especially on the following seven guidelines:
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976)
[hereinafter Classroom Guidelines].
Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 70-71 (1976)
[hereinafter Music Guidelines].
Guidelines for Off-Air Recordings of Broadcast Programming for Educational Purposes,
H.R. REP. No. 97-495, at 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter Off-Air Guidelines]. These guidelines first
appeared in 127 Cong. Rec. 18, at 24,048-49 (1981).
CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements, in
NATIONAL COMMISsION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, July 31, 1978 [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT] 54-55 [hereinafter CONTU
Guidelines].
Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images, in INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE, November 1998 [hereinafter CONFU FINAL REPORT] 33-41
[hereinafter Digital-Images Guidelines].
Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning, in CONFU FINAL
REPORT 43-48 [hereinafter Distance-Leaming Guidelines].
Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia, in CONFU FINAL REPORT
49-59 [hereinafter Multimedia Guidelines]. A slightly different version of the Multimedia
Guidelines were the subject of a "nonlegislative report" issued by a congressional
subcommittee in December 1996. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., FAIR USE
GUIDELINES FOR EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter MULTIMEDIA
COMMrrr PRINT]. For a discussion of the origins of this MULTMEDIA COMMrr=E PRINT, see
infra text accompanying notes 215-16. For a discussion of one critical way that the guidelines
in the nonlegislative report differ from the "final" version published in the CONFU FINAL
REPORT, see infra note 431.
The Digital-Images Guidelines, the Distance-Learning Guidelines, and the Multimedia
Guidelines are collectivelyreferred to on occasion as the "CONFU Guidelines."
These guidelines share these common characteristics: they interpret either sections 107 or
108 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and they have been endorsed or supported or ratified by a
governmental body. In those respects they are different from other possible guidelines that
could also be the subject of study. For example, the report from the Conference on Fair Use also
included a document entitled Statement on Use of Copyrighted Computer Programs (Software)
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such guidelines-addressing issues of photocopied handouts for classroom
teaching 5-has been available for scrutiny and application since passage of the
first fair-use statute in 1976. Fundamentally, these and other guidelines respond to
the fact that fair-use law is subject to many different and reasonable
interpretations. In an attempt to address and relieve that uncertainty, interested
parties have met periodically to develop, guidelines detailing fair use, particularly
for applications related to education.6 Stakeholders in the debate over the
resulting guidelines have given them diverse descriptions and characterizations.
The guidelines sometimes have been identified as "merely advisory" and at other
times declared as the true meaning of fair-use law. In the context of fair-use law,
however, each of those characterizations proves faulty, and most of them are not
sustainable by any legal interpretation. This article will offer a legal analysis that
can more accurately identify the legal significance of the guidelines, and that can
provide a more reliable foundation for the emergence of inevitable guidelines in
the future.
An enormous difficulty in coming to terms with the role of fair-use guidelines
is that the literature of the law has largely neglected them and left them without a
clear and meaningful conceptualization.7 That lack of clarity, nevertheless, has
in Libraries-Scenarios. See CONFU FINAL REPORT, at 61-65. That document, however, is
principally an application of sections 108 through 109 of the Copyright Act. Further, the
American Library Association and other organizations have issued interpretations of fair use
that have been adopted by some educational institutions and other organizations, but not
supported by governmental agencies. See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, MODEL
POLICY CONCERNING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PHOTOCOPYING FOR CLASSROOM, RESEARCH
AND LIBRARY RESERVE USE (1982) [hereinafter ALA MODELPOLICY].
5 See infra text accompanying notes 56-80.
6 Klingspom, supra note 1, at 101 (stating, "copyright owners, copyright users, and
legislators have attempted to increase the predictability of fair use through 'guidelines"').
7 No law review article has made a systematic study of the guidelines, although the
guidelines have received moderate attention in the standard treatises on copyright and fair use.
See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT § 10.2.2(b) (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998); MELVILLE
B. & DAvID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2000) [hereinafter NIMER ON
COPYRIGHT]; WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1995)
[hereinafter PATRY, FAIR USE] (covers only the earlier guidelines). On the other hand, the
guidelines have been the subject of considerable discussion, but usually with little critical
analysis, in numerous books that seek to apply fair use in the education or library setting. See,
e.g., ARLENE BiELEFiELD & LAWRENCE CHEEsEMAN, LIBRARIES & COPYRIGHT LAW (1993);
JANis H. BRUWELHEIDE, THE COPYRIGHT PRIMER FOR LIBRARIANS AND EDUCATORS (1995);
LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 1990S (1994); MARY BRANDT JENSEN, DOES YOUR PROJECT HAVE A
COPYRIGHT PROBLEM? (1996). A few books, on the other hand, have offered some critical
analysis. See, e.g., GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND
SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway, ed., 1997) [hereinafter GASAWAY, GROWING PAINS]; ESTHER I
SINOFSKY, OFF-AIR VIDEOTAPING IN EDUCATION: COPYRIGHT ISSUES, DECISIONS,
IMPLICATIONS 98-102 (1984). Various articles have offered different insights, and many of
them are cited throughout this work.
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not stalled efforts to devise new guidelines. Indeed, recent efforts to devise new
fair-use guidelines have been built explicitly on guidelines of the past as
models-even though the merits of earlier guidelines never have been the subject
of detailed legal scrutiny.8 This article will attempt the needed analysis.
This article will examine the manner in which fair-use guidelines have been
characterized by interested parties and in court cases in order to test the validity of
many of those portrayals and to discern the legal status and significance of the
guidelines. The analysis is rooted in legal theory. This article will examine the
several cases that have referenced any of the guidelines, 9 and it will posit an
understanding of the guidelines not only from the view of courts attempting to
apply fair use, but also in the context of legal theories relating to positive law,
normative law, and the significance of legislative history in the interpretation of
statutes. 10 This article will ultimately demonstrate that most of the guidelines that
purport to interpret fair use in fact bear little credible relationship to the law, and
that the guidelines of the past are a weak foundation for developing new
interpretations for the future.
A. Background ofFair-Use Law and Guidelines
The fair-use doctrine of American copyright law has been derided as among
the most hopelessly vague of legal standards, requiring complex and often
subjective interpretation.'1 It has been scomed as the last, desperate defense from
a scoundrel, who only claims fair use to avoid wanton liability.12 It has been
attacked as a lure that draws into its trap fools who underestimate the wrath that
the doctrine incurs among the circles of many copyright proprietors. 13 The
8 The final report from the Conference on Fair Use, see infra text accompanying notes
116-51, includes several references to earlier guidelines as models for new guidelines. See, e.g.,
CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6 ("Participants were encouraged to follow the
example of previous successful efforts to develop voluntary fair use guidelines-the Classroom
Guidelines in 1976, and the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works... which dealt with the issues raised by photocopiers and computers in 1978.").
9 See infra Part M. Of particular importance in this analysis will be the following cases,
which give considerable attention to the fair-use guidelines: Princeton University Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995); Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
10 See infra Part V.
I Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
12 Jeremy Phillips, Nimmer on Copyright: David Nimmer Discusses Current US
Copyright Law, and Possible Changes to It, MANAGING INTELL PROP., Feb. 1995, at 17
(Nimmer calls fair use "the last resort of scoundrels.").
13 One article suggests that the application of fair use is inevitably amorphous:
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doctrine of fair use is also the cause of ample confusion among lawyers and
laypersons alike, who often need to understand its nuances and live by its tenuous
and fragile principles. A determination of whether or not some activity may or
may not be fair use is actually akin to a prediction of how a judge might decide
the same question, based on limited precedent and wide variations in possible
interpretations. 14
From another perspective, fair use is an essential element of effective
communication and education, and it is a crucial bridge for the widespread
sharing of ideas. 15 Fair use allows an author to borrow a meaningful quotation
from another source and to comment upon and share messages and missives
exchanged on the Intemet. 16 Among the principal beneficiaries of fair use for the
public interest have been the education and library communities. 17 Indeed, fair
Many who have looked at the relationship between copyright protection and the fair use defense
have concluded that finding a fair use is, at best, a matter of balancing hard-to-define equitable
considerations, or at worst, a matter of luck. Additionally, for those of the orthodox school,
obtaining a fair use exception in court is simply a matter of marshalling more emotionally
appealing equitiesfor fair use than the creator of the work can offer against fair use.
Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics behind Copyright Fair Use: A
Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.L 143, 144 (1993) (footnotes
oritted).
14 Lisa M. Babiskin, Case Comment, Oh, Pretty Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 193, 223 (1994) ("In the absence of clear guidelines, fair use is
essentially a rule of reason, the outcome depending on the facts and circumstances in each
case.").
15 CONSORTIUM FOR EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN UNIVERsITY SYSTEMS, FAIR USE OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS: A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN EDUCATING AMERICA (1995) (This pamphlet
was written in large part by the author of the present article; text of the work is available at
http'/www.cetus.org/fairindex.html (last visited April 4, 2001)). The purpose of fair use has
been articulated in many ways. See, e.g., Elliott Epstein & Andrew J. Zulieve, The Fair Use
Doctrine: Commercial Misappropriation and Market Diversion, 13 ME. BJ. 142, 142 (1998)
("The 'Fair Use Doctrine' ameliorates the potentially suffocating effect on creative expression
of the monopolistic rights conferred by the Copyright Act on authors of original works. In
essence, the doctrine allows certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted work for criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and other 'transformative' purposes."); Phan,
supra note 1, at 169. ("The copyright regime seeks to balance the public's desire for broad
access to copyrighted works with the need to provide a pecuniary incentive for the copyright
holder to disseminate her work").
16 Although, just making this statement is a highly presumptive act. The two common
activities mentioned are not explicitly established as fair use in any statement of law from
Congress or the courts, but they may be nearly universally acknowledged as fair use. That is:
nearly universally. Open discussion at the CONFU meetings revealed that someone is always
prepared to contest even the seemingly clearest example of fair use. See infra notes 141-46.
17 These communities are hardly the only groups benefiting enormously and importantly
from fair use. Individuals who make copies at their local public library are exercising fair use.
Lawyers who attach documents to court pleadings are engaged in fair use. Commercial
publishers that excerpt sentences and other materials into new publications often depend on fair
[Vol. 62:599
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use is specifically applicable to teaching, scholarship, and research-the main
objectives of educational institutions and of the users of libraries of all types--as
they access information resources for their own learning and progress.' 8 In that
regard, fair use is also consistent with the constitutional objectives of copyright in
general: to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.19 The framers of
the U.S. Constitution clearly intended that the law of copyright-including fair
use-would be tailored to serve the advancement of knowledge.20
use. Indeed, the commercial publishing industry maybe the greatest beneficiary of fair use, and
it certainly has litigated its claim to fair use more often and with greater zeal than most parties.
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that
quotations from an unpublished book manuscript used in a magazine are not fair use); Wright v.
Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that quotations from unpublished
journal in a commercially published book are fair use); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987) (holding that quotations from
unpublished letters for a commercially published biography are not fair use); Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987) (book including
extensive quotations successfully defended as fair use); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836
F. Supp. 909 (D. Mass. 1993) (reprinting a psychology test scale in a commercial textbook is
fair use); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (sketches from
the Zapruder film included in a book as fair use). For a general study of fair use in the context of
commercial applications, see Steven D. Smit, "Make a Copy for the File. . .": Copyright
Infringement by Attorneys, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1994).
18 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (describing in the preamble that fair use is "for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research").
19 The clause of the U.S. Constitution that empowers Congress to enact copyright law sets
forth a policy for the law: "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Despite
strenuous arguments to the contrary, a recent court ruling has held that the preamble language
for this provision in fact has little substantive constraint on congressional authority to make
copyright law. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372,378 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For a strong argument that
the Copyright Clause is a limit on Congress, see Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on
Congress, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 1119.
20 In 1984 the Supreme Court made this statement about the social objective of limiting
the rights of copyright owners: "Ihe monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved." Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). In 1994, the Court made a more
direct statement about the constitutional purposes that fair use serves: "From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST.,
art. I, §8, cl. 8).
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When Congress fully revised the Copyright Act in 1976, it added for the first
time a statutory provision on fair use.21 After many years of hearings and
recommendations, 22 Congress ultimately chose to give fair use little definition.23
The fair-use statute specifies that fair use applies to teaching, research,
scholarship, and other educational needs, but the determination of fair use in any
particular case depends on an application of four factors. The text of section 107
of the Copyright Act articulates those principles:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work,
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.24
Because case law in 1976 had not begun to address common educational
needs, and because the four factors in the statute could be interpreted differently
to produce divergent outcomes, educators and other parties were resolved to
identify with some greater certainty the meaning and scope of fair use.25
21 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C.)
22 The effort in Congress that led to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 began in 1955
when Congress authorized the U.S. Copyright Office to conduct studies of various copyright
issues. The Copyright Office delivered those studies in 1960 and 1961, which began the process
of legislation in earnest. Thirty-four studies were reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY (Comm. Print 1960). The thirty-
fifth study was published in 1963. For the congressional appropriation that is generally credited
with initiating these studies, see Legislative Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1956, 69 Stat.
499,517 (1955).
23 H.1 REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("The statement of the fair use doctrine in section
107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in
particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute.").
24 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
25 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-67 (1976).
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Congress was not prepared to include further details in the law, but it urged the
stakeholders to negotiate their concerns and to reach agreement about the
meaning of the law.26 The outcome of that effort was the series of early
guidelines.27 Negotiations in the mid-1970s gave rise to the first set of guidelines
on the issue of photocopying for classroom handouts.2 8 Soon came guidelines on
making copies of musical works for education 2 9 and later emerged guidelines on
sending copies of journal articles for interlibrary loans30 and recording television
broadcasts off-air for classroom use.31 Once these guidelines were developed,
Congress usually gave them a gesture of acceptance, but little substantive
scrutiny. A few court decisions since then have relied on them, although with
mixed impressions.32 Despite the legal ambiguity of guidelines, the impetus to
devise guidelines for fair use has accelerated in recent years as interested parties
struggle with new applications of copyright law.33
Three proposals for new fair-use guidelines were included in a December
1998 report of the Conference on Fair Use, also known as CONFU.34 Issued by
26 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-67 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 62 (1966).
Professor Jessica Litman has been less patient with the pressures from Congress. She has
written that Congress "encouraged, cajoled, bullied, and threatened the parties through
continuing negotiations." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 871 (1987). See also Off-Air Tapingfor Educational Use: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice, 96th
Cong. 3-4 (1979). With respect to negotiating guidelines for off-air videotaping, Thomas E.
Mooney, Associate Counsel to the Subcommittee, made this statement: "This is an area which I
am afraid we are going to have to revisit and revisit, and then revisit again, until hopefully a
solution of sorts emerges." Id A recent Register of Copyrights made this sweeping statement:
"It is our perception... that in the past the Congress in general and this subcommittee in
particular have expressed their preference and desire for the interested parties in the various
copyright issues voluntarily to resolve them among themselves.' Copyright Office/Copyright
Royalty Tribunal: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, 98th Cong. 5 (1983) (remarks of David L. Ladd). This statement
suggests that, despite the many purposes and characterizations attributed to the guidelines, see
infra Part IV, one additional underlying purpose of the guidelines is to help Congress avoid the
need to address the issue in a level of detail demanded by some interested parties.
27 Those guidelines are listed at supra note 4.
28 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4.
29 Music Guidelines, supra note 4.
30 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
31 Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4.
3 2 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (referring to the Classroom Guidelines). See infra Part m of this article.
33 Of particular importance in recent years has been the work of the Conference on Fair
Use to devise anew generation of guidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 116-96.
3 4 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-59. See also INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST
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the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the report indluded proposals for
guidelines on the issues of multimedia development, digitizing of visual images,
and distance learning.35 Those proposed guidelines have been the subject of
conflicting and sometimes hostile debate. Many of the major education and
library associations opposed herr, 36 and many publishers and other proprietor
groups have given the guidelines their endorsement.37 Despite the good intentions
of CONFU organizers, the planned effort to reach consensus seems in some
respects further away today than it did when CONFU first convened in 1994.38
PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE, (1997) [hereinafter CONFU INTERIM REPORT]. This
report is similar in many respects to the report issued nearly two years later, and includes the
text of the same three proposed guidelines.
35 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 33-59.
36 For example, among the groups opposing some or all of the CONFU Guidelines were:
American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), American Council on
Education (ACE), American Historical Society (AHS), American Library Association (ALA),
Association of American Universities (AAU), Association of Research Libraries (ARL),
Medical Library Association (MLA), National Association of State Universities and Land-
Grant Colleges, and the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL). See NOTIFICATIONS
RECEIVED FROM ORGANIZATIONS ON THE PROPOSALS FOR FAIR USE GUIDELINES, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomfolia/confu/notif.htm (last visited April 4,2001).
37 Support for the various CONFU Guidelines was diffused. Numerous organizations
noted on the public record their support for the Multimedia Guidelines, but most of those
groups did not take a public position on the other guidelines. Among those supporters,
particularly of the Multimedia Guidelines, were: Association of American Publishers (AAP),
Association of American University Presses, Inc. (AAUP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BM1),
Consortium of College and University Media Centers (CCUMC), American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA), Software Publishers Association (SPA), Association of American Colleges and
Universities (AAC&U), American Association of Community Colleges (AACC). See
NOTIFICATIONS RECEIVED FROM ORGANIZATIONS ON THE PROPOSALS FOR FAIR USE
GUIDELINES, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomfolialconfu/notif.htm (last visited April
4,2001). The list of endorsers of the Multimedia Guidelines also appears in the CONFU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-57.
3 8 CONFU convened at the behest of the U.S. Information Infrastructure Task Force,
which issued the "Green Paper" report in July 1994 calling on the diverse interest groups to
negotiate an understanding of fair use for educational needs in lieu of any proposal for
legislative action on fair use. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1994) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]. According to
the GREEN PAPER: "Therefore, the Working Group will sponsor a conference to bring together
copyright owner and user interests to develop guidelines for fair uses of copyrighted works by
and in public libraries and schools." Id. at 134. In September 1995, the 1ITF issued a final
"White Paper" that emphasized the hopes that CONFU would resolve the conflicts over fair use
relatively quickly: "[1]t appears reasonable to anticipate that drafts now in preparation may be
formalized as guidelines before the end of 1995." INFORMATION INFRASTUCTURE TASK
FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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This article will suggest that the fractured outcome of CONFU may be traced to
the lack of objective legal analysis of fair-use law and guidelines.39
This article reflects on almost twenty-five years of experience with existing
guidelines, with the hope that experience will offer insights about their
significance-or lack of significance. A better understanding of the record of
existing guidelines should also help address the fundamental questions about
future guidelines: Do fair-use guidelines offer an appropriate standard for
copyright owners and users who must make frequent fair-use determinations?
What are the qualities or attributes of guidelines that make them successful or
unsuccessful in the context of fair-use applications? To facilitate the creation of
more effective guidelines and to better scrutinize guidelines that are offered to
universities and others for implementation, copyright owners and users alike need
a fresh look at, and a critical framework for, understanding guidelines.
Despite the weak platform from which guidelines are promoted, they
continue to have appeal in the marketplace simply because the unsettled nature of
fair use leaves many individuals uncomfortable with applying the law.40 The law
of fair use regularly leaves lawyers, judges, and the public in turmoil and debate
over its meaning and application. The U.S. Copyright Act now codifies broad
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASRUcTuRE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 83 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. The first meeting of
CONFU was held in September 1994, more than two years before issuance of the three
proposed guidelines in the CONFU INTERM REPORT, supra note 34. For the announcement of
the first CONFU meeting, see Conference on "Fair Use" and the National Information
Infrastructure (NI), 59 Fed. Reg. 46,823 (Sept. 12, 1994). The WHITE PAPER from 1995 added
this motivation for the CONFU participants: "Should the participants in the Conference on Fair
Use fail to agree on appropriate guidelines, the Working Group may conclude that the
importance of such guidelines may necessitate regulatory or legislative action in that area."
WHrrE PAPER, supra, at 84.
39 Readers should know that I participated in most of the meetings of CONFU on behalf
of Indiana University and the Indiana Partnership for Statewide Education. The experience
proved to be of utmost importance in reshaping my understanding of fair use and the role and
nature of guidelines. See Kenneth D. Crews, Electronic Reserves and Fair Use: The Outer
Limits of CONFU, 50 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. 1342 (1999); Kenneth D. Crews, What
Qualifies as "Fair Use"2, CHRON. HIGHER ED., May 17, 1996, at B1. Because the guidelines
for electronic reserves, on which this author focused considerable effort, were never formalized
and accepted by the CONFU participants, they are not included among the policies analyzed in
this article. For an overview of electronic reserves and associated copyright issues, see Steven J.
Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries, and Electronic Reserves, 92 L. Lm. J. 157 (2000).
40 During hearings that eventually led to enactment of the Copyright Revision Act of
1976, an attomey representing a coalition of educators stated: "What education needs is a
statute which will enable teachers easily to know when they can use copyrighted materials.
Proposed section 6 [on fair use] does not give this certainty, but means that a teacher in
preparing every single lesson must either consult a lawyer or act at her risk." STAFF OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5: 1964
REVISION BILL wITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 97 (Comm. Print 1965) (Statement of Harry
N. Rosenfield).
2001]
OHIO STATELA WJOURNAL
principles underlying fair use, but ultimately offers few details for understanding
its meaning in specific applications.41 Yet each day thousands of individuals
depend on fair use for the furtherance of education, research, and public service-
exactly the pursuits that the law was intended to support. But they may often
make their decisions based on speculation and erroneous information. Many
individuals also make decisions at their peril; articulations of fair use by
educators, librarians, researchers, and students are the object of hostile criticism
and even threats of litigation from groups representing copyright owners. The law
affords ample opportunity for reasonable people to differ widely about fair use,
but the law also gives copyright owners the ability to threaten lawsuits when
differing views are otherwise unresolved.
B. Perceptions of the Guidelines
In a lineage of diverse sources-from informal essays to institutional
policies-fair-use guidelines have been given a wide range of characterizations
and appellations. These descriptions have come from many diverse perspectives
and have continued from the inception of the first guidelines in 1976 through
today. These characterizations also reflect the complex relationship that the
guidelines have with the law, with the parties who created then, and with the
marketplace where difficult fair-use decisions occur. Those decisions need to be
made by individuals who may benefit from fair use or who may be adversely
affected by the exercise of fair use. The decisions also signal whether a copyright
owner may want to consider bringing an infringement action. The decisions
further indicate a great deal about the mutual relationships among copyright
owners and users and the terms on which they may find themselves agreeing to
co-exist in a complex environment of competing pressures and often opposing
ideals. Guidelines are specifically intended to shape those decisions. How one
understands and characterizes the guidelines, therefore, will consequently shape
the fair-use decision based upon them.
Part IV of this article will examine the validity of the many ways that the
guidelines have been perceived and characterized since their inception in 1976. In
broad terms, the guidelines have been described in terms of their relationship to
the law of fair use itself. If the guidelines bear no relationship to fair use law, they
are futile or perhaps even a fraud.42 In their strongest endorsement, they are
described as an accurate statement of fair use law. The "Uniform Preamble" to the
CONFU guidelines, for example, states: 'The purpose of these guidelines is to
41 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
42 See L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAWOFUSERS' RIGHTS, 8-9 (1991).
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provide guidance on the application of fair use principles... 43 The connection
to the law cannot be overlooked.
More often, the guidelines are portrayed as a "minimum" measure of fair use,
or are a "safe harbor" from infringement.44 The earliest guidelines, from 1976,
include a declaration that they "state the minimum and not the maximum
standards of educational fair use under section 107."45 In that regard, the
guidelines apparently offer a "safe harbor" from infiingement.4 6 On the other
hand, unless the guidelines are some statement of security from litigation, then
they are not even a minimum standard.47 Whether minimum, maximum, or
definitive, the various guidelines clearly claim to be some version of fair-use
law.48
If the guidelines are not about the law, they may instead define the private
relationship between parties to the guidelines themselves. The earliest of the
guidelines, the Classroom Guidelines, were formally entitled an "agreement," and
parties to the CONFU guidelines are described as "endorsers." 49 This language
suggests assent to terms, whether contractual or not. The guidelines perhaps have
been most significant in shaping institutional policy. In that regard, they may well
be binding on the parties that agree to accept them as standards of behavior for
members of an educational institution that uses the guidelines as formal policy.50
These possible perceptions of the guidelines only hint at the confusion that
surrounds them.
4 3 CONFrJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
44 See infra Part WA.2.
45 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68.
46 See infra Part IVA.2.
47 This particular clause in the preamble has been a point of serious contention among
CONFU participants. Some negotiators have understood it as a generous expression of
openness to possible fair use beyond the defined limits of the guidelines; as the CONFU
preamble does make explicit that something beyond the limits of the guidelines may still be fair
use. See CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-32. Other negotiators have seen the
language as an anchor on the flexibility of fair use, constantly pulling one back to the
gravitational center of the stated limits in the guidelines.
48 The concept of guidelines as minimum standards is discussed infra Part IVA.2. The
concept of guidelines as maximum standards is discussed infra Part IVA.3.
49 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4; see also infra note 431.
50 An analysis of fair-use policies at leading research universities revealed that
approximately eighty percent of the institutions incorporated some of the early guidelines into
their formal policy statements on fair use. KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND
THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSrrIES 73 (1993) (The Classroom Guidelines "are the foundation
for the policies at approximately eighty percent of the universities that address either classroom
or research copying."). See also id at 98 (Of the fifty-four policies addressing interlibrary loans
"all but eight are rooted in the CONTU Guidelines.").
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I1. FAIR-USE GUIDELINES FOR THE EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
ENVIRONMENT
A. Emergence ofFair-Use Guidelines (1935-1981)
Despite the essential relationship between fair use, educational institutions,
and libraries, remarkably little legislation or litigation has dealt with even the
most common examples of possible fair use, ranging from simple photocopying
to customary uses of the Internet.51 Given the relative void of true legal guidance,
stakeholders in the enterprise of teaching, learning, and librarianship have met
periodically during the last few decades to negotiate "guidelines" that attempt to
define an understanding of fair use as it may apply to frequently occurring
situations.52 Part II of this article will survey the origins and content of the
guidelines. Critical analysis of the relationship between the guidelines and the law
of fair use will be set forth in Parts IV and V.
1. Gentlemen's Agreement (1935)
The earliest example of such a fair-use guideline was the so-called
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1935 that identified instances of reproduction of
short copyrighted works that would be allowed under the law at that time.53 The
relatively simple standard was a response to the introduction of photographic and
other photo-duplication equipment in libraries.54 As technologies evolved in the
following decades, particularly with the growth of high-speed photocopying, the
51 The few cases that offer some insight for education or library applications do not
involve such nonprofit entities that are generally favored under fair use. See, e.g., Basic Books,
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (photocopying by a
for-profit copyshop).
52 For a list of the guidelines examined in this article, see supra note 4.
53 The Gentlemen's Agreement and the Problem of Copyright, 2 J. DOCUMENTARY
REPROD. 29, 31-33 (1939). See also Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, reprinted in
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY No. 14, § 11-12,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960) (suggesting that the Gentlemen's Agreement
revealed an intention by the publishing industry to regulate private activity and not to concede
common uses).
54 Previously, the controversy over fair use had focused on the lawfulness of making
manual transcriptions of articles and other research materials found in a library. See generally
R.R. Bowker, The National Library as the Central Factor of Library Development in the
Nation, 37 LIBR. L 3, 3-6 (1912). As recently as 1973, counsel to Williams & Wilkins Co., a
journal publishing company, suggested that a student who transcribes content of the journal for
research or study would be making a "technical infringement." Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciay, 93rd Cong., 152-53 (1973) (remarks of Arthur Greenbaum).
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debate over fair use shifted from isolated copies to multiple copies that more
likely held the risk of replacing purchases of copyrighted works. 55
2. Classroom Guidelines (1976)
The best known of all fair-use guidelines emerged in 1976, not coincidentally
in conjunction with the passage of the newly revised Copyright Act.56 For the
first time, the law embodied fair use in statutory terms, and not merely as a
judicial doctrine.57 To many copyright proprietors-particularly publishers-the
newly codified fair use was a challenge or even a threat 58 Although the new
statute was fundamentally unspecific and susceptible to broad interpretations, it
nevertheless made unequivocal that fair use would exist and could be raised in a
wide range of cases.59 The new statute also stated explicitly that fair use would
generally apply to educational uses, including multiple copies of protected works
for teaching purposes.60 The new law, as enacted in 1976, was astonishingly
simple in its reliance on four factors: the purpose of the use; the nature of the
work; the amount of the work used; and the effect of the use on the value of, or
the market for, the original work 61
For many educators, however, the new statute was uncomfortably vague,
demanding analyses of four factors on which even the most seasoned copyright
lawyers could not reach agreement.62 The legal interpretations and the possible
legal liabilities were daunting to the teachers, librarians, and administrators who
55 Other proposals for fair-use standards emerged in the intervening years, but with little
acceptance. For example, the American Library Association issued a "Reproduction of
Materials Code" in 1941. See Borge Varmer, Photoduplication of Copyrighted Material by
Libraries, reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY No.
15, COPYRIGrr LAwREvisiON 52-53 (Comm. Print 1960).
56 For the Copyright Act of 1976 as originally passed by Congress on October 19, see
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
57 Fair use in American copyright law originated in judicial rulings. Scholars generally
regard the doctrine as having originated in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901).
5 8 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 974-76 (1967) (remarks of
William M. Passano, president of the Williams & Wilkins Co.).
5 9 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-67 (1976).
60 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
61 Id.
62 Early in the process leading to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, educators urged
Congress to enact a fair-use law with specific provisions for permitted copying. Author and
publisher groups opposed specifics in the law, as did the U.S. Copyright Office. See Copyright
Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights, 89th
Cong. 27-28 (1965).
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found themselves needing to make responsible decisions that, they hoped, were in
conformity with the law.63 Even if they were inclined to take on the task the
nuances of fair use appeared demanding and time-consuming. Each new
situation, each new member of the faculty or staff, and each new report about
copyright developments could engender a raft of new questions, absorbing the
scarce time of educators. Most educators have little time or propensity for such
complexities, and copyright responsibilities should not be a burden on, or
distraction from, educational duties.64 Moreover, difficult decisions about fair use
are a steady reminder that erroneous decisions might expose instructors to legal
liabilities.
Yet, the reality was that copyright law set limits on the use of protected
works. In particular, the Copyright Act of 1976 granted to copyright owners
exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution of their works, along with
various other rights.65 Without a fair-use right, all copying of materials for the
simple pursuit of classroom handouts would be prohibited.66 The new fair-use
statute, however, allowed copies for teaching, but only within the limits of the
four factors. Educators were once again thrust into the unwelcome position of
needing to understand and apply the uncertain law.
From this apparent intrusion by copyright, and from the new uncertainty that
fair use seemed to represent, came a yearning for more specific guidance about
63 Educators expressed concerns about the challenge of fair-use decisions well before
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. In 1967, a representative of educator groups explained:
"Fair-use gives teachers and scholars no assurance of when copyrighted materials may be
copied, nor how much, nor under what specific circumstances." Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 122 (1965) (remarks of Harry N. Rosenfield). See also H.R. REP.
No. 90-83, at 30 (1967) (Educators "argued further that the doctrine of fair use alone is
insufficient to provide the certainty that teachers and other nonprofit educational users of
copyrighted material need for their own protection.). If the educator is incorrect about a fair-
use decision, and the activity is an infringement, the possible liabilities for copyright
infringement include: injunctions, impoundments, actual damages, statutory damages, attorney
fees and court costs, and even criminal penalties. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-06 (1994). For further
discussion of statutory damages, see infra text accompanying notes 441-48.
64 The burdens on individuals are the "transaction costs" of decisions about fair use, and
the guidelines have an intended function of reducing those costs. See Kenneth D. Salomon &
Michael J. Pierce, Commentary, Copyright Law and the Information Superhighway, 96 WEST's
EDUC. L. REP. 315,325 (1995).
65 Copyright owners in general have the exclusive rights to reproduce the works, to
distribute copies to the public, to make derivative works, and to make public displays and
performances. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). With respect to works of visual art,
the author has certain "moral rights," notably the right of attribution and integrity. 17 U.S.C. §
106A (1994). A "work of visual arV' is defined generally as paintings, sculpture, and some
photographs made in limited copies. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
66 Of course, theoretically, some other right under some other name could allow such
copying, but this discussion will adhere to the current law and its offerings.
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the law's meaning.67 Consequently, representatives of educators, authors, and
publishers met during the years prior to passage of the 1976 Act in order to
negotiate an understanding of the new law as applied specifically to multiple
photocopies of materials for classroom use.68 The product of those meetings was
the "Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit
Educational Institutions," also known as the "Classroom Guidelines. 6
9
The Classroom Guidelines are built on the premise that some photocopying
of materials for distribution to students is within fair use, but with limits. These
guidelines allow single copies of short items, such as an article or book chapter, to
be made by a teacher for research or class preparation. Multiple copies for
distribution, however, are subject to the rigorous limits of "brevity,"
"spontaneity," and "cumulative effect" Copies must include "a notice of
copyright"70 "Brevity" is a precise limit on the number of words that an
instructor may copy from each work; the user must literally count the words in the
original article, count the words in the excerpt for copying, and stay within
specified limits.71 "Spontaneity" means that the copying is at the instructor's
"instance and inspiration" and needs to be so close in time to classroom use '"hat
67 See Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 159-63 (1998) (tracing origins of the Classroom
Guidelines); Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at 144-45.
68 Much of the effort to complete the Classroom Guidelines came in the final months
leading to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, once Congress had made clear that it would
not enact a statute that detailed the law applicable to educational needs. Still, the parties did
meet early in the process to reach agreement, but without success until the brink of passage of
the act by Congress. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 618 (1967)
(remarks of Erwin C. Surrency).
69 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4.
7 0 The Classroom Guidelines do not explicitly state whether the notice must be the formal
copyright notice as appears on the original work, or whether it may be some general statement
about copyright and its applicability to the work. The debate over the form of notice was part of
the struggle over similar language in section 108(a) of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress recently clarified the matter by amending the statute to
provide that copies made under section 108 must include the formal notice as it appears on the
original. If no notice is on the original, the copy must include the general statement about
copyright. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 404, 112 Stat. 2860,
2889-90 (1998) (amending section 108(a) of the Copyright Act). Perhaps the logic of that
construct could be extended to the Classroom Guidelines.
71 For example, if an article is less than 2,500 words, the instructor may copy the entire
article. If it is more than 2,500 words, the instructor may copy only an excerpt of a length equal
to the lesser of either 1,000 words or ten percent of the work-although the excerpt may in any
event be at least 500 words in length, and the instructor may go a little over the limit to reach
the end of a "prose paragraph." Despite these rigors, one commentator has described the
Classroom Guidelines as allowing "fairly liberal photocopying for purposes of research and
scholarship." Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw out the
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403,411 n.18.
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it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission."72
"Cumulative effect" generally puts a cap on the number of works that may be
copied from an individual source.73 For example, during a single instructional
term, the teacher may copy only one article from a single author, or three articles
from a single collection or periodical, and no course shall include more than nine
instances of multiple copying during the term.
In addition to these three standards, the Classroom Guidelines also offer
"prohibitions."74 Even if the copying is scrupulously within the three conditions
of brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect, some activities are still forbidden
under the guidelines. For example, students may not be charged for the material
beyond the actual copying cost; the copying cannot substitute for a purchase of
books and other publications; a teacher may not copy the same material in more
than one term; and the copying "shall not be used to create or to replace or
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works. 75 The Classroom
Guidelines not only blatantly diverge from the four factors in the fair-use statute
and replace them with three different mandates, but also add blanket prohibitions
that cannot be overcome by any balancing of factors or equities.76 The guidelines
unquestionably displace the law with a standard that is a departure from the
statute in many respects.
The most common attraction of the guidelines is their promise of relative
certainty about fair use.77 Yet even an objective and generally supportive
discussion of the guidelines will often yield more questions about not only their
legal significance but also their factual applicability. Nimmer on Copyright gives
the Classroom Guidelines tremendous deference in the interpretation of fair use,78
but when attempting to explain their content, the treatise proceeds to question the
validity and consistency of the word limits and puzzles over the concept of
"special works,"79 calling it "very badly defined" and noting the logical flaws of
72 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69. See also Steven K. Barton, Comment and
Note, Felony Copyright Infringement in Schools, 1994 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 143, 154.
73 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69.
74 Id.
75Id.
76 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69-70. For an additional summary of criticisms
of the guidelines, see Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First
Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 617,637-39 (2001).
77 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68. See also Babiskin, supra note 14, at 223;
Mary R. Barry, Note, Multiple Photocopying by Educators and the Fair Use Doctrine: The
Court's Role in Reducing Transactions Costs, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 387,395.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 383-86.
79 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69 (defining "special works" as "[c]ertain works
in poetry, prose or in 'poetic prose' which often combine language with illustrations and which
are intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more general audience fall short of
2,500 words in their entirety").
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the treatment.80 The guidelines may well offer more certainty, but they still raise
their own questions and pose their own problems for application.
3. Music Guidelines (1976)
The apparent need for guidelines was not limited to simple classroom
copying, even upon the passage of the 1976 Act. A second set of guidelines,
addressing the copying of music for instructional purposes,81 was in the same
House Report that included the Classroom Guidelines. 82 These ' Music
Guidelines" focus on a few common situations that arise in the teaching of music.
They outline when teachers may copy sheet music for classroom performance, or
record and duplicate student performances of copyrighted music. 83
The Music Guidelines lack the highly detailed standards of the Classroom
Guidelines. For example, they allow "emergency copying" of music for an
"imminent performance," provided that the school or instructor purchases
replacement copies "in due course." 84 An instructor may copy excerpts of music
for "academic purposes other than performance." 85 The excerpt is not measured
strictly by quantity, but must be less than a "performable unif and not more than
ten percent of the entire work.86 Instructors may also record performances by
students and may make a single copy of an existing sound recording8 7 for
constructing aural exercises or examinations.88 These guidelines also include
80 4 NIMMERoN COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 13.05[E][3][c], n. 534.
81 Music Guidelines, supra note 4.
82 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976).
83 Id. at 70-71.
84 Id. at 71.
85Id.
86iad
87 Since the drafting of the Music Guidelines, Congress has enacted the Audio Home
Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), which generally bars copyright infringement actions
against individuals who use certain audio recording equipment to make copies of sound
recordings of musical works. In return, the music industry receives revenue from a "tax"
imposed on the sale of recording devices and materials. Consequently, the making of copies of
sound recordings may be perfectly lawful, within the narrow conditions of a single copy for
classroom use. While the Music Guidelines may have been a reasonable interpretation of fair
use in 1976, they may not reflect the broader rights of this particular use that current law allows.
See generally, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the AHRA exemption from liability does not apply to music files downloaded onto
computer drives).
88 In a most revealing twist, the Music Guidelines add parenthetically this statement to the
provision allowing copies of sound recordings: "This pertains only to the copyright of the music
itself and not to any copyright which may exist in the sound recording." Supra note 4, at 71.
One can only surmise that negotiations leading to the guidelines included participation from
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"prohibitions" similar to the ones found in the Classroom Guidelines. 89 Like the
Classroom Guidelines, these guidelines make no pretence of relating the detailed
standard of fair use to the four factors in the law. While they may not be as
meticulous as the Classroom Guidelines in their measurement of fair use, they
still stray far from the law's flexibility.
4. Off-Air Videotaping Guidelines (1981)
In addition to the classroom handouts and music copies, one more set of
guidelines was in preparation in 1976, but the House Report duly noted that it was
not yet ready for final approval and publication.90 Not until 1981 did the parties
negotiating these guidelines reach a conclusion91 and issue the "Guidelines for
representatives of the owners of compositions, and not participation by representatives of the
recording artists. For a study of the creation of these guidelines, with confirmation of the
perhaps incomplete representation in the drafting, see Barbara L. Bell, The Controversy Over
Establishing Fair Use Guidelines for Off-Air Videotaping for Educational Uses: A Case Study
of Attempts to Formulate Policy 170-77 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University) (on file with the Indiana University Education Library).89 One of the prohibitions in the Music Guidelines provides that all copies must include
"the copyright notice which appears on the printed copy." Supra note 4, at 71. Unlike the
Classroom Guidelines, this standard clarifies that the notice must be the formal notice, and not a
general statement of copyright. See supra note 70.90 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 71-72 (1976).
91 After passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, negotiators continued to meet, notably in a
four-day session during July 1977, to draft guidelines. That effort broke down and needed to be
reinvigorated in congressional hearings nearly two years later. See Off-Air Taping for
Educational Use: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, 96th Cong. 2 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier).
Apparently causing much of the delay was the reluctance of the motion picture industry,
notably the Motion Picture Association of America, to endorse the guidelines that would allow
some off-air taping of its works. During the protracted negotiations, congressional hearings
attempted to advance the effort, and an officer of the MPAA made this broad statement: "And
quite frankly, it is the view of the motion picture companies that the taping of entire copyrighted
works off the air is an infringement and not a fair use." Id at 32 (remarks of James Bouras).
The MPAA never did endorse the Off-Air Guidelines. Not long after issuance of the guidelines
in 1981, prominent members of the MPAA filed a lawsuit against Sony Corporation, asserting
that its manufacture and sale of home videorecording devices was contributory infringement.
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,432 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The U.S.
Supreme Court eventually ruled in that case that home recording of off-air broadcasts was fair
use. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,455 (1984). At the time,
the MPAA may well have acted in its own appropriate self-interest by not endorsing guidelines
that could weaken, however slightly, its infringement claim that it was soon to assert. In
retrospect, the decision to file that lawsuit has been heavily criticized as short-sighted, with
analysts pointing to the rapid growth of the motion picture industry and revenues following the
widespread consumer acceptance of videocassette recorders. See generally, JAMBS LARDNER,
FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND TBE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 284-85
(1987).
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Off-Air Recording of Broadcast Programming for Educational Purposes."9 2
Better known as the "Off-Air Guidelines," this standard would, in general, allow
a teacher to record, off-the-air, a television broadcast for later use or
"performance" in classroom teaching. The instructor could use the tape in the
classroom on only one occasion93 and then only during the first ten school days
during the forty-five calendar days following the date of the transmission and
copying.94 Any repeat or later use would require permission.95
The Off-Air Guidelines differ in some important respects from the other
guidelines, but they also share some common traits. Like the others, these
guidelines are not built explicitly on the four statutory factors. Elements of the
guidelines may well be relevant to satisfaction of the factors, but the guidelines do
little if anything to make the connection to the language of the law. Unlike many
other standards, the Off-Air Guidelines are not as unrelentingly precise in their
measure of fair use. The guidelines are specific about the span of days during
which the recording may be used, but the guidelines do not place exacting limits
on the quantity of the broadcast that may be either recorded or used. Indeed, the
guidelines allow the teacher to record and use the entire televised work In that
regard, the Off-Air Guidelines may be easier to apply and more palatable than
some of the other standards, but those differences do not necessarily tell whether
they are a more accurate statement of fair-use law.
5. Overview of the Early Guidelines
The Classroom Guidelines, the Music Guidelines, and the Off-Air Guidelines
have much in common with one another. They were developed through voluntary
negotiations among diverse stakeholders, often representing copyright owners,
publishers, educators, librarians, and others.96 Each set of guidelines was
92 Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8-9
93 Id. Repeat use is allowed only once and "only when instructional reinforcement is
necessary."
94 Id
95 Id.
96 For the Classroom Guidelines, members of the negotiating team included: Ad Hoe
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision; the
Authors League of America, Inc.; and the Association of American Publishers, Inc. For the
Music Guidelines, members included: Music Publishers' Association of the United States, Inc.;
National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.; Music Teachers National Association; Music
Educators National Conference; National Association of Schools of Music; and the Ad Hoc
Committee on Copyright Law Revision. For the Off-Air Guidelines, members included the
Agency for Instructional Television; Association of Media Producers; Motion Picture
Association of America; American Library Association; National Education Association;
Association for Educational Communications and Technology, Authors League of America;
Screen Actors Guild, Joint Council on Educational Communications; Directors Guild of
America; Association of American Publishers; National Association of Broadcasters; Public
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delivered to Congress, and the committee reports included favorable observations
and lent important credibility to the guidelines as reasonable, if not positive,
developments consistent with the law that Congress had actually made.97 Those
comments appear in congressional reports and other official publications, lending
the appearance of "official" approval to the guidelinesY8 The legal community
will undoubtedly recognize that publication in a report does not make the
guidelines "law." Yet the larger public is not prepared to grasp or appreciate the
distinction, often leading to a conclusion that the guidelines are accepted by
Congress and therefore must be accepted by the American public in its quest to
understand fair use. Moreover, none of the guidelines exhibits any relationship to
the statutory definition of fair use; none is built on the four factors that Congress
and the courts have laid down as the actual measure of lawful activity.99
B. CONTU: The National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (1979)
1. Origins of the CONTU Guidelines
A fourth set of early guidelines emerged under considerably different
conditions. When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress also
recognized that the law was flexible to meet new technologies, but had not
specifically addressed the looming demands of computers and large-scale
photocopying.100 To begin a close examination of the new law, Congress
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) and authorized it to make recommendations for revising and
implementing the new law.1° I
Broadcasting Service; American Council on Education; National School Boards Association;
Writers Guild of America, East; American Federation of Television and Radio Artists; ABC;
and CBS.
97 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at72 (1976):
Teachers will know that copying within the guidelines is fair use. Thus, the guidelines
serve the purpose of fulfilling the need for greater certainty and protection for teachers. The
Committee expresses the hope that if there are areas where standards other than these guidelines
may be appropriate, the parties will continue their efforts to provide additional specific
guidelines in the same spirit of good will.
98 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) ("The Committee believes the guidelines
are a reasonable interpretation of minimum standards of fair use").
9 9 See infra text accompanying notes 367-77.
10 0 See 120 CONG. REC. 30, 516 (1974) (remarks of Sen. McClellan, recognizing that
there would be new "copyright issues ... arising from the development of new technology.").
101 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-5. See Pub. L. No. 93-573 (1974).
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One provision of the Copyright Act that CONTU confronted was section
108(g)(2), which provided for qualified libraries10 2 to engage in the making and
distribution of photocopied materials in furtherance of "interlibrary
arrangements," or loans. The new law allowed libraries to make copies of some
works to meet the research and study needs of individual users. 103 Those copies
may also be sent to users at other libraries who request the copies.104 When
making those copies for distribution as interlibrary loans, however, the law
establishes further conditions. In general, section 108 prohibits any "systematic"
copying-which could be multiple copies sent through interlibrary loans-but the
law nevertheless allows interlibrary arrangements:
The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section extend to the
isolated and unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of
the same material on separate occasions, but do not extend to cases where the library
or archives, or its employee-
engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of single or multiple
copies or phonorecords of material... : Provided, That nothing in this clause
prevents a library or archives from participating in interlibrary arrangements that do
not have, as their purpose or effect, that the library or archives receiving such copies
or phonorecords for distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute
for a subscription to or purchase of such work 105
In its final report, issued in 1979, CONTU offered guidelines for interpreting
that statutory standard, at least with respect to copies of recent periodical articles,
the mainstay of many interlibrary-loan operations. Under the CONTU Guidelines,
libraries are allowed to receive from another library, during a calendar year, up to
five copies of articles from the most recent five years of issues of a single
journal.106 Under that standard, receipt of a sixth article in a year would imply a
sufficient demand for that periodical such that the receiving library may be
relying on interlibrary arrangements that substitute for a subscription to the
work.10 7 Many libraries use the guidelines to evaluate the need to purchase a
subscription, or upon reaching the sixth copy begin to seek permission for making
1027Te statute specifies, in particular, that for a library to have the benefits under section
108, it must be "open to the public" or at least not limited exclusively to users who are affiliated
with the library or its parent institution. 17 U.S.C. § 108(aX2) (1994). Most public libraries and
academicIibraries will likely meet this requirement. Private or corporate libraries maynot.
103 For example, the library may make copies of chapters of books and articles under
some conditions, and may even copy an entire book or other lengthy work under more rigorous
conditions. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(d)-(e) (1994).104 Id.
105 17 U.S.C. § 108(g) (1994).
106 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 55-56.
107 Id. at 56.
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additional copies or decide to pay a fee to a service such as the Copyright
Clearance Center.1 08
2. Distinctive Traits of the CONTU Guidelines
The CONTU Guidelines are not truly "fair-use" guidelines; they are not an
interpretation of section 107 of the Copyright Act. Nevertheless, they are closely
aligned with the other guidelines, and section 108 is also deployed in libraries and
educational institutions alongside section 107, often to facilitate similar services
in fulfillment of education and research needs. Yet these guidelines are in other
respects fundamentally different from the three other standards. First, while the
CONTU Guidelines are the outgrowth of a congressional commission, the fair-
use guidelines are the product of negotiations among interested parties. This
difference is critical in many respects.
Voluntary negotiations have intrinsic limits. The parties who are most likely
to attend are the ones perceiving the most immediate concern about the issue-
often the parties with the greatest financial stake. The parties may also be the ones
with the financial wherewithal to attend negotiating sessions at all. Voluntary
negotiations also mean that the outcome has the potential of being skewed by an
imbalance of representation among the diverse perspectives, or even the absence
of some points of view.109 By contrast, the appointment of commissioners to a
limited number of positions holds the prospect that the major views on copyright
matters will be represented and balanced. Appointment to a federal commission
may also imbue each individual with a greater sense of public service, perhaps
with an objective of serving the greater good, and not the short-term demands of
the company or organization that may be paying the travel costs and daily
wages-or hourly billings-of each negotiator.
1 0 8 GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 7, at 54-55 (outlining several alternatives for libraries
upon reaching the limits of the guidelines). A study in 1983 determined that more than forty
percent of academic libraries that fulfilled interlibrary-loan requests had refused to fulfill user's
requests for copyright reasons, and more than thirty percent of those libraries refused to fill
some requests received from other libraries for copyright reasons. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17
U.S.C. § 108) (1983), app. I, at 1-6. For more information about the Copyright Clearance
Center, see: http://www.copyright.com (last visited April 4,2001).
109 For example, during the CONFU negotiations, see infra text accompanying notes
116-51, educators complained of being "outgunned." See Robert L. Jacobson, Furor over
"Fair Use:" Educators Seem Outgunned in Negotiations with Copyright Owners, 42 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 10, 1996, at A25, and subsequent letters to the editor, 42 CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., June 14, 1996, at B4. The court in the Kinko's decision was not inclined to evaluate
retrospectively the process for formulating the Classroom Guidelines once they had
congressional support. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See infira Part m1A.2.
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A second distinction of the CONTU Guidelines is their substantive measure
of legal rights of use. Whatever the ambiguities of the law, these guidelines set a
standard that is relatively easy for a library to implement and that allows the
library to deliver a meaningful quantity of material to the patron who requested
it.110 The Classroom Guidelines would have educators count words before
copying for some uses; the Music Guidelines refer to copies of ten percent of
some works. By contrast the CONTU Guidelines are based on a useful unit of
intellectual content-a journal article-without the need to count words or define
some other disruptive sub-unit in order to claim a rightful exercise of fair use.111
The CONTU Guidelines differ from other guidelines in a third respect: their
foundation in a judicial decision.11 2 This article will look closely at court cases
which have referred to the various fair-use guidelines following their
development and issuance.11 3 Those cases, of course, arose after issuance of the
guidelines. Negotiators of those guidelines did not have the benefit of insight
from direct court rulings. By contrast, the CONTU Guidelines emerged from
practices that were in fact devised and implemented at a major research library
and that were later scrutinized and judged in the course of litigation against that
library.114 The effort to create the CONTU Guidelines was directly aided by the
views of judges who ruled on the critical issues and scrutinized a library's
practices; the CONTU commissioners had the benefit of knowing what other
judges would likely allow to pass muster under a fair-use analysis.115
110 Several early studies indicated that the CONTU Guidelines were not necessarily a
serious limit on library services. See, e.g, Dale R. Middleton, Predicting the Impact of
Copyright Specifications on Interlibrary Borrowing, 65 BuLL. MED. LIR. ASSOC. 449 (1977);
John Steuben, Interlibrary Loan of Photocopies ofArticles under the New Copyright Law, 70
SPEC. LmR. 227 (1979); Johanna E. Tallman, One Year's Experience with CONTU Guidelines
for Interlibrary Loan Photocopies, 5 J. ACAD. LiBR. 71 (1979).
111 Similarly, the Off-Air Guidelines do allow copies of entire broadcasts. See Off-Air
Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8 ("A broadcast program may be recorded off-air .... 'Broadcast
programs' are television programs transmitted by television stations for reception by the general
public without charges.").
112 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973).
1 13 See infra Part H.
1 14 For a discussion of that litigation that led to the CONTU Guidelines, see infra Part
m.C.
1 15 Although the CONTU Guidelines closely parallel the copying that was sanctioned in
the Williams & Wilkins decision, the report from CONTU that offered the guidelines
surprisingly does not analyze that case. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 52-75
(examining the issues surrounding library photocopying). The report does mention the case
only in a brief footnote with respect to growing concerns about copyright in the late 1960s.
CONTU FNAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 5 n.14.
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C. CONFU. The Conference on Fair Use (1994-1998)
1. Background and Purposes of CONFU
The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) was an informal gathering of
interested parties, convening at the behest and encouragement of government
officials.116 The genesis of CONFU lies in a draft report, known as the "Green
Paper," of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the Information
Infrastructure Task Force (IrF).1 17 That task force was an assembly of federal
officials, business executives, and representatives of various nongovernmental
organizations. 118 Each member presumably brought some combination of
expertise and representation of diverse interests in the outcome of the IITF. In its
Green Paper, issued in July 1994, the Working Group outlined and summarized a
wide range of copyright and related issues affecting the expansion of digital
commerce and communication.119 One of those issues of major concern was fair
use.120
The Green Paper summarized the law of fair use and addressed problems
raised with the application of existing law to the needs and circumstances of
digital technology.121 New technologies were creating a new environment where
copyright protected materials may be easily used in the name of fair use but may
be extensively reproduced and disseminated beyond the limits of the law.1 22
Rather than propose legislation, as the report did with respect to other issues,123
the Green Paper instead made this proposition: "Terefore, the Working Group
will sponsor a conference to bring together copyright owner and user interests to
develop guidelines for fair uses of copyrighted works by and in public libraries
and schools." 124
116 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134.
117 Id
118 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1993). IITF's chair is the Secretary of
Commerce; at the time it was the late Ronald H. Brown. See TE's website,
http/www.iitf.nist.gov (last visited April 4,2001).
119 Green Paper, supra note 38, at 120-39.
120 Id. at 133.
121 Id. at 45-53.
122 Id. at 134.
123 For example, the GREEN PAPER included proposals for legislation on issues such as
transmission and the expansion of the distribution right, the meaning of publication, and the
applicability of the first-sale doctrine. See id. at 120-33.
124 Id. at 134.
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CONFU held its first meeting on September 21, 1994, in Washington, D.C.,
under the direction of an official from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.125
Meetings occurred on a frequent basis--often monthly-with approximately
forty individuals regularly participating in most meetings. Most of those
participants were from the publishing industries, educational organizations, and
library associations. 126 Many other individuals attended less regularly. In
September, 1995 the Working Group issued its final report, known as the "White
Paper."'1 27 It provided this summary of developments after a year of CONFU
meetings:
To date, no formal guidelines have been the subject of agreement, but it appears
reasonable to anticipate that drafts now in preparation may be formalized as
guidelines before the end of 1995....
Should the participants in the Conference on Fair Use fail to agree on appropriate
guidelines, the Working Group may conclude that the importance of such guidelines
may necessitate regulatory or legislative action in that area.128
Not until September 1997 did the work of CONFU progress to the stage of
having draft guidelines ready for broad, public distribution.129 An interim report
included "proposals" for guidelines on three topics: multimedia development the
use of digital images, and the transmission of works through distance learning.130
A year later, in December 1998, the final report from CONFU included the same
three sets of interpretive guidelines. 131 During that year, however, the public was
invited to review the proposals and to indicate support or opposition to them.132
That process revealed sharp divisions among the interested parties. 133 Many
of the commercial publishers, for example, generally supported the guidelines.
Many of the organizations representing educational institutions and libraries
125 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. The individual who originally led the
meetings was Christopher A. Meyer. He left the PTO in July 1995 and was replaced by Peter
Fowler. Id. at 6. Their public duties were generally confined to convening the meetings,
distributing announcements, and preparing progress reports. Outside public view, these
individuals mediated sensitive discussions and balanced competing pressures, particularly as the
final report took shape. As the drafter of the final report, Mr. Fowler was especially influential
in determining the outcome of CONFU.126 See Conference on Fair Use Participants, CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 19.
127 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38.
128 Id at 83-84.
129 CONFU INTERIM REPORT, supra note 34.
130 Id. at 35-64.
131 Id. at 33-59.
132 Ia at 14.
133 Id. at 18 ("Some participants opposed the process, as well as the results, while others
strongly supported both. Others strongly supported the process, but determined that they could
not, or would not, support the results.").
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opposed the guidelines. 134 None of the guidelines had anything approaching
unanimous support.135 In fact, the Digital-Images Guidelines received nearly no
support. By contast, the earlier guidelines from the 1970s and 1980s had support
from nearly all the parties who expressed an interest; 136 few parties openly
opposed them when they were issued.137 The CONFU guidelines, however,
stirred sharp opposition from many prominent groups. Still, they gained support
from many other groups and even from governmental agencies.
CONFU was an effort to bring diverse groups together to reach a mutual
resolution of major issues of fair use. 138 The outcome of the effort, by contrast,
revealed deep division in the participants' understanding of fair use.13 9
Anticipating that division and the resistance of some parties to adopt the
guidelines, the CONFU report labeled them as "proposals" for guidelines. 140
Apparently they would move beyond a "proposal" status only with some
unspecified future action-perhaps further action by the government or perhaps
by the individuals or organizations that might adopt the guidelines as the
appropriate standard for application.
CONFU also had substantive limits. The original, self-imposed agenda called
for discussion and possible guidelines on numerous topics.141 In the end, only
three proposals for guidelines on fair use emerged from the process.' 42 The other
topics fell aside for different reasons.143 Some topics were dropped because
influential participants insisted. For example, one topic was the fair use of
printing or downloading a single copy of an item found on the Interet for
personal use or study. The Association of American Publishers objected sharply
to any discussion that could lead to identifying fair use of such activity,
explaining that it was reserving the right to monitor and charge fees for such
uses.144 The topic fell off the agenda.' 45 Topics such as "browsing" proved to be
134 Heather Florence, Copyright Reform and Licensing Practice, 557 PLI/PAT 123, 266-
67(1999).
135 lingspom, supra note 1, at 114 (referring to the failure of CONFU to meet its goals).
13 6 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 67,70 (1976).
137 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) (noting opposition by the American
Association of University Professors and the Association of American Law Schools to the
Classroom Guidelines).
138 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134.
139 CONFJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
140I Jjat 10.
141 Id. at 27 (listing twenty-one topics, ranging from "what is a classroom" and "what is a
library" to encryption, transient copying, permissions, and purpose of fair use).
142 Digital-Images Guidelines, Distance-Leaming Guidelines, and Multimedia Guidelines,
see supra note 4, and infra Part II.C.2-4.
143 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
144 The present author attended most of the CONFU meetings, and these statements from
the AAP representative are from the author's notes of the meeting.
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too nebulous for the group to define and comprehend consistently.146 The use of
software in libraries was addressed in alternative terms; the issues were not
strictly fair use, but rather arose under relatively clearly defined statutory
provisions of sections 108 and 109 of the Copyright Act.147
The important issues of fair use related to making materials available in
electronic-reserve systems and through interlibrary loan moved significantly
toward draft guidelines, 148 but the effort did not yield finished documents that
were brought into the final CONFU report by consensus of the participants. 149
The failure of CONFU to elaborate on numerous topics or to formally adopt draft
standards on a few critical issues reveals various limits in the dynamics of
CONFU.150 Some fair-use issues were apparently too unsettled or relatively
unimportant; other issues were too contentious or perhaps simply too important to
engender meaningful concession and compromise as is necessary in successful
negotiations.151
145 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 ('Topic deemed inappropriate for
guidelines.").
146 Id ("Given concerns over terminology, CONFU agreed not to proceed with a
statement").
147 Id. at 17 ("[l]t was generally agreed by CONFU participants that, since the scenarios
developed by the working group clearly illustrated the general rules and how particular uses of
computer program software in libraries either complied with or violated the Copyright Act,
there was no need to draft separate guidelines"). See also Statement on Use of Copyrighted
Computer Programs (Software) in Libraries-Scenarios, CONFU FINAL REPORT, id., at 61-65.
148 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 (For electronic reserves, "CONFU could
not proceed with guidelines;" for interlibrary loan, document delivery, and electronic document
sharing, the 'Working Group agreed that it was premature to draft guidelines for digital
transmission of digital documents.").
14 9 CONFU operated without any explicit or clear procedures, but rather by consensus.
No one can say with any definitiveness whether guidelines are in or out of the report with
support from a majority or from any set of influential participants. The present author was
involved in efforts to develop guidelines for electronic resources. For this author's views on the
failure of CONFU to formalize those guidelines, see Crews, Electronic Reserves, supra note 39.
150 One study puts the reason for the failure of CONFU more bluntly-
Nearly three years and thousands of dollars and human hours later, the parties could not
come to a consensus on guidelines in any of the areas. One explanation for the impasse was that
academics and other educational users of copyrighted information felt the proposed guidelines
were too restrictive (preferring the uncertainty of the law and the four-prong test to the proposed
guidelines), while publishers seemed to believe they were being asked to relinquish more
control over the use of their materials in the context of fair use than was desirable.
Stephan I. Colbert & Oren R. Griffin, The Impact of "Fair Use" in the Higher Education
Community: A Necessary Exception?, 62 ALB. L. REV. 437,456 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
151 Several studies have examined the basic factual background of CONFU and
summarized the features of the proposed guidelines. See, e.g., Kent D. Stuckey, Internet and
Online Law, 526 PLI/PAT 419, 546 (1998); Needham J. Boddie, II, et al., A Review of
Copyright and the Internet, 20 CAMrBELL L. REV. 193, 246-259 (1998).
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2. Multimedia Guidelines
These guidelines, formally entitled "Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for
Educational Multimedia,"1 52 apply to the digital "cutting and pasting" of various
works to make a unified multimedia project for use in the classroom setting.153
They evolved through the deliberations of CONFU meetings, but they also took
shape in a parallel set of meetings, with many of the same participants, organized
and hosted by the Consortium of College and University of Media Centers
(CCUMC). 154 These guidelines were not the exclusive domain of CONFU
simply because the CCUMC began the process of developing them at an earlier
date. 155 They were soon brought within the purview of CONFU. 156
The CCUMC openly explored the prospect of such guidelines at a public
conference held in Washington in June 1994.157 Again, diverse parties with
diverse interests in the outcome attended to discuss possible fair-use guidelines.
CCUMC largely represents directors of media centers from educational
institutions around the country, and they expressed serious concerns about the
pressures they faced to utilize media technology for educational purposes in ways
that raise troublesome questions about fair use and copyright infringement. They
often felt caught between expectations of faculty members who seek greatest
utility of technology, and the threat of legal liability to third-party copyright
owners. The guidelines were an effort to mediate that tension.
Working closely with representatives from industries in the fields of print
publication, music, video, and motion pictures, the CCUMC led the effort to
devise the guidelines. 158 They were also explicitly seeking to follow, in many
respects, the model of the Classroom Guidelines and other earlier standards. 159
After more than two years, the guidelines took a completed shape that many of
the participants were prepared to endorse.160 The finished document is a lengthy
152 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 49.
15 3 Id. at 50. CONFU offered this definition of a multimedia work. "In general,
multimedia projects are stand-alone, interactive programs incorporating both original and pre-
existing copyrighted works in various media formats." Id.
154 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
155 Id.
15 6 Id. at 14-15.
157 See AGENCY FOR INSTRUCIONAL TECHNOLOGY & CONSORTIUM OF COLLEGE AND
UNIVERsITY MEDIA CENTERS, WHAT'S FAmr? A REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EDUCATIONAL FAIR ACCFss AND THE NEw MEDIA, (Washington,
D.C., June 15-17, 1994).
158 CONFU FiNAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
159 Id. at 6 ("Participants were encouraged to follow the example of previous successful
efforts to develop voluntary fair use guidelines-the Classroom Guidelines in 1976, and the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works.").
160 Id. at 15.
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and detailed attempt to define with utmost precision the parameters of fair use as
applied to the wide-ranging activities and materials used in the name of
multimedia development for educational purposes.161 As with all of the
guidelines examined in this article, the Multimedia Guidelines are explicitly
applicable only to non-profit educational uses.162 That limit is rigidly defined in
this document and confined to curriculum-based uses at institutions that have
education as a primary mission.163 By implication, fair use does not apply, or
does not apply as broadly, to other uses or to uses in other organizations.164
Central to these guidelines are the "portion limitations" for each type of
work 165 A multimedia work may be an assemblage of text, images, sound, and
other materials "cut and pasted" in digital form onto a single disk or other storage
unit.166 Each of these types of works has its own limit in allowed quantity.167 For
example, clips of text are limited to the lesser of either one thousand words or ten
percent of the original work 168 Sound clips are limited to the lesser of either
161 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 51. Under the Multimedia Guidelines,
educational multimedia projects "incorporate students' or educators' original material such as
course notes or commentary, together with various copyrighted media formats including but not
limited to, motion media, music, text material, graphics, illustrations, photographs and digital
software which are combined into an integrated presentation."
162 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 32. The Preamble, uniform to all CONFU
guidelines, establishes that "these guidelines do not cover non-educational or commercial
digitization or use at anytime, even by non-profit educational institutions:'
163 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 51. "Educational multimedia
projects... under these guidelines may be used only for educational purposes in systematic
learning activities including use in connection with non-commercial curriculum-based learning
and teaching activities." Also, "educational institutions are defined as nonprofit organizations
whose primary focus is supporting research and instructional activities of educators and
students for noncommercial purposes."
164 But see, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (stating that "the works and uses to
which the doctrine of fair use is applicable are as broad as the copyright law itself').
165 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 53 ("Portion limitations mean the amount of a
copyrighted work that can reasonably be used... regardless of the original medium from which
the copyrighted works are taken").
166 Id. at50.
167 Id at 53. "In the aggregate means the total amount of copyrighted material from a
single copyrighted work that is permitted to be used in an educational multimedia project
without permission under these guidelines. These limitations apply cumulatively.., for the
same academic semester, cycle or term." Id
168 Id at 53. For poems, other limitations apply:
An entire poem of less than 250 words may be used, but no more than three poems by one poet,
or five poems by different poets from any anthology... For poems of greater length, 250
words may be used but no more than three excerpts by a poet, or five excerpts by different poets
from a single anthology.
Id. at 54.
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thirty seconds or ten percent.169 A multimedia project may utilize only thirty
seconds of a lengthy symphony or only eighteen seconds of a three-minute
popular song.170
Even while staying within these parameters, the instructor or student who
prepares the work is subject to numerous other conditions. For example, the
project may be retained and used for only two years,171 although it may be part of
the individual's portfolio for employment purposes.' 72 Many uses beyond the
limits in the guidelines explicitly require permission 173-analogous to the
'"prohibitions" in the Classroom Guidelines174-even though the preamble to the
guidelines indicates that they are "minimum" standards and that additional uses
may be allowed under the law.175
3. Distance-Learning Guidelines
The Distance-Leaming Guidelines addressed an especially challenging
interrelationship between fair use and the distance-learning provisions of section
110(2) of the Copyright Act.176 The statute allows the transmission of displays
and performances of copyrighted works, but only within sharp limitations.177
First, the law sets "ground rules" for the use of works under any circumstances; in
particular, the content of the course may be communicated to classrooms or other
places "devoted to instruction."'178 The transmission may reach students at other
locations-such as home or work-but only if their "disabilities or other special
circumstances 179 prevent their coming to the classroom. Once complying with
these conditions, the law allows displays of all works, but allows performances of
169 Id. at54.
170Id
171 Id. at 53.
172 Id- at52.
173 Id at 55.
174 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69-70.
175 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 50.
176 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1994). For a critical examination of the current state of section
10(2) and of a proposal from the United States Copyright Office to revise it, see Kenneth D.
Crews, Distance Education and Copyright Law: The Limits and Meaning of Copyright Policy,
27 J.C. & U.L. 15(2000).
177 Section 110(2) allows the transmission of only select types of copyrighted works in
distance learning. The statute allows "displays" of all types of works, but it allows the
"performance" of only nondramatic literay works and nondramatic musical works. 17 U.S.C. §
110(2) (1994). By contrast, section 110(1) allows performances and displays in the context of
"face-to-face" teaching, and it sets no limits on the types of allowed works. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)
(1994).
178 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994).
179 § 110(2)(C)(ii) (1994).
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only "nondramatic"180 musical or literary works. Audiovisual works are not
allowed at all in transmissions for distance learning.181
The guidelines from CONFU were an attempt to use the terms of section 107
on fair use to reach beyond the rigors of section 110(2).182 Fundamentally, the
guidelines are a deliberate move away from the troublesome delineation between
works that are allowed and not allowed in distance learning.183 The guidelines
drop the classification of "dramatic" and 'nondramatic" works and the ban on
audiovisual works, but the guidelines allow the broadening of works only on
secured transmissions, and generally only for live or "synchronous" transmissions
of the instructional experience. 184 Only enrolled students at nonprofit educational
institutions who are receiving the content at permitted locations where further
reproduction may be controlled may receive these transmissions. 185 Moreover,
the guidelines allow only a single use of each work by each instructor, any repeat
use for future classes requires permission. 186 Within these conditions, the
instructor may display or perform the entire work-which includes showing an
entire videotape to the class.187
"Asynchronous" transmissions-often where the material resides on a
computer server or other device and may be accessed by the students at their
discretion-proved to be highly problematic for the negotiators. Publishers and
other copyright owners expressed deep concern about the possibility that students
would be able to download and further reproduce or disseminate the materials,
thereby circumventing passwords or other restrictions on access and undercutting
markets for the materials.188 These guidelines from CONFU do not rule out that
180 § 110(2) (1994).
181 § 101 (1994) (defining "literary work' to exclude audiovisual works).
182 Section 110(2) of the Copyright Act sets highly problematic and restrictive limits on
the use of copyrighted works in distance learning. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright and
Distance Education: Displays, Performances, and the Limitations of Current Law, in
GASAWAY, GROWING PAINS, supra note 7, at 377,393-94.
183 Distance-Leaming Guidelines, supra note 4, at 44-45.
18 4 Id at46.
185 Id at 46-47.
186 Id. at 46 ('For subsequent performances, displays or access, permission must be
obtained."). Cf Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8 (allowing single performance of a
videotape recorded "by individual teachers in the course of relevant teaching activities, and
repeated once only when instructional reinforcement is necessary').
187 Distance-Learing Guidelines, supra note 4, at 46. "Works performed must be
integrated into the course, must be part of systematic instruction and must be directly related
and of material assistance to the teaching content of the transmission. The performance maynot
be for entertainment purposes." In addition, "[p]erformance of an entire copyrighted work or a
large portion thereof may be transmitted only once for a distance learning course." Id
188 This concern as a practical matter is likelyto grow in the future as technology evolves.
It may well be addressed, however, in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which creates a
new federal offense for the circumvention of technological measures that protect copyrighted
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fair use may apply to asynchronous transmissions, but they openly acknowledge
that the parties were simply unprepared to reach agreement at that time.189
4. Digital-Images Guidelines
The Digital-Images Guidelines are perhaps the most awkward of all the
guidelines to emerge from CONFU.190 They are set forth in a lengthy document
that seeks at its core to articulate when a library or educational institution may
make a digital version of a photograph or other image and make it available for
teaching and research.191 While this subject may appear to be relatively focused
in its scope, the legal issues actually became extraordinarily intertangled. The
result is a complex and convoluted set of guidelines.
The use of visual images poses distinct challenges for applying fair use.192
The use will most likely require the entire work, a fact that most often weighs
against fair use. 193 A photograph may also be a highly creative work, which also
works. Thus, the college or university may transmit content, but impose passvords as a
condition of access. Defeating or circumventing such measures may be a new form of federal
offense that gives rise to civil and criminal penalties. Copyright owners strongly supported that
legislation in order to give added assurance that their materials would be better protected in a
digital environment. Thus, this new legal protection should allow greater assurance of
protection when applied in the distance-learning context to control use and prevent misuses of
content. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). For an
examination of events leading to development of the Distance-Learning Guidelines and the
critical attacks on them, see Laura N. Gasaway, Guidelines for Distance Learning and
InterlibraryLoan: Doomed and More Doomed, 50 J. AM. SOc'YFORINFO. ScI. 1337 (1999).
189 Distance-Leaming Guidelines, supra note 4, at 45. "Although the participants believe
fair use of copyrighted works applies in some aspects of [asynchronous delivery of distance
learning], they did not develop fair use guidelines to cover these situations because the area is so
unsettled.' Id. True, these developments in distance learning are "unsettled," but they are not
likely to become any more settled in the near future. This stated reason for not addressing
asynchronous distance learning likely conceals more realistic reasons: it poses too large a risk to
copyright owners to win their acceptance of guidelines that acknowledge or concede fair use.
For further discussion of the background of these guidelines see Gasaway, supra note 188.
19 0 Phan, supranote 1, at 198-201 (highly critical of the Digital-Images Guidelines).
191 Digital-Images Guidelines, supra note 4, at 36-37,40.
192 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. "It was recognized at the outset of
CONFU that digital images collections raise issues different from text issues; that these
considerations and concerns were not addressed by text norms and understandings (e.g.,
quality/distortion/accuracy issues, commercial exploitation potential, and the critical mass
necessary for educational uses)." Id. Since issuance of the Digital-Images Guidelines, a district
court has ruled that the use of "thumb-nail" versions of photographs in search engines to locate
them on the Internet is permitted under fair use. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d
1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999). See also Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F. 3d 18 (1st
Cir. 2000) (holding that the reproduction of photographs as a news item is fair use).
193 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,925-26 (2d Cir. 1995).
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generally weighs against fair use.194 Moreover, a single photograph may involve
layers of legal claims. The photographer may hold the copyright, but the
photograph may capture the image of a painting or other copyrighted work, or of
a sign that has trademark protection, or of a person who has rights of privacy or
publicity.195 The image may be from a book or slide collection, to which a
publisher other party holds a compilation copyright. These circumstances give
rights to multiple claimants with respect to one visual image.
The Digital-Images Guidelines met this challenge in a most complex manner.
These guidelines allow faculty and others to make digital versions of analog
images, but subject to numerous conditions that are not clearly articulated. Images
may be made and presented in forums such as the face-to-face classroom and in
peer conferences, but generally the images may be accessed only on a "secure
electronic network" and only for "one academic term." Those restrictions are
reasonable, if not modest, but the guidelines are, overall, far from such a simple
and clear approach. The language of this document is convoluted, verbose, and
obscure. The measure of fair use is repeatedly hedged with admonitions about the
need to secure permission and to keep records of all efforts. If some specific
activity is outside an elaborately sanctioned provision, the guidelines repeatedly
refer users back to "the four-factor fair use analysis" under the law. The standards
outlined in the guidelines are presented as if they are not only a "safe harbor"
from liability, but a safe harbor from fair use as well. For those parties who might
accept the Digital-Images Guidelines, they seem to offer explicitly an alternative
to-or escape from-the need to understand fair use.196
D. Three Classes ofFair-Use Guidelines
This lineage of fair-use guidelines underscores that while many of the
guidelines have some common traits, they also have many critical differences. For
purposes of analyzing their legal standing, the guidelines may be grouped into
three categories: (1) privately developed guidelines that have congressional
recognition in legislative history of the copyright law;197 (2) guidelines developed
194 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (referring to the "nature"
factor, the court found that "[s]ince 'Puppies' was creative and imaginative and Rogers, who
makes his living as a photographer, hopes to gain a financial return for his efforts with this
photograph, this factor militates against a finding of fair use!).
195 See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that'a photograph of a public-domain work of art does not have copyright protection).
196 Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, andArt Museums: Cyberspace and
Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 149, 232 (1999) (arguing that the CONFU
Guidelines will not solve the copyright problems of museums, and the potential liability
"contravenes the essential purpose of copyright law, and threatens the ability of museums to
carry out their mission in the electronic times in which we live").
197 Classroom Guidelines, Music Guidelines, Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4.
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by a duly authorized governmental commission; 198 and (3) privately developed
guidelines that have been endorsed or supported by administrative agencies. 199
Invariably, these classifications are not entirely discrete. Some overlap of
characteristics among the guidelines does occur. Yet these classifications are
intended to isolate and identify the salient attribute of each set of guidelines that
purports to give them "official" or "legal" status. By making this classification,
the analysis can begin to test the significance of that status for attributing legal
validity to each of the fair-use interpretations.
1. Guidelines andLegislative History
The Classroom Guidelines, the Music Guidelines, and the Off-Air Guidelines
are in this category. Each of these standards was the product of private
negotiations, but the finished work was submitted to Congress for review. 00 At
no time did any of these guidelines advance in Congress toward legislation. In
fact, the earliest of the guidelines grew out of exactly the opposite situation. They
were a direct response to a known unwillingness of Congress to legislate the
details of fair use. Yet with respect to each of these guidelines, members of
Congress expressed approval.
2. Guidelines and Congressional Commissions
The CONTU Guidelines are the only fair-use guidelines forthcoming from a
congressional commission.2 01 While the CONTU commission had no authority to
make law, it was a commission charged by an Act of Congress and acting
consistently with that charge in developing guidelines under the auspices of the
source of copyright law-Congress. 02 In that regard, these guidelines may be
understood as emerging from a more authoritative source than, for example,
guidelines that result from negotiations among private parties. Not only is such a
commission closely connected to a law-making authority and charged by that
authority to act, but such a commission will be accountable to that authority in the
end.
When the CONTU Commission completed its work and submitted its final
report in 1979, it delivered its findings and recommendations to Congress.2 03 The
significance of accountability was vivid from the outset. One recommendation,
198 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
19 9 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
200 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 67,70 (1976).
201 See CONTU FINALREPORT, supranote 4, at 3.
202 See supra text accompanying note 101.
203 See generally, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
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for example, was a revision of section 117 of the Copyright Act 204 governing the
use of computer software.205 Congress enacted that recommendation in 1980.206
The commission members must certainly have recognized that its
recommendations must be balanced and reasonable to win congressional
approval. Similarly, when CONTU recommended the guidelines for interlibrary
loans, its members surely must have perceived the need to be fair and balanced
simply to gain acceptance and to avoid rejection. The public might accept or
reject the guidelines as they seek to follow them. Congress could also have
accepted or rejected the CONTU recommendations.
The work of CONTU was also accountable to legal precedent. In particular,
the interlibrary-loan guidelines were built on the foundation of a statute-section
108207 -and a case-Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States.20 8 Those existing
developments provided a relatively specific standard against which to evaluate
any recommended guidelines. For the guidelines to be accepted in the legal
community and by librarians, they must bear strong fidelity to the statute and the
case. Critics would be able to undermine the credibility of the commission's work
if it strayed far from existing law. Thus, not only was the commission accountable
to Congress, an authoritative source of law, but it was also more clearly
accountable to the law itself. The relevant law in this instance was also reasonably
specific.
3. Guidelines andAdministrative Agencies
The CONFU guidelines are the work of an informal gathering of interested
parties acting under the auspices of federal agencies, principally the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. CONFU arose from a suggestion in a report from
the National Information Infrastructure Task Force, and the U.S. Copyright Office
joined in supporting the effort.209 While the Patent and Trademark Office and the
Copyright Office have some lawmaking authority, notably the issuance of
regulations on limited matters, 210 neither organization has the authority to provide
any rulings or elaborations on the meaning of fair use under copyright law. In
fact, the Copyright Office distributes widely a form letter explaining that it does
204 17 U.S.C. §117 (Supp. IV 1998).
2 05 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
206 Pub. L. No. 96-517,94 Stat. 3015,3028 (1980).
207 17 U.S.C. §108 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
208 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973). This case is examined in detail at infra Part III.C.
20 9 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134. ("[The Working Group will sponsor a
confererce to bring together copyright owner and user interests to develop guidelines for fair
uses of copyrighted works by and in public libraries and schools.)
2 10 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing the general authority of
the Copyright Office to act on specified matters).
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not answer inquiries from the public about the meaning of fair use.211 The
Copyright Office, however, long has issued a "circular" that provides general
information about the law of fair use and reprints the earlier fair-use guidelines.212
CONFU was therefore acting under the guidance of federal agencies that
obviously have no authority to make law relevant to fair use. They have no
specific authority to convene and empower a group to adopt binding standards.
Moreover, these administrative agencies had no authority to respond in any
binding way to any recommendations that emerge from CONFU. When the
CONTU Commission delivered its final report in 1979, it delivered it to Congress
and to the President, and Congress had the power to act on many of the
recommendations.2 13 Congress could have rejected the interlibrary-loan
guidelines as inconsistent with the law of section 108. In contrast, when CONFU
delivered its final report in 1998, it delivered it to the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, the head of an agency with no authority to give any
recommendations with a binding stature.214 Acceptance or rejection by that
agency might reveal a point of view or bolster a particular objective, but it would
have no legal authority.
In a gesture that tacitly acknowledged those limits of the CONFU process,
supporters of the Multimedia Guidelines seemed to perceive that congressional
imprimatur could lend the guidelines greater significance or possible authority. In
September 1996 those supporters took the draft guidelines to members of the
Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives and
obtained a signed, "nonlegislative report" that offered a general endorsement of
the guidelines.215 Recognizing the authority of Congress to make copyright law,
approval from a subcommittee-albeit vaguely stated-was a significant step
toward bestowing the appearance of law on the guidelines.216 Even viewing that
2 11 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FAIR USE, F.L. 102 (1993) ('The Copyright Office can
neither determine if a certain use may be considered 'fair' nor advise on possible copyright
violations. If there is any doubt, it is advisable to consult an attorney."). That form letter is
available at http'lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/fls/fl102.pdf (last visited April 4,2001).2 12 See U.S. Copyright Office, CIRCULAR 21: REPRODUCrION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS, at http'/lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/circs/circ21.pdf (last visited
April 4,2001).
213 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.214 Id.
2 15 MULTMIA COMMI=fEE PRINT, supra note 4.
2 16 The nonlegislative report from the subcommittee stated in part: "the Subcommittee
congratulates" the developers of the Multimedia Guidelines "for their hard work and effort,
which clearly advances the strength of the U.S. copyright system.'Id. More substantively, the
report makes this statement:
While only the courts can decide whether a particular use of a copyrighted work fits within the
fair use exemption, these guidelines represent the participants' consensus view of what
constitutes the fair use of a portion of a work which is included in a multimedia educational
project. The specific portion and time limitations will help educators, scholars and students
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development most generously, support from a subcommittee hardly makes the
guidelines law. In the final analysis, the CONFU guidelines are partly the work of
one or more federal agencies, perhaps seeking to serve important goals, but
ultimately acting without authority to create results that are binding on any party.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND FAIR-USE GUIDELINES
While the fair-use guidelines have had a central function of assisting
educators, librarians, and other individuals as they apply fair use in common
situations, the guidelines also have shaped several judicial decisions. Some of
those decisions provide detailed applications of the guidelines to the given facts,
often with insightful discussion of the legal standing of the fair-use
interpretations. Other decisions have offered only passing mentions of the
guidelines. Each of these court opinions is important in its own way. The detailed
examinations provide essential scrutiny of the guidelines, allowing readers to
examine the court's comprehension of fair use and the negotiated guidelines. The
brief references in several other cases are also vital. A few words from a court can
be rife with meaning. A court may summarily articulate a conclusion, or a few
words may reveal the court's understanding of the role and importance of the
guidelines. This Part III of the article will survey those cases and analytically
discern from them the legal significance of the guidelines in the eyes of the
federal judiciary.
A. Courts and the Classroom Guidelines
1. Association of American Publishers v. New York University
The first infringement litigation against photocopying for educational uses
arose not long after the fair-use statute took effect on January 1, 1978. In 1980
and 1981 publishers brought copyright actions against two for-profit shops that
were photocopying materials for student use. The parties settled both cases, and
the settlement included an agreement that the shops would adhere to the
more easily identify whether using a portion of a certain copyrighted work in their multimedia
program constitutes a fair use of that work. They grant a relative degree of certainty that a use
within the guidelines will not be perceived as an infringement of the Copyright Act by the
endorsing copyright owners, and that permission for such use will not be required. The more
one exceeds these guidelines, the greater the risk that the use of a work is not a fair use, and that
permission must be sought.
Id at 2. A lawyer may not confuse such ambiguous statements with the law, but an educator
who may be inclined to find an "answer" to fair use or who may be seeking protection from
liability could easily find comfort in such words from a congressional source.
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Classroom Guidelines as a limit on fair use.2 17 Faculty at colleges and
universities, however, have an enormous range of places and possibilities for
securing photocopies of class materials, and the publishing industry faced the
daunting prospect of litigation against numerous shops and other outlets. To make
the point of copyright infringement directly against educators, publishers filed a
lawsuit against New York University (NYU) and several named faculty members
in December, 1982.218 Only four months later, the parties settled that suit as
well.219 Again; the settlement incorporated the Classroom Guidelines.2 20 This
time the guidelines were adopted as the formal standard of fair use at NYU-a
major research university.221
The incorporation of the guidelines in the NYU settlement had several
consequences of tremendous importance. 22 First, the measure of fair use in the
guidelines became the formally adopted standard at a major university and
established a precedent or model that other institutions could follow. Second,
other institutions did follow it. They followed it out of concern that they also may
face unwanted litigation. They followed it because the publishing industry sent
hundreds of letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging
them to adopt the guidelines or face a risk of litigation.223 Third, the NYU
settlement restructured the Classroom Guidelines into an even more rigid
standard than was embodied in the original version. That rigid version became the
model or precedent that other institutions often adopted. Of particular note, the
2 17 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Tyco Copy Servs., Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
(CCH), 25,230 (D. Conn. 1981); Basic Books, Inc. v. The Gnomon Corp., COPYRIGHT L.
DEC. (CCH), 25,145 (D.C. 1980).
2 18 Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. N. Y. Univ., No. 82-8333 (S.D.N.Y.filed Dec. 14,
1982). See, e.g., Edwin McDowell, Nine Publishers Sue NYU, Charging Copyright Violation,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1982, at C34.
219 Copyright Infiingement and Photocopying for the Classroom: The Association of
American Publishers v. New York University Settlement, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 313 (Michael Meyer & John David Viera, eds., 1983).
See also Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. New York Univ., No. 82 CIV 8333, 1983 WL 1134,
1983 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,544 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
2 20 Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. New York Univ., 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y.), at 4-6.
2 21 Id. at 6 ("The Guidelines ... are to be used to determine whether or not the prior
permission of the copyright owner is to be sought for photocopying for research and classroom
use. If the proposed photocopying is not permitted under the Guidelines... permission to copy
is to be sought.").
222The Classroom Guidelines are an integral part of the Policy Statement on
Photocopying of Copyrighted Materials for Classroom and Research Use This policy
statement was approved by the Board of Trustees of New York University on May 9, 1983, and
is available at http'//www.nyu.edu/pages/os/publications/photocopying.html (last visited April
5,2001).
223 Form letter from Townsend Hoopes, President of the Association of American
Publishers, Inc., to college and university administrators. (June 10, 1983).
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NYU settlement adopted the guidelines without the opening preamble about
"minimum" standards.224 Faculty making copies under the settlement were
expected to follow the strict limits, not as a minimalistic safe harbor, but rather as
a ceiling on fair use. Any uses beyond those limits required advance approval
from university counsel. For all practical purposes, the minimum standards of the
original guidelines became maximum standards at NYU.
2. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.
One court decision questioned critically at least one major portion of the
Classroom Guidelines and ultimately ruled that those guidelines, in that one
respect, were not consistent with fair-use law. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp.,225 several prominent commercial publishers of textbooks and
other books alleged that Kinko's had infringed their copyrights by making
multiple copies of lengthy excerpts from the books and compiling them into
"coursepacks" or "anthologies" sold to students at nearby colleges and
universities.2 26 Faculty members at those institutions selected the materials, and
the students acquired the copies for reading in connection with specified
courses.227 Kinko's at that time operated a "Professor Publishing" program to
solicit from professors the business of making and selling copies.228
Based on an analysis of the four factors from section 107, the district court
had little trouble concluding that the copying was not fair use.229 Only after
2 24 The settlement agreement with NYU provides that the university will adopt the
Classroom Guidelines. It specifies that faculty will adhere to the guidelines as set forth in the
appendix to the settlement. That appendix includes only the substantive standards, without the
introductory language about minimum standards. That language, however, does appear in a
footnote to the settlement and NYU policy in connection with a discussion of the origin of the
guidelines. Still, the settlement is explicit in calling on faculty to adhere to the guidelines
without inclusion of the "minimum" language. See Copyright Infringement and Photocopying
for the Classroom: The Association of American Publishers v. New York University
Settlement, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PuBUISHNG AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 321 (Michael
Meyer & John David Viera, eds., 1983). See also Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. N. Y. Univ.,
No. 82 CIV 8333, 1983 WL 1134, 1983 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,544 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 1983).
225 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
226 Id. at 1528.
227 I.1 at 1528-29, 1531.
228 Id. at 1528-29,1534.
229 In summary, the court found that the copying was for "commercial" purposes when
pursued by Kinko's and not by the individual instructor or university. Id at 1531-32 ('The
amount of that profit is unclear, however, we need only find that Kinko's had the intention of
making profits). The amount, ranging from approximately five percent to twenty-five percent
of the original books, was excessive. Id at 1533-34. In addition, the court found in copying
entire chapters the amount taken was "substantial because [the copies] are obviously meant to
stand alone.., as a complete representation of the concept explored in the chapter." Id. The
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reaching its conclusion did the court turn its attention to the Classroom
Guidelines. That sequence is revealing. It affirms that the statute, and not the
guidelines, is the source of the law, and by first having reached a decision based
on the law, the court was free to explore the merits of the guidelines as dictum
and not as a rule of law. The court even seemed reluctant to look at the guidelines
at all, acknowledging that they should apply to copying by an instructor or an
educational institution, and not by a for-profit copyshop.230 Yet the court found
"the circumstance of copying for college students to be particularly compelling in
this case."231 The court proceeded to evaluate the "brevity," "spontaneity," and
"cumulative effect" of the copying,232 concluding with little surprise that the
actions of Kinko's were outside the bounds of those rigorous confines.2 33
Not content with winning the court's rejection of fair use based on analysis of
section 107 and of the Classroom Guidelines, the plaintiffs argued further that
Kinko's should be held in violation of a specific "prohibition!' contained in the
guidelines, a provision that would bar any copying "used to create or to replace or
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works. ''234 The plaintiff-
publishers argued that this language was a sweeping gesture to place all
coursepacks outside the ambit of fair use.235 The court refused the bait, accepting
copying also interfered with the market for the original books. Id. at 1534. Only the third
factor-the "nature" of the works-weighed in favor of finding fair use. The court resolved that
the materials were factual in nature and that factual works with information of public interest
are more amenable to a finding of fair use. Id. at 1532-33.
230 Id. at 1535-36 ("For a proper analysis, there must be initial consideration given to the
issue of what comprises educational copying and whether Kinko's status as a for-profit
corporation, and its profitmaking intent, renders outside of a Guidelines review. We believe that
it does"). Other commentators have been highly critical of the court's use of the Classroom
Guidelines. According to one study:
Once again the Kinko's court missed the point. Reliance on the Agreement on Classroom
Guidelines for guidance about fair use is questionable at best. The Agreement was not included
in the legislative history to change the law "in any way." It does not even limit copying but
instead sets forth bright line rules that indicate when teachers are within a safe harbor. Even as a
safe harbor, though, the Agreement is not especially illuminating. It is so restrictive that most
classroom uses are outside this safe harbor anyway. By design, the Agreement on Classroom
Guidelines simply does not provide a meaningful standard for determining when classroom uses
infringe.
Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at 156.
231 Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n.1 1.
232 See Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68, and supra text accompanying notes
71-73.
233 Kinko 's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
234 Id. at 1537. The reference is to Part III of the Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at
69.
235 Id. (According to the plaintiffs, "Part III of the Guidelines 'flatly and unequivocally'
prohibit[s] the copying of the sort in suit.).
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instead Kinko's urging for "a less rigid view of the meaning of the
Guidelines."2 36 Although the court could see that the construction of anthologies
may be a factor weighing against fair use, largely because the "cumulative effect
[on the income to copyright owners] would be disastrous,"237 it nevertheless
concluded: "We... refuse to hold that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited
without a fair use analysis."238 The court added: 'Thile we agree that Congress
did manifest a specific apprehension of the use of anthologies, it is not clear that
Congress intended strict application of this prohibition without fair use
balancing."2 39
In the final analysis, the Kinko's court gave the Classroom Guidelines some
important credibility.240 They captured the court's attention, and they received a
systematic application to a given situation. But a close reading of the case
confirms that the guidelines were never given the weight of law. Moreover, the
ruling undercut the guidelines in one crucial respect-the prohibition against
anthologies was rejected categorically. The court also demonstrated that the
guidelines are subject to close scrutiny in light of the four factors of section 107.
Despite the congressional attention and the importance of having guidelines to
address common fair-use dilemmas, the court was not prepared to take them at
face value.
236 Id.; see also Bartow, supra note 67, at 153; Scott M. Martin & Jonathan Zavin,
Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use Utuer the Copyright Act, in EXAMPING THE
IMPLICATIONS OFTHEFESTANDKNKO'SDECISIONs 661 (1991); Eileen N. Wagner, Beware the
Custom-Made Anthology: Academic Photocopying and Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics 68
WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 2(1991) (agreeing that the decision did not enforce the prohibition).
2 37 Kinko%'s, 758 F. Supp. at 1537 & n.14. In the analysis of the four factors from section
107, the court also looked to "other factors" and noted with no further explanation:
"Additionally, the Classroom Guidelines express a specific prohibition of anthologies. The fact
that these excerpts were compiled and sold in anthologies weighs against defendant" Id at
1535.
238 I at 1537.
239 Id.
240 One study concluded that the Kinko 's court gave much more weight to the Classroom
Guidelines than the present analysis finds:
The court engaged in a balancing analysis of Kinko's conduct under the Agreement on
Classroom Guidelines as if it were actually a controlling part of the law within the Copyright
Act. Though the court initially equivocated on whether the Agreement stated the minimum or
maximum allowable copying under the fair use doctrine, it ultimately determined that a
"violation" of the Agreement was yet another factor to be weighed against the defendant in a
fair use analysis.
Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at 155.
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3. Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.241
demonstrates the lack of resolution on some of the most common fair-use issues,
and the case reveals the struggle even among federal judges over the meaning of
fair use in general, and the applicability of the Classroom Guidelines in
particular. 242 On November 8, 1996, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed
down an en bane decision concerning the ADS case (the defendant is commonly
called "MDS"), holding that large-scale photocopying by a commercial copyshop
for the creation of "coursepacks" was not fair use. The decision in many respects
is an affirmation of the earlier Kinko's ruling,243 and it held that similar copying,
also by an off-campus for-profit shop, was not fair use.244 Not only do reasonable
experts disagree about fair use, but so do reasonable jurists, as eight judges agreed
that the copying was infringement and five judges dissented and believed the
activities to be within the scope of fair use.245
241 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
242 The various anicus briefs filed in the case on appeal also evidence the strong interest
in this case. For example, the brief filed on behalf of eleven copyright law professors is
published at L. Ray Patterson, et al., BriefArnicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors
in Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 183 (1994).
24 3 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
24 4 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1383. The en banc ruling and the earlier three-judge panel from the
Sixth Circuit showed that federal judges were far from a like mind on this case. In a February
1996 ruling, two of the three appellate judges held that the copying was fair use. The Sixth
Circuit, on accepting the decision for rehearing en bane, vacated this decision. With the
November 1996 decision, the court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, which had entered summary judgment for the publishers. See Princeton
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 913 (ED. Mich. 1994). See
generally Denise K. Magner, Federal Appeals Court Eases Copyright Rules for "Course
Packs, " CHRON. OF I-IGHBR EDUC., Feb. 23, 1996, at A20. (reporting the appellate ruling in
favor of fair use).
2 45 The decision from the Sixth Circuit is seriously problematic in many respects. Notably
lacking is a detailed and insightful analysis of the four factors of fair use. Indeed, the court
acknowledged that it provided only sparse comment on two of those factors. ADS, 99 F.3d at
1389-90 (examining only briefly the "nature' and "amounf' factors). The court reversed the
order of the factors, examining the "effece' factor first, and attributing greater weight to it: "We
take it that this factor, 'the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work,' is at least primus inter pares, figuratively speaking, and we shall turn to it
first." Id. at 1385-88. Further complicating the legal analysis, the court also resolved that when
the challenged activity is "commercial," as in this case, the burden of proving adverse market
effect is on the defendant, and the use is presumed unfair until the defendant proves otherwise.
Id. at 1385-86. The concept of presumptions shaping the fair-use analysis is rooted in recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but the validity of that approach remains open to debate.
Moreover, this decision, as others, does not carefully distinguish whether the presumption is
against a conclusion of fair use or applies with respect to one factor only. For decisions from the
Supreme Court that struggle with the creation and application of presumptions, see Campbell v.
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The majority based most of its decision on a finding of potential adverse
market effects that could result from photocopying, which, if "widespread,"
would threaten the stream of revenue from permissions that the plaintiffs had in
fact been able to cultivate.246 According to the majority, the other factors were
"considerably less important" and the court dealt with them "relatively
briefly."247 The court's examination of the "amount" factor is also cursory, but
focuses on the measure of copying that ranged from five to thirty percent of the
original works, noting among other conclusions that MDS greatly exceeded the
1,000-word limit in the Classroom Guidelines.2 48 Additionally, it found with little
surprise that the copying undertaken by MDS greatly exceeded the rigid, minimal
standards of fair use set forth in the guidelines.2 49 The court justified its reliance
on the guidelines by noting their appearance in congressional reports
accompanying passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.250 Yet the court also
pointedly noted that the Classroom Guidelines "state the minimum and not the
maximum standards of educational fair use."251
One paragraph, especially its closing sentence, discloses the court's
ambiguous response to the Classroom Guidelines and its view of them as
minimalistic interpretations:
In its systematic and premeditated character, its anthological content and its
commercial motivation, the copying done by MDS goes well beyond anything
envisioned by the Congress that chose to incorporate the guidelines in the legislative
history. Although the guidelines do not purport to be a complete and definitive
statement of fair use law for educational copying, and although they do not have the
force of law, they do provide us general guidance. The fact that the MDS copying is
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
246 Indeed, the court made a passing critique of an earlier case that had held more limited
copying of an individual journal article for library patrons to be fair use. "A licensing market
already exists here, as it did not in a case on which plaintiffs rely." MDS, 99 F.3d at 1388, citing
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)."
247 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F3d at 1388. The court found the "purpose" to be entirely
"commercial" Id. at 1386, 1388-89. The majority opinion gave no meaningful attention to the
'nature" factor, noting only that the defendant acknowledged that the materials copied
contained creativity or expression. Id. at 1389.
248 Id at 1389-90.
249Id at 1390-91.
250 Id at 1391. For a discussion of the origins of the Classroom Guidelines and their
original appearance in the congressional report, see supra Part IIA.2.
251 Id. at 1390.
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light years away from the safe harbor of the guidelines weighs against a finding of fair
use.
2 52
This single paragraph encapsulates several essential principles about fair use
that are often obscured by confusion and misleading statements. 53 First, the MDS
court confirms that the Classroom Guidelines are not the law. They have not been
read into law in this case or any other case, and Congress has not made them
law.254 Their appearance in congressional reports does not make them law.
Second, the guidelines may be helpful "general guidance." 255 They may articulate
useful concepts for understanding the meaning of fair use in particular
circumstances, but they do not necessarily offer a definition for ultimately
establishing fair use. Third, activities may be outside the ambit of the Classroom
Guidelines, but they are not necessarily infringements. Indeed, the MDS court
found that when activities are "light years" away from the guidelines, that fact
may only "weigh against" a finding of fair use.2 5 6 Fourth- in the court's view, the
guidelines are at best a safe harbor.257 They may even be a safe harbor for a
commercial copyshop, in addition to the nonprofit organizations for which the
guidelines were intended2 58
2 52 !d at 1390-91.
25 3 See Michael G. Frey, Note, Unfairly Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 959, 1014-15 (1998). Frey offers a similar critique of the court's use of the guidelines and
takes the matter further:
What the text does not clearly indicate, however, but what the majority extracts from it, is the
fact that copying which falls outside the Guidelines' safe harbor should weigh against a finding
of fair use. The court's reasoning is wrong because the Guidelines were not meant to serve as an
additional barrier to a finding of fair use in educational settings.
Id.; see also Gilbert Busby, Note, Fair Use and Educational Copying: A Reexamination of
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 86 KY. L. 675, 706-07
(1997-1998) (highly critical of the use of legislative history and the guidelines inMDS).
254 In an examination of the relevant cases, Part III of this article demonstrates that no case
has adopted the guidelines as a legal standard. Part lI.A.2 traces the origins of the Classroom
Guidelines, also revealing that Congress never adopted them as a mandatory standard. See HIL
REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976).
2 55 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1391.
256 Id
257 Although some interested parties strongly object to labeling the guidelines as a "safe
harbor," the MDS court explicitly pronounced them as such. See supra Part IV.A.2.
258 Of considerable significance, the court called the guidelines a "safe harbor" even as
applied to a for-profit defendant, taking the concept far beyond the nonprofit setting where the
guidelines are intended to apply. Id. at 1391. The label "safe harbor" defies the role of
guidelines regularly espoused by many commercial publishers which may be seeking to
preserve rights to bring legal action against even a nonprofit institution that has acted within the
constraints of these guidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 400-02. See generally, Frey,
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Five judges dissented in three separate dissenting opinions.2 59 Judge Ryan
wrote a detailed dissent that exceeded the majority opinion in both length and
depth.2 60 He took the majority to task on several aspects of fair use, but also
devoted considerable attention to the Classroom Guidelines, arguing that they
were of little significance in comprehending the law. Judge Ryan correctly noted
that the guidelines are not enacted into the law, and then scrutinized the majority's
reliance on the guidelines as an element of "legislative history" for interpreting
the fair-use statute. 61 Ryan condemned the use of legislative history and
underscored strong propositions from recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions:
Despite the well-settled rule that legislative history is irrelevant and inappropriate
to consider except to clarify ambiguity in the text of a statute, the majority relies upon
the legislative history without identifying any ambiguity in the statute, but only
because "[t]he statutory factors are not models of clarity ... the fair use issue has
long been a particularly troublesome one..., [and other] courts have often turned to
the legislative history when considering fair use questions." I wish to emphasize in
the strongest terms that it is entirely inappropriate to rely on the Copyright Act's
legislative history at all. 2 6 2
Judge Ryan acknowledged that section 107 begs the need for some clarity,
but he was quick to accept the duty of bringing meaning to fair use by deciding
the case based on the factors in the statute. He declined to rely on guidelines:
supra note 253, at 1010 (calling application of the Classroom Guidelines to for-profit activity
"strange").
259 A short dissent by Chief Judge Martin focuses on the constraining effect of copyright
on the free flow of information and the needs of educators and students. MDS, 99 F.3d 1381 at
1393-94. A dissent by Judge Meritt adopts the argument that multiple copies for classroom use
are within fair use under section 107 and ought not be further limited by the four factors. Id at
1394-97. Judge Merritt reinforced his views by asserting the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution in support of broader fair-use rights. Id. at 1397. The interrelationship between fair
use and rights of free speech often leads courts to read the scope of fair use more broadly in
order to protect the speech rights of the defendant who is using copyrighted works to advance
the activities that ordinarily enjoy First-Amendment protections. See, e.g., Time Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (allowing the use of sketches from the
famous Zapruder film in a book about the Kennedy assassination).
2 60 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1397-1412. Ryan's dissent is also structured with the style and
formality of a lead opinion, suggesting that the judge may have hoped to persuade his
colleagues on the bench to join him, or perhaps persuade the U.S. Supreme Court, should it
have reviewed this decision on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari.
Mich. Document Servs., Inc. v. Princeton Univ. Press, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997). The parties then
settled the case. See Footnotes: Michigan Copy Shop and Publishers Settle Copyright Lawsuit,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuC., June 20, 1997, at A12 (reporting settlement terms that allowed
MDS to copy no more than a single page of a protected work and required payment of $50,000
damages).
261 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1412.
262 Id. at 1411 (alterations in original) (quoting majority opinion at 1390).
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"The Classroom Guidelines do not become more authoritative by their adoption
into a Committee Report. '263 He added:
That the Classroom Guidelines are not law should be reason enough for this court to
refrain from using them to find infringement, but this is not the only reason to reject
out of hand arguments based on legislative history. Committee Reports are unreliable
"as a genuine indicator of congressional intent ' and "as a safe predictor of judicial
construction. 264
Judge Ryan also may have overstated the majority's dependence on the
Classroom Guidelines, though his general statements about the importance of
legislative history and the lack of significance of the guidelines do bear
considerable credibility. Judge Ryan may have also overstated concerns about the
majority's reasoning. Had the majority relied primarily or even prominently on
the Classroom Guidelines, concern about the merits of legislative history would
be crucial. Instead, the majority used the guidelines in a manner similar to
previous cases that have gone before: as a source of support for a decision already
reached on an evaluation of the four factors, The guidelines are, quite simply, a
crutch. They give some modicum of assurance to educators and librarians when
the four factors leave lingering doubts. They also give assurance to federal judges
who may be looking for external validation of a decision already reached,
knowing that fair use is open to diverse interpretation and that eminently
reasonable people can easily criticize any conclusion that anyone may reach 265
4. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.
In a controversial decision from 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that single copies ofjournal articles made by a research scientist for
his own research program at a for-profit company may in some instances not be
fair use.2 66 Again, the guidelines become a source of solace for a court rendering
a troublesome decision.267 In its general analysis of the law, the court noted that
263 Id.
264 I (citation omitted).
2 65 See Elliott Epstein & Andrew J. Zulieve, The Fair Use Doctrine: Commercial
Misappropriation and Market Diversion, 13 ME. BJ. 142, 1467 (1998) (noting that the AMDS
court had little trouble ruling that the copying was not fair use, suggesting that the court did not
need additional support from the guidelines).
2 66 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
267 Perhaps evidencing protracted debate among the judges who decided this case, the
court went so far as to amend its opinion seven months after its initial decision. The Second
Circuit handed down its original decision in October 1994, but issued a significantly amended
opinion in July 1995. Most remarkably, the amended opinion also came after the parties settled
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"Congress has thus far provided scant guidance for resolving fair use issues
involving photocopying, legislating specifically only as to library copying, and
providing indirect advice concerning classroom copying."268 With the Classroom
Guidelines as virtually the only clue of congressional insight on fair use for
photocopying, traces of the guidelines crept into the court's analysis of the
copying involved in this case, despite the case's for-profit enterprise context. In
particular, the court's analysis of the "purpose" factor examined the scientist's
reason for making the copies.2 69 The court sympathized with the argument that
copying for immediate laboratory use may well be fair use: "This is the sort of
'spontaneous' copying that is part of the test for permissible nonprofit classroom
copying."2 70 "Spontaneity" is a concept from the Classroom Guidelines, and it
appears nowhere in the law. Bringing it into the Texaco case can only be seen as
an encroachment of the guidelines into law.2 71
The Texaco decision alluded to the Classroom Guidelines again when the
opinion struggled with language affirming that the ruling encompasses
"institutional, systematic copying" and not copying "by an individual, for
personal use in research or otherwise.'2 72 In a footnote the court provides this
summary of the legal weight of the guidelines: 'Though these guidelines are not
considered necessarily binding on courts... they exist as a persuasive authority
marking out certain minimum standards for educational fair use .. . .,273 In the
final analysis, the Texaco decision confirms in a small way the trend apparent in
all other cases addressing the Classroom Guidelines: they are not law, they are a
minimal standard of fair use; they are a compelling source of congressional
insight on fair use; they are a useful crutch for the courts that are struggling with
fair-use ambiguities as much as are the stakeholders in the fair use debates; and
they add some authority for a judicial decision that is first and foremost based on
the law and not the guidelines.
their lawsuit and successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to dismiss the petition for
certiorari. See U at 913.
268 Id. at 917 (footnote and internal citation omitted).
269 Among other purposes, Texaco claimed that the copies allowed the scientist to bring
less bulky copies into the laboratory, and the copies would not have to be safeguarded from
damage. Id at 919.
270 Id.
271 See Zimmerman, supra note 71, at 411 n.18 (claiming that the ruling "calls into
question the legitimacy of such copying for personal use outside the narrow parameters of the
guidelines").
272 Texaco, 60 F3d at 916. The opinion also states: "In other words, our opinion does not
decide the case that would arise if Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist
engaged in copying and creating files for independent research, as opposed to being employed
by an institution in the pursuit of his research on the institution's behalf." Id The court added
much of this language when it amended the opinion. See supra note 267.
273 Texaco, 60 F. 3d at 919 n.5 (citations omitted).
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5. Marcus v. Rowley
The earliest court ruling to make any examination of the Classroom
Guidelines was the 1983 decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Marcus v. Rowley.274 Eloise Marcus, the plaintiff, wrote a thirty-five page booklet
on cake decorating and used it to teach adult-education classes. She sold copies to
her students for two dollars each, and she properly included a copyright notice on
all copies and registered the work with the Copyright Office.2 75 Shirley Rowley,
the defendant, enrolled in one of Marcus's classes and purchased a copy of the
booklet. Rowley later developed her own booklet for her own classes, and eleven
of the twenty-four pages in her work were copied directly from Marcus's original
work. Rowley neither gave the plaintiff credit for her work nor acknowledged her
copyright.276
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the use was not fair, in a decision based on the
four factors of the statute.277 As in the Kinko's case, the court turned to the
Classroom Guidelines, but only after already reaching a conclusion based on the
law, and only to affirm the decision already rendered. The Marcus opinion
confused the fundamental nature of the guidelines in a series of contradictory
statements. In one paragraph, the court noted that classroom copying "was of
such major concern to Congress," that Congress "approved a set of guidelines
with respect to it."'278 The opinion then added that the guidelines represent "the
Congressional Committees' view" of fair use.279
In the same paragraph from Marcus, however, the Ninth Circuit first appears
to have ratified the Classroom Guidelines as definitive: "The guidelines were
designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible
copying .... -280 After giving the guidelines that conceptual boost, the court then
promptly marginalized them: "The guidelines were intended to represent
minimum standards of fair use."281 Once again, the Ninth Circuit seems more
accurate with its second statement-the guidelines are at best a minimum
measure of fair use in the educational setting. The one weighty paragraph from
274 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
275 Id. at 1173.
276 Id.
27 7 Id. at 1177. The court acknowledged that the then new Copyright Act of 1976 did not
apply to the activities in this case, because the events occurred before the Act took effect in
1978. Yet the court noted that the fair-use doctrine was not intended to change under the new
law, so the court could reliably look to the text of section 107. Id at 1174.
2 78 1d. at 1178.
2 79 Id. The decision is referring to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, which issued the report in which the Classroom Guidelines first appeared. See
supra note 4.280 Id.
281 Id.
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the Marcus opinion recovers from its ambiguity and ends on perhaps its most
accurate statement: "Thus, while they are not controlling on the court they are
instructive on the issue of fair use in the context of this case.' 282
The Marcus court proceeded to apply the Classroom Guidelines, concluding
that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's booklet did not meet the standards of the
guidelines. 28 3 The court looked to the tests of "brevity" and "spontaneity,"
concluding, among other findings, that the copying was excessive, and that the
use of the materials during three academic years was not "spontaneous." 284 The
court found that the defendant met the "cumulative effect' test of the guidelines,
but did not include a copyright notice on the copied portions as required by the
guidelines.285 For all the court's rhetoric about the guidelines as "not controlling"
and as "minimum standards," 286 the court's actual analysis of the guidelines has
all the appearance of treating the Classroom Guidelines as a mandatory standard
of inflexible application, yet the court still was not basing its decision on them.
The best indication of the meaning of the guidelines is their position in the
overall analysis of fair use within the opinion. As in the Kinko's and MDS
decisions, the court turned to the Classroom Guidelines only after reaching a
conclusion based on the four factors. The guidelines largely served the purpose of
affirming the decision that the court had already reached. Given their relatively
strict-or at least literal-application in the Kinko's, MDS, and the Marcus
decisions, perhaps the real value of the guidelines is to serve as a tool for judges
to find some degree of assurance about a decision that is in reality based on the
factors from section 107.
6. Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vien
A 1993 ruling from the District Court for the Southern District of California
was one decision in a series related to the aggressive defense of copyrights held
by L. Ron Hubbard and the Church of Scientology.287 In Bridge Publications,
Inc. v. Vien,288 the defendant was accused of reproducing or instructing students
to reproduce literary works and sound recordings for use in a for-profit course
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id
287 Perhaps the most significant copyright infringement case involving materials owned
by the Church of Scientology is Religious Tech. Cir. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Also notable is the ruling against the fair use of Hubbard's
writings in a biography. See New Era Publ'n Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1989).
288 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
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taught by the defendant. 289 The opinion glides through the four factors of section
107 with little explanation or analysis, and with little hope of finding fair use; the
court swiftly concluded that all four factors weighed against the defendant.290 The
court added this brief look at the Classroom Guidelines:
Finally, the court finds defendant's use does not fit within the special guidelines
approved by Congress as to fair use in the educational context. Defendant's copying
and use of the works was not restricted to one copy for her own use in teaching.
Additionally, the undisputed evidence shows defendant's copying was not limited and
spontaneous, but was extensive and methodical, and consisted of copying from the
same author, time after time. This is clearly not within the letter or spirit of the
Congressional guidelines.291
Aside from questioning whether the court really understood the standard
prescribed in the guidelines, or whether they should apply at all to for-profit uses,
the application of the Classroom Guidelines in Bridge Publications was
superfluous in light of the drubbing that the court gave the defendant under
section 107. Most importantly, the reference to the Classroom Guidelines was, as
in Kinko's and Marcus, a mechanism available to the judge for reinforcing a
determination already rendered under the statute.
B. Audiovisual Works: Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks
In Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks,292 three plaintiff
companies produced and distributed, for profit, educational audiovisual materials,
mostly on videotape or sixteen-millimeter film.293 The defendants were a
cooperative of public schools in upstate New York and its officers and
directors.2 94 The cooperative, known by the acronym 'BOCES, ' 295 was a
289 Id. at 632. The cursory opinion offers few details about the events in this case. It is a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, and the opinion at its most elaborate states: "Nor is
there a genuine issue of fact regarding defendant's copying of, or directing the copying of, the
copyrighted works. The undisputed evidence shows that defendant copied or directed her
students to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted materials as part of a 'Dynamism' course which she
offered for sale." Id. The opinion later refers obliquely to "sound recordings," "wholesale
copying," and sales of materials to students at $3,000 "for the same purpose intended by
plaintiffs."Id at 632, 634, 636.
290 Id. at 635-36.
291 Id. at 636 (citation omitted).
292 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
293 Id. at 1158.
294 Id. at 1159.
295 The fomal name of 'BOCES" was Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory
District, Erie County, New York. Id. at 1159.
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nonprofit organization funded by nineteen school districts and servicing more
than one hundred schools. 96 BOCES maintained an elaborate and expensive
array of equipment in order to facilitate large-volume recording off-air of
programs transmitted by broadcast or by cable and reproducing those tapes in
quantities for the needs of members. 297 Member schools could request a tape,
which BOCES would make and deliver, and the instructor could play the tape,
generally five or six times, for showing to different sections of a particular
class. 98
The court focused on the four factors of section 107299 and found little
support for the claim of fair use,300 despite some sympathy for the nonprofit
296 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1159.
297Id. at 1162.
298 Id at 1163.
2 99 The case involved activities that occurred before and after January 1, 1978, the
effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, so the text of section 107 was technically not
applicable to all claims of fair use by the defendants. Id at 1160. The court acknowledged that
discrepancy, but was little troubled by it "Section 107 ... which, although not controlling in all
instances here, is intended to be a codification of preexisting law." Id. at 1168. The defendants
unsuccessfully argued that the taping was merely "time-shifting," building upon another case
that found "time-shifting" for private home recording to be fair use. Id at 1163. In the early
1980s, the precedent for time-shifting as fair use was Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a case that was destined for the United States
Supreme Court, which would also hold that private off-air recording of non-subscription
television broadcasts is fair use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984). By the time of deciding Crooks, however, the Sony case had been appealed to
and decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the taping was not fair use.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). Despite
the potential applicability of the Sony decisions, and their mixed results, the court in Crooks
found them to be little help:
Both this case and the conflicting Sony decisions evolve from the relationship of the
copyright laws to the use of new and similar technologies. Beyond this threshold, however, the
similarity ends. The analyses of fair use and the copyright laws in the Sony opinions are at times
helpful and instructive to the legal issues presented here, but the Sony cases are, in comparison
to the instant case, "no more like than an apple to an oyster." Of foremost concern here are the
copyright laws and their application to off-the-air videotape recordings used for classroom
educational use.
Crooks, 542 F. Supp at 1169 (footnote omitted).
300 The court found an improper purpose in light of the "highly sophisticated" system for
copying, the lack of "spontaneity," and the multiple copying. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. The
court also found that the films were educational in "nature" which tipped against fair use in
order to protect the educational market and the revenues from it. Id. at 1177-78. The court
found that the work was also "out-of-print," which could have helped tip the "nature" factor
toward a finding of fair use. Id at 1177. The relevance of a work being out-of-print has had
mixed consequences for fair use. Most authority is consistent with the Crooks decision, holding
that if a work is out-of-print, fair use can apply more liberally. See Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 64 (1965); H.R
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educational purpose.3 01 Although this case involved off-air videotaping of
broadcasts, and the Off-Air Guidelines had been published in the Federal Register
the year before, the court never mentioned them.302 The Classroom Guidelines,
however, did influence the reasoning. The court noted the defendant's lack of
"spontaneity," 30 3 a concept derived from the guidelines 0 4 The Classroom
Guidelines were especially salient when the court determined that the "effecf'
factor weighed heavily against fair use.305 In a peculiar twist on a concept from
the guidelines, the court noted: "The cumulative effect of BOCES' massive
videotape copying indicates that there would be no market whatsoever for
plaintiffs' videotape sales or licensing agreements if off-the-air videotaping of
plaintiffs' works is permitted to continue in an unregulated fashion. '30 6 Under
the guidelines, "cumulative effect" was defined with precise limits on the extent
of copying; by the court's reasoning, cumulative effect gave rise to infringement
when it occurred without "regulation" by BOCES, apparently well beyond strict
numerical limits.3 0 7 Such an analysis leaves open the prospect that "cumulative
effect," if within reasonable policy limits established by the defendant, could in
fact be adverse to the plaintiff, but not so adverse as to tip the fourth factor against
a finding of fair use.308
REP. No. 94-1476, at 67 (1976). By contrast, the Kinko's decision determined that if the work is
out-of-print, fair use applies more narrowly, because royalty payments for rights to make copies
are the only remaining market for the work. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758
F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court also ruled that the "amount' factor weighed
against fair use because of the copying and storing of full copies of films for many years.
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1179. The court was adamant, however, in holding that reproductions
of full copies could still be within fair use. Id. The court quoted from Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973): "the idea that copying an entire copyrighted
work can never be fair use is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions, and
rejected by years of accepted practice." Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1179.
301 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1174.
302 For discussion of the origins of the Off-Air Guidelines, see supra Part II.A.4; see also
Bell, supra note 88 at 170-77.
303 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175.
304 See supra text accompanying note 72.
30 5 The court emphasized that the off-air taping interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to
market the works for educational users and "tend to diminish and prejudice the potential sale of
plaintiffs' works in videotape format." Id. at 1169.
30 6 Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added).
307 Id.
30 8 A crucial word here is "reasonable' BOCES had a "rough rule of thumb" that it
purchased an additional copy of a film after the first copy received thirty "teacher requests" Id
at 1173. The court seemed unimpressed with the looseness of the standard and with the high
ceiling on demands for copies before purchasing another original.
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When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, its reports acknowledged
that some off-air taping for educational use could be fair use.3 09 The court,
however, took a much narrower view of this possibility, noting that the House
report "briefly mentions the possibility that the fair use doctrine may have some
limited application to off-the-air videotaping for nonprofit classroom educational
use."310 The court also looked to the Senate report, which would have allowed
only "temporary use" to fit within fair use.311 In conclusion, the court resolved:
'BOCES' massive and systematic videotape copying and the retention of some
master videotapes for up to ten years cannot be considered 'limited' or fair
use .... "312
Reliance on the Classroom Guidelines in Crooks is deeply flawed. For
example, concepts of "cumulative effect' are vestiges of the Classroom
Guidelines meant for photocopying; the Off-Air Guidelines for videotaping do
not delimit fair use according to "cumulative effect" Turning to any of the
guidelines in this case is suspect. The photocopy guidelines are not germane; the
off-air guidelines were available to the court, but were not in existence at the time
the infiinging event occurred. But the use of the guidelines in this case is no less
extraordinary than the use of the Classroom Guidelines in Kinko's or Texaco,
which involved copying by a for-profit entity.313 Applying guidelines to activities
occurring before the guidelines were negotiated may be inappropriate or unfair;,
similarly, applying the Classroom Guidelines to a for-profit defendant breaks
significantly from the letter and spirit of the guidelines. Nevertheless, these
decisions reveal that courts have little hesitation referring to the guidelines when
they can bolster a case built on uncertain law.
In none of the relevant cases is the application of a set of guidelines a perfect
fit, or even a close fit. Instead, the urge to apply the guidelines is "compelling," in
the words of the Kinko's decision.3 14 The courts are driven to apply the guidelines
in their quest for support; in turn, readers of the decisions are often drawn to the
brief references to guidelines in their search for specific resolution of the fair-use
issues. The circumstances seem no less compelling in the Crooks case. Perhaps
309 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 71 (1976) ("The Committee believes that the fair use
doctrine has some limited application in this area... ."); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 66 (1975).
310 Crookg, 542 F. Supp. at 1181.
311Id
312 Id BOCES also argued that making copies of audiovisual works was within its rights
under section 114 of the 1976 Copyright Act, but the court noted that the argument was a
stretch, given that the provision applies specifically to sound recordings. The court also used the
opportunity to emphasize once again the language from H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976),
affirming that off-air taping is afair-use problem. Id. at 1183.
313 For discussion of the Kinko's and Texaco decisions, see supra Parts m.A.2 and
mIIA.4.
314 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
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they are sufficiently compelling that even though the court really did not apply the
guidelines, many readers of this case have seen the silhouette of the guidelines in
the court's reasoning and have called upon this case for its feeble vindication of
the negotiated stance.
C. Interlibrary Loans: Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States
In the late 1960s the Williams & Wilkins Company, publisher of various
medical journals, brought suit against the National Library of Medicine (NLM)
for making and distributing photocopies of its journal articles in the name of
"interlibrary loans."315 As a legal action against the United States government,
the case began in the U.S. Court of Claims, and the commissioner held that the
copying was beyond the scope of fair use.316 On appeal, the full panel of the
Court of Claims reversed, and held for the library.317 The publisher sought review
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and in 1974 it split four-to-four, with one justice not
participating.3 18 Consequently, the decision from the appellate panel was upheld,
with its finding that the copying in question was fair use.
This case is of considerable importance for several reasons. It revealed the
flexibility of interpreting fair use in the years leading to final passage of the 1976
Act. Stakeholders in the debate over fair use had fresh ammunition for arguing
that fair use was ambiguous not only for them to apply in daily activities, but even
for judges trained in the law. The case further underscored the importance of fair
use for the survival of interlibrary-loan activities, and it gave judicial credence to
the appropriateness of allowing fair-use copying at all for interlibrary sharing of
resources. That fundamental proposition ultimately became part of the 1976 Act
in section 108(g)(2),3 19 and it may not have become part of statutory law had the
Williams & Wilkins case not reached a conclusion at such a propitious time.
More significant, the case is the clearest judicial signal that reasonable
standards or limitations on photocopying for research purposes can pass a fair-use
test, and those reasonable standards in turn became influential on the formulation
of the CONTU Guidelines.320 The NLM based its copying practices on a
"General Interlibrary Loan Code" that had been adopted voluntarily by libraries
cooperating in lending programs.321 As instituted at the NLM, the "Code" meant
315 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 (Cl. Ct. 1973),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 US. 376 (1975). For a most enjoyable look at the
strategy and events surrounding this case, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY.
FROM GUrENBERG TO THE CELESTAL JUKEBOX 78-128 (1994).
316 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1346--47.
3 17 Id at 1363.
318 Williams & Wilkins Co., 420 U.S. 376.
319 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2) (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
320 See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
321 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1348.
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that the library provided only a single copy of an article from a journal issue for
each request, and each copy included a statement that it is for "study or
research." 322 The library also identified 104 "widely-available" journals and
generally refused to fulfill copying requests until the requestor had sought the
journal from nearby libraries that held those more common publications.3 23 The
NLM, nevertheless, would fulfill the request if it came from another government
library, or if the article requested was more than five years old, or if the requestor
had been unsuccessful in securing the article elsewhere.324 The library adhered to
other limits on the number of copies it would provide to each requestor and the
number of pages it would copy from any one journal 25
These limits greatly influenced the court's ruling: '"Both libraries have
declared and enforced reasonably strict limitations which, to our mind, keep the
duplication within appropriate confines. '326 In the end, however, the court looked
to the equitable doctrine of fair use, and turned for guidance to language of
committee reports surrounding the copyright revision bills then in Congress.
Those reports noted the need for interested parties to convene and negotiate a
resolution of a "mutual understanding" and "workable clearance and licensing
conditions. ' 327 Lacking those resolutions, fair use depends on "all the applicable
3 22 Id. The full statement placed on the copies was: "This is a single photostatic copy
made by the National Library of Medicine for purposes of study or research in lieu of lending
the original." Id.
323 Id at 1349.
324Id
325 See id
326 Id at 1354. The court went further and drew analogy to the practice of the Library of
Congress, which permitted individual library users to make their own copies on unsupervised
machines which bore notices that allowed single copies "for the purpose of study, scholarship,
or research." Id at 1356 n.16. The more complete text of the notice on the machines, as
included in the court's opinion, provides "a single photocopy of copyrighted material may be
made only for the purpose of study, scholarship, or research, and for no other purpose" and "the
sale and/or further reproduction of any photocopied copyrighted materials is illegal." Id. The
court viewed the requestor in the interlibrary-loan arrangement to be little different from the
user who comes to the library in person. "The reader who himself makes a copy does so for his
own personal work needs, and individual work needs are likewise dominant in the reproduction
programs of the two medical libraries-programs which are reasonably policed and enforced.'
Id at 1355. Current law of library copying also makes no fundamental distinction between
making copies for a user at the library and for a user who requests the copy from another
library. In either case, the library that is actually making the copy for the user is subject to the
same conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(d)-(e) (1994) (allowing a library to make copies of
articles and other short works, and even entire works, under specific conditions). Only when the
material is sent to another library for delivery to the user is the library that requests the copy
then subject to the added conditions that are the object of interpretation in the CONTU
Guidelines. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(gX2) (1994).
327 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1361 (citing H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 36 (1967)).
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criteria and the facts of the particular case."328 The court concluded that the
libraries had acted consistently with that approach and held that copying an entire
article is not necessarily an infringement3 29 The photocopying by the libraries
was fair use.330 In the summary of its reasons for reaching that conclusion, the
court underscored its desire'for Congress to take the lead in "contriving pragmatic
or compromise solutions which would reflect the legislature's choices of policy
and its mediation among the competing interests." 331
The court's conclusion may have been more prescient than it could have
expected. Just a few years later Congress enacted section 108, which explicitly
permitted photocopies of articles and other short works for library users, whether
on location or through a request from another library.332 Congress also imposed
general limitations on interlibrary arrangements, and the further elaboration of
those limitations fell upon CONTU.333 The CONTU Guidelines for interlibrary
loans embody many of the limitations that the Williams & Wilkins court found to
be persuasive when considering the lawfulness of the NLM photocopying
program.334 Consequently, libraries that rely on the CONTU Guidelines are not
only implementing guidelines that have the support of a congressionally
established commission, but guidelines that have in large substance been the
subject of-or at least have emerged from--judicial analysis. Those circumstance
alone give the CONTU Guidelines greater authority and greater legal credibility
than any of the other guidelines examined in this article.
Although the Williams & Wilkins case may give the CONTU guidelines
important support, the case has been frequently criticized. Nimmer joins a list of
copyright experts who have been highly critical of the Williams & Wilkins ruling:
"This landmark decision by the Court of Claims appears to this writer to be
seriously in error, with implications that might well justify its description by one
of the dissenting judges as 'the Dred Scott decision of copyright law.' 335 A
comparison of fair use to slavery may be hyperbole, but the depth of the criticism
is clear. Nimmer disassembles the internal logic of the ruling, and he argues that
the case is inconsistent with fundamental precepts of fair use.336 The questionable
survival of Williams & Wilkins in future court decisions elevates the importance
32 8 Id.
329 Cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984)
(finding fair use despite reproduction of the entire work). See also supra note 300.
330 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356-57.
331 Id. at 1363.
332 Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976), 90 Stat. 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 108
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
333 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2) (1994).
334 487 F.2d at 1354.
335 4 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 13.05[E][4][c] (footnote omitted).
3 3 6 Id.
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of the passage of section 108(g)(2) to secure limited rights of copying for
interlibrary loans, notwithstanding variable interpretations of fair use.
The CONTU Guidelines further reinforce that lawful opportunity. This
transition from the uncertainty and controversy of fair use to reliance on section
108 is a manifestation of the importance that Congress places on the survival of
interlibrary services and the copying that makes the service and the preservation
of collections possible. Even if Nimmer is correct about traditional fair-use
principles when, for example, he criticizes the decision for placing too much
emphasis on the interest of "medicine and medical research" in general,337
Congress may well have overridden that concern by passing section 108 of the
Copyright Act. Section 108 and the CONTU Guidelines may not be wholly
consistent with fair use, but that conclusion may not be relevant to the merits of
current law for interlibrary services; that law is now rooted in broader principles
of the need for expanding access to materials at remote locations, on urgent
request, and under other circumstances that advance interests of learning and
expanding knowledge in general.
D. Glimpses from the U.S. Supreme Court
Two decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court provide some brief indications
of the Justices' thinking on this matter. In the well-known 1984 decision, Sony
Corporation ofnAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court ruled narrowly
that taping a broadcast television program off the air for later private viewing was
fair use.338 Four Justices dissented, arguing that fair use does not necessarily
allow the making of complete copies of works, even for private use.339 The
dissenters noted, for example, that section 107 of the Copyright Act allows full
copies under certain circumstances 340 :
In other respects, the making of single copies is permissible only within the limited
confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate report [accompanying passage of the
1976 Act], in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes that the fair use
337 See id § 13[E][4][c].
338 464 U.S. 417,455 (1984).
33 9 Id. at 457-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
340 Id. at 464-65. The dissenters noted further that full copies may be allowed under
section 112 (broadcasters may make one copy of transmissions) or copies for blind persons or
copies made by student calligraphers for learning purposes (then solely a matter of fair use, but
today some such copies are allowed under section 121). The list is a peculiar hallmark of the
issues of that time. Id at 464-65 nn. 11 & 12.
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doctrine would permit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the
classroom, but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or treatise.3 4 1
The dissenters made a detailed survey of fair use, with numerous references
to hearings, reports, and other pieces of the legislative history of the Copyright
Act, but the opinion, curiously, never alludes to the Classroom Guidelines. 342 The
Court did not need to make those references, but the opinion seenis to touch every
other relevant issue surrounding the guidelines, including the quotation above
about copies for teaching. Evidently, the Court was avoiding the repercussions of
making any statement about the guidelines in a case where such statements would
be unnecessary and likely inflammatory in the aftermath of a closely divided
decision of importance to the millions of Americans who watch television.
The Sony dissent also examines off-air videotaping in the legislative history
of the fair-use statute.3 43 In a brief examination of off-air videotaping for
educational uses, the Court did not look to the guidelines,344 but it instead referred
to the committee reports from the passage of the 1976 Act to conclude: "Even in
the context of highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided this
temptation [to 'stretch' fair use for new technologies]; in passing the 1976 Act,
Congress made it clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in
very limited situations. '345 This heavy emphasis on the legislative history, with
scrupulous avoidance of the guidelines themselves, is consistent with the
dissenters' discussion of photocopies for education: considerable detail from the
reports and hearings, but no mention of the guidelines. 3 46 Inferences from
omissions are hazardous, at best. Yet, amidst detailed examination of the
legislative history, the omission of any mention of the guidelines begs questions
about their significance as a gauge of the law or even of congressional intent.
The following year, in 1985, the Court ruled in Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises347 that a magazine exceeded the limits of fair use when
it made brief quotations . from President Gerald Ford's then unpublished
341 Id at 465. The dissenters proceeded to cite S. REP. No. 94-473, at 63-64 (1975) and
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69,71 (1976).
342 Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-86.
343 Id. at 480-81.
344 See Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4.
345 Sony, 464 U.S. at 481. The opinion cites H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 71 (1976), and S.
REP. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975).
346 The Off-Air Guidelines may be distinguished in this context from the Classroom
Guidelines, because the former did not exist until 1981 and thus were not truly evidence of
congressional intent supporting passage of the 1976 Act. Yet the dissenting opinion in Sony
mentions neither set of guidelines, even the Classroom Guidelines as they appeared in the H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976). See Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,476
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
347 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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memoirs.348 The Court drew some of its fair-use analysis from the legislative
history of the 1976 Act, noting that the Senate Report "selected photocopying of
classroom materials to illustrate fair use."1349 In the process, the Court lent some
credibility to the Classroom Guidelines. The Senate Report includes some
analysis of classroom photocopying, but that language was omitted from the
subsequent House Report. The Court did not view the omission as a retraction of
principles in the Senate Report, but instead the Court made this explanation:
It appears instead that the fair use discussion of photocopying of classroom materials
was omitted from the final [House] Report because educators and publishers in the
interim had negotiated a set of guidelines that rendered the discussion obsolete. The
House Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by reference, citing to the
Senate Report and stating: "the Committee has reviewed this discussion, and
considers it still has value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use]
problem" 350
This approach is little more than a recognition that the Classroom Guidelines
exist, without offering them any support or criticism. The Court did not need to
give them any substantive look. The issue of classroom copying was not at issue
in this case, and the discussion of classroom copying was only a model for
understanding fair use in general. If anything, the Court's passing mention of
classroom copying and the guidelines is a reminder that the Court will look
primarily to general principles of fair use in its quest to resolve an issue before it,
but guidelines continue to surface in the quest for fair use.351
34 8 Id at 569.
349 Id at 553.
350 Id at 554 (citations omitted).
35 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed directly the issues surrounding
photocopying for teaching or research purposes. The Sony and Harper & Row cases are the
Court's only mentions of the Classroom Guidelines. In 1994 one more passing mention of
classroom photocopying was buried in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994), the well-known decision involving the rap-parody version of Roy Orbison's song "Oh,
Pretty Woman." The "purpose' factor under section 107 may weigh in favor of fair use under
various circumstances, including if the use is "transformative." Id. at 579 n.1 1. Transformative
use was a critical part of the analysis in a case involving a significant variation on an existing
song. Transformative use usually does not occur in a case of simple photocopying. At least two
cases have found straight photocopying to be non-transformative and therefore the purpose
factor weighed against fair use. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99
F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
Yet in a passing mention in the Campbell decision the U.S. Supreme Court made this strong
statement about fair use and classroom copying: "the obvious statutory exception to this focus
on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom
distribution." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.1 1. The source of this conclusion is the language of
section 107 itself, which, in listing the types of activities to which fair use may apply, mentions
"teaching," followed by this parenthetical statement: "including multiple copies for classroom
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E. Synthesis of the Cases
In almost twenty-five years of fair-use guidelines, only a few court rulings
have been relevant to the intended applications of the guidelines. None of the
principal cases is actually within the scope of the guidelines; none involves copies
made for nonprofit educational purposes. The courts have stretched application of
the guidelines not to find a foundation for a ruling, but instead to reinforce a
ruling already reached. However, outside the scope of these few cases where the
courts were willing to stretch guidelines to copying for profit, whether conducted
by a researcher or by Kinko's, most courts have not been willing to make similar
leaps.3 52
Applying the guidelines in any case beyond the literal situations they
encompass is a risky proposition for all interested parties. Imagine either of two
situations. First, suppose the court in Texaco had applied the four factors and
concluded, as it did, that the copying was not fair use.3 53 Then the court looked to
the Classroom Guidelines, and by analogy to single copies of articles for teaching
and research, concluded that the copying taking place inside Texaco Inc. was
within the "spirit" of the guidelines and hence perhaps within fair use after all.
Under this proposition, the conflict between law and guidelines would be overt,
and the publishers in the Texaco case would ultimately be arguing for a reading of
fair use that conflicts with the court's understanding of guidelines that the
publishers has supported for many years.
The second situation is the reverse. Imagine that the Texaco court ruled that
the copying was within fair use, after applying the statutory factors. Then it
looked to the guidelines and resolved that the for-profit activity was clearly not
within the guidelines, and that application of the guidelines was "compelling." 354
use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The Court's recognition of the importance of this provision is
well deserved. The clause was a late addition to the language of section 107 shortly before
passage of the Copyright Act in 1976, and its addition to the pending bill was a careful and
deliberate step to articulate the intent of Congress that straight copying was within the
congressional understanding of fair use. This conclusion is hardly an open door for all
classroom copying to be fair use, but it is an indication that classroom copying is generally
favored under the law and need not be subject to a test of "transformative" use. This broad
acknowledgement of allowing direct copies suggests that rigorous conditions on portion limits
and restrictions in the guidelines maybe in disregard of the special deference Congress gave to
education when exercising fair use.
352 For example, in Texaco, 60 F.3d at 915, the Second Circuit ruled that single copies of
articles for research are not fair use. Although these basic facts are similar to some conditions
outlined in the Classroom Guidelines, the facts were also critically different. The research was
in the context of a for-profit entity, and the copies were not made for private research or for
teaching preparation. See also supra Part III.AA.
3 53 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 932.
354The Kinko's decision found application of the Classroom Guidelines was
"compelling." See supra text accompanying notes 231.
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Again, the court would have found a conflict between its reading of the law and
its application of the guidelines.
Either of these situations creates a direct conflict between law and guidelines.
How might the court respond to that conflict? Clearly the court should respond by
giving the law precedence over the guidelines. But perhaps the prospect of such
an awkward conflict reveals the limited significance of the courts' utilization of
the guidelines in actual cases; the guidelines were raised only to affirm a decision
already rendered. The guidelines were not even part of a fresh perspective on the
legalities of fair use. They were not even truly given a separate analysis. They
were reinforcement to give the ruling a slightly stronger foundation and to give
the judges a slightly stronger sense of having reached a correct conclusion. The
guidelines simply would not have been deployed by the court had they stirred a
contradictory result and posed yet a further challenge for a judge needing to make
practical sense of fair use. These succinct hypothetical situations, reinforced by
the way guidelines are used in actual court cases, demonstrate that the guidelines
ultimately have not been adopted as a legal foundation for fair use, but rather are a
tool of convenience to achieve a desired result.
What then is the real meaning of the Classroom Guidelines as revealed in
these cases? On the one hand, if the guidelines are useful tools for judges and
other arbiters of fair-use controversies, then they are still only a tool for bolstering
a decision already made after applying the four factors of section 107 to the facts
of the case. For educators and others who need to live by some measure of fair
use for routine classroom copying, the cases manifest some definite lessons about
the weaknesses of the guidelines. They are not the law. They may even contradict
the law in past and future cases. For all practical purposes, courts may view them
as a "safe harbor," but even many of the most vigorous supporters will not give
them that level of credibility.355 On the other hand, if the courts look to them as
crutches, in roughly analogous cases, one can be certain that a court will look to
the guidelines in a case against an educator or educational institution-the
situations where the guidelines are intended to apply. Yet the cases from the past
also suggest that the court will most certainly look to the guidelines only after
applying the four factors. Thus, even when guidelines are available for a specific
application, educators would be remiss to rely on them without applying the four
factors that actually form the foundation of fair-use law.
IV. CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF FAIR-USE GUiDELINEs
Building upon the preceding foundation of legal analysis, this Part IV of the
article will test the validity of various perceptions and characterizations attributed
to the guidelines. Those characterizations will be grouped in classifications that
reflect the broader impressions that guidelines have made on the community
3 55 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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working with fair use. Some examinations lead to the conclusion that guidelines
are a measure of fair-use law. Other reviews have given them weight as
legislative history, perhaps revealing congressional intent about the meaning of
fair use. Still other characterizations see the guidelines as private tools for
applying fair-use principles only to the parties that assent, or as evidence of
acceptable or tolerable behavior.
This scrutiny of the guidelines will reject the validity of most common
perceptions of the guidelines. Part V of this article will offer to replace those
faulty characterizations with a fresh comprehension that reflects more accurately
the legal status of the guidelines.
A. Guidelines and the Law
1. Guidelines as a Measure ofFair Use
All of the guidelines fail any valid claim that they might have binding, legal
authority.356 Congress never enacted them.357 No court ever has read them into
law in a legal decision.358 From a source-based analysis, one can unequivocally
conclude that the guidelines are not themselves binding on the public as a rule of
law.359 That conclusion, however, begs the remaining question: could the
guidelines still be an accurate statement of fair-use law, even though they have
not been specifically adopted by a lawmaking authority? Just because the courts
have not adopted the guidelines does not necessarily mean that they do not
embody an accurate measure of fair use for the limited situations they describe.
No court has had such a case for actually testing the guidelines.
Indeed, the circumstances in the cases examined in this article have departed
greatly from the limits of the guidelines. According to the MDS decision, for
example, the use was 'light years beyond" the limits of fair use articulated in the
Classroom Guidelines.3 60 Without a court ruling on facts resembling the
guidelines, the outcome of such a decision is somewhat, although not entirely,
speculative. Some suggestions of such a ruling appear in a few of the existing
cases. The Kinko's case, for example, made a fairly meticulous review of the
356 See, e.g., Jonathan Zavin, Copyright Infringement Litigation, 567 PLIPAT 327, 331
(July-Aug. 1999) (arguing that Classroom Guidelines lack the force of law).
357 The guidelines that have been presented to Congress have received only positive
comments in reports, but never have they been carried any further toward legislation. For
discussion of such treatment of the guidelines, see infra Part IV.AA.
358 For discussion of the treatment of the guidelines in court rulings, see supra Part III.
359 Part V of this article will examine the "pedigree" of the guidelines with respect to the
authority of their sources and their relationship to positive law.
360 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th
Cir. 1996).
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guidelines,361 and the court ultimately rejected urgings by the publishers to
endorse one important prohibition in the Classroom Guidelines.362 Thus, the court
found that the Classroom Guidelines were, at least in that one important respect,
not consistent with fair use and were instead more restrictive than the law actually
allowed.3 63 Even a for-profit copyshop, where fair use is relatively narrow, was
not held to the full sweep of restrictions in the guidelines. If the guidelines were
an attempt to express the actual law of fair use, they failed in at least one critical
respect that was oftremendous importance to the plaintiffs.
Language directly from other court opinions further affirms that the
guidelines are not likely to be accepted as a statement of law. Typical of a court's
view of the Classroom Guidelines is this statement from Marcus v. Rowley:
"Thus, while they are not controlling on the court, they are instructive on the issue
of fair use in the context of this case."364
Guidelines are far from law in many other respects, both substantively and
structurally. The Classroom Guidelines are again the most salient case on point.
They seek to quantify a law that Congress took pains to keep flexible. 65 They
also introduce variables in the fair-use equation that appear nowhere in the
statute.366 Specifically, fair use under the statute depends on the four factors of
purpose, nature, amount, and effect.3 67 The guidelines, however, make fair use
dependent on brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect 368 By focusing on those
variables, rather than the statutory four factors, guidelines depart abruptly from
the law itself and may in fact make decisions based upon standards that are
legally less sound. To the extent that the variables from the Classroom Guidelines
have recast conceptualizations and articulations of fair use, the guidelines may be
a subversive force on the law, as they purport to displace the congressionally
sanctioned factors with a privately negotiated alternative.3 69
361 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535-37 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
36 2 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
3 63 See supra text accompanying note 238.
364 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983).
36 5 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976).
36 6 Id. at 68-69, 71 (1976).
367 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
36 8 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
369 Not only do the Classroom Guidelines replace legal factors with negotiated factors, but
the guidelines also replace the balancing test of fair use with a requirement that users satisfy all
of the factors in the guidelines. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 11 ("All four tests [brevity,
spontaneity, cumulative effect, and inclusion of notice] must be satisfied to provide Fair Use
protection for multiple copying.").
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One of the most salient examples of such variation from the law is
"spontaneity. '370 The Classroom Guidelines introduced this concept explaining
that copying must be "at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher,"
and that the decision to use the work must be "so close in time" to the 'moment
of its use" that permission is not likely to be obtainable.3 71 This type of
"spontaneity" may be evidence that the copying is for educational purposes,
consistent with the "purpose" factor of the statute.3 72 Spontaneity may also be
evidence that the ability to seek and secure permission is not practical, so a charge
for fees is also unlikely. Such circumstance may evidence that the copying has
little adverse market effect consistent with the last factor under the fair-use
statute. To that extent the guidelines may offer one possible means toward
satisfying the law. But in this context, the guidelines are vastly overreaching.
First they tend to freeze the means for satisfying the fair-use statute, when
multitudes of possibilities for defining fair use ought to have the same credibility
as any other possibility.373 Second, they give the impression that "spontaneity"
and other concepts really are part of fair use. That misperception has been
prevalent in many of the CONFU meetings, where participants often demanded
that statements of fair use include a "spontaneity" requirement. Spontaneity may
well be evidence relevant to some of the fair-use factors, but it is hardly required.
The guidelines have been construed as if to require it.
Another prominent conflict between the guidelines and the law is with
respect to the "amount" factor. The amount allowed under many of the guidelines
is both rigid and minuscule.374 Perhaps the narrowest quantum of copying in any
case that identified an infringement was in the Harper & Row v. Nation Enters.
decision from the United States Supreme Court in 1985, holding that a quotation
of only about three hundred words in a publication was an infringement.375
370 Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use: The Duplication of
Error, 39 J. COPYRJGHT SOC'YU.S.A. 345,386 (1992).
371 According to the Classroom Guidelines: "The copying is at the instance and
inspiration of the individual teacher," and "[t]he inspiration and decision to use the work and the
moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be
unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission.' See Classroom Guidelines,
supra note 4, at 69.
372 At least one case has used "spontaneity' in this context See Am. Geophysical Union
v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1994).
373 The Classroom Guidelines first appeared in the House Report from 1976, and they
directly contradicted statements in that report against "freezing" fair use. H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 66 (1976) ("There is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change.").
3 74 L. Ray Patterson, Regents Guide to Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair
Use, 5 J. INTEL PRoP. L. 243, 283 (1997) ("Quantifying fair use is contrary to the statutory
right of-fair use, which authorizes the user to exercise his or her judgment in accordance with
the provisions of section 107.").
375 471 U.S. 539, 565 n.8, 569 (1985).
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Although that case dealt with reproduction and publication of the materials, the
exceedingly brief excerpt was within the tight parameters of "brevity" laid out in
the Classroom Guidelines.3 76 On the other hand, Harper & Row also involved the
surreptitious taking and use of an unpublished manuscript and knowingly
jeopardizing sales of the work once published-facts that also militated against a
finding of fair use.377
By contrast, when the facts involve earnest and good-faith uses of published
works, in ways that do not likely hann significant sales-as would often be the-
situation with common copies for classroom distribution-the outcome in a court
case is likely to be completely different. Such was the case of Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell,378 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the use of
extensive excerpts from one book into a later publication. There the court ruled
that copying as much as seven thousand words was fair use.379 The cap of one
thousand words under the "brevity" element of the Classroom Guidelines seems
paltry by comparison.
Despite the many problems with the Classroom Guidelines in particular, they
have had an irresistible appeal for many people who perhaps ought to know
better. The judge in the Kinko's case, for example, called application of the
guidelines in that case "compelling,"380 despite their inapplicability to for-profit
copying3 81 and despite finding that the guidelines are not entirely a good
summary of the law.382 Even a prominent copyright treatise, Nimmer on
Copyright, makes what might be best called an overreaching conclusion about the
Classroom Guidelines. Nimmer correctly emphasizes that the guidelines "purport
to state merely the minimum extent of fair use in connection with teacher
photocopying."383 Nimmer also adds that the guidelines are not controlling on a
court, citing language from Marcus v. Rowley.3 84 Yet in an odd twist, Nimmer
underscores that the House Report containing the original guidelines385 does not
control the definition of fair use, but he concludes that the guidelines are
practically the embodiment of law:
376 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68 (allowing, for example, an instructor to
photocopy for distribution up to one thousand words from an article).
377 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
378 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
379 Id. at 1257, 1263.
380 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 n.1 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
381 Id at 1535--36.
382 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
383 4 NIMMERON CoPY'r, supra note 7, § 13.05[E][3][a].
384 Id.; Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983).
385H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-71 (1976).
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Strictly speaking, the guidelines represent merely the Congressional
Committees' "understanding" of what the courts would regard as fair use in applying
the traditional judicial doctrine of fair use. Congress does not purport to substitute its
judgment for that of the courts in any particular case. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
the courts will be greatly influenced by this "understanding," so that for practical
purposes the guidelines may usually be regarded as the equivalent of statutory text 38 6
Nimmer builds his case on matters of no precedential value, and which
involve no judicial decision: the 1983 settlement of the lawsuit against New York
University387 and an opinion of the Attorney General of Kansas.388 Nimmer also
depends heavily on Marcus v. Rowley,3 89 but that court carefully avoided reading
the guidelines into the law.3 90 The Kinko's court may have reflected common
sentiment when it called the Classroom Guidelines "compelling,"39' but Nimmer
is without justification when he equates them with statutory status.
2. Guidelines as a Minimum Scope ofFair Use-the "Safe Harbor"
The original language from the Classroom Guidelines and the Music
Guidelines began the notion that guidelines are an expression of "minimum"
concepts of fair use.3 92 By their own terms those guidelines "state the minimum
and not the maximum standards of educational fair use under section 107.393 The
Court of Appeals in Marcus v. Rowley accordingly declared: 'The guidelines
were intended to represent minimum standards of fair use.1394 The Uniform
Preamble of the CONFU guidelines carries a similar message in considerably
different terms: 'Uses that exceed these guidelines may or may not be fair use.
The endorsers also agree that the more one exceeds these guidelines, the greater
386 4 NIMMR ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 13.05[E][3][a] (footnotes omitted). Another
major treatise on copyright law takes a comparatively subdued and objective approach to the
Classroom Guidelines: "The guidelines, which do not have the controlling force of law, aim to
create a safe harbor for classroom photocopying." 2 PAUL GOLDsEN, COPYRIGHT § 10.22.1
(2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998).
387 For discussion of the NYU case, see supra Part III.A.1.
388 Op. Att'y Gen. Kan., 1981 COPYRiGHrL. DEC. (CCH) 25,331 (1981).
389 695 F.2d at 1178-79.
390 For discussion of the Marcus case and its use of the guidelines, see supra Part I.A.5s
274-86.
391 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
392 David I Bianchi et al., Comment, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.:
PotentialLiabilityfor Classroom Anthologies, 18 J.C. & U.L. 595, 606 (1992).
393 Music Guidelines, supra note 4, at 71; see, eg., Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at
68.
394 695 F.2d at 1178.
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the risk that fair use does not apply."395 While this language does not explicitly
describe the guidelines as "minimum" standards, the implication that they
represent some version of a minimalist interpretation is clear. The CONFU
preamble does make explicit that something beyond the limits of the guidelines
may still be fair use.39 6
Another articulation of a "minimal" concept of the guidelines is the
appellation "safe harbor." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals called the
Classroom Guidelines a "safe harbor" in the MDS case.3 97 The district court in
Kinko 's also referred to them as a "safe harbor,"398 but equivocated. That court
seemed to reserve the possibility that copying beyond the guidelines may be fair
use, but copying within them may also be infringement: "courts must balance the
interests involved."399
The label "safe harbor" was an object of steady attention and diligent
rejection in the CONFU negotiations400 Many participants were accustomed to
calling the earlier guidelines a "safe harbor," and they saw in the language of the
CONFU preamble and in the nature of the discussions that the next generation of
guidelines would also take the same construct. The guidelines would be a
minimal measure of fair use, where one would most assuredly be free from
infifngement risks. Additional fair use would be possible, but with no assurance
of protection from liability. Many representatives of the commercial publishing
industry eschewed that vision. They sought instead to preserve the right to bring
an infringement action against uses that are within the guidelines, however remote
the desirability of such an action may be.
The purported "final" meeting of CONFU, on May 19, 1997, brought the
beginning of change and some crucial reinforcement of the "safe harbor" concept
for guidelines.40 1 Representatives of the Association of American Publishers
(AAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc., announced in the open meeting that they would
regard the Multimedia Guidelines to be a safe harbor, and that they would not
bring a lawsuit against nonprofit educational institutions that remain within the
395 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
396 This particular clause in the preamble has been a point of serious contention among
CONFU participants. Some negotiators have understood it as a generous expression of
openness to possible fair use beyond the defined limits of the guidelines. Other negotiators have
seen the language as an anchor on the flexibility of fair use, constantly pulling one back to the
gravitational center of the stated limits of the guidelines.
397 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir.
1996).
398 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
399 Ia. at 1536 (citing 4 NIMER ON COPYRiGHT, supra note 7, at § 13.05[E], at 13-96).
400 These observations from CONFU meetings are from the author's personal
participation in the discussions.
401 Id
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guidelines. Their change of position was an important development, but it did not
achieve full assurance. The Authors League of America responded that it was not
prepared to give up the right to bring an action against even "minimal" activities.
The League's representative pointedly called the guidelines, at best, a "safer
harbor."402
The guidelines may ultimately fail to pass complete scrutiny as "minimal"
standards or as a safe harbor.403 Until the prospective plaintiffs-particularly the
commercial publishers and authors--unequivocally give the guidelines an
identity as a zone of safety, the guidelines may never attain the degree of
assurance necessary to attract broad-based consensus for the standards. The AAP
and others undoubtedly changed their position and declared the Multimedia
Guidelines to be a "safe harbor" in order to attract added support for the
guidelines, especially from educators who may be looking for sure protection
from liability.
Theoretically, a court could read a set of guidelines into the law of fair use
and declare them to be a zone of safety, or Congress could stake out a similar
position by statute. But the courts and Congress have avoided exactly those
possibilities. The notion of a safe harbor may have some intuitive appeal, but it
could have important detrimental consequences. A "safe harbor" would be a
major step toward freezing fair use and undermining its flexibility. 404 In the end,
the concept of safe harbor may be established only by the private parties who give
the guidelines their shape and existence in the first -place. Without near unanimity
among the publishers, authors, and other copyright owners, the concept of a Iruly
safe harbor for any set of guidelines is fatally flawed. As long as the right to sue
or even threaten to sue a party remains, the harbor has rough water and mines.
3. Guidelines as a Maximum Scope ofFair Use
To call the guidelines a "maximum" measure of fair use may defy logic and
contradict the language of "minimum" standards.4 05 Indeed, rational arguments
and plain statements from the text of the guidelines and some relevant cases point
to conceptualizing the guidelines as minimum standards,406 or even perhaps a
402 Id.
4 03 Nevertheless, the perception of a "safe harbor" persists with some inference of its
benefits. See Salomon & Pierce, supra note 64, at 325 ('These understandings between
educators and copyright owners have served as 'safe harbor' standards for fair use and have, to
some degree, reduced uncertainty and transaction costs for educators.").
404 Contra H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (stating, "there is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change").
4 05 Klingspom, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that universities adopt the guidelines as
maximum standards).
4 06 See supa Part IV.A.2.
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definition of fair use itself4 07 Yet some suggestion of "maximum" limits
surround the guidelines.40 8
The most prominent example of a maximum standard is the use of the
Classroom Guidelines in the settlement of the New York University case4 09
There the settlement required faculty members and others at NYU to seek advice
of university counsel before exceeding the guidelines 4 10 As a practical matter,
that advice is not readily forthcoming, and the guidelines consequently become
the limit of fair use for classroom photocopying. Moreover, the wording of the
settlement agreement and the consequent policy statement for the NYU
community was built on the Classroom Guidelines, but omitting the prefatory
paragraph assuring that the guidelines are "the minimum and not the maximum
standards" of fair use4 11 By their plain language and their practical effect, the
NYU settlement made maximums of minimums.412
Further, the guidelines themselves may include language of "minimum"
standards, but they also include some overt maximum standards. The inclusion of
"prohibitions" in the Classroom Guidelines, and similar outer boundaries in the
Multimedia Guidelines, is an attempt to establish caps on fair use. One such
prohibition-regarding the making of anthologies-was asserted against the
defendant in the Kinko's decision 4 13 The plaintiffs urged the court to adopt a
sweeping prohibition against all coursepacks, in accord with the prohibition from
4 07 See supra Part IVA. 1.
4 08 See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 137, 142 n.26 (1993) (expressing concern over mischaracterizations of the guidelines as
maximum standards).
4 09 See supra Part IlI.A.1.
410 Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University Research or
Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'YU.SA. 181,202 (1992).
411 The Uniform Preamble to the CONFU Guidelines, CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 31-32, includes this statement: "This Preamble is an integral part of these guidelines
and should be included whenever the guidelines are reprinted or adopted by organizations and
educational institutions." Inclusion of that statement is a direct result of the experience of the
NYU case and the stripping off of the prefatory paragraph that put the guidelines in an
important context. The author of this article is hardly a supporter of the CONFU Guidelines, but
he is the author of that one sentence and pressed the CONFU negotiators to include it in order to
prevent a repeat of the NYU experience with parties under pressure accepting bowdlerized
versions of the guidelines, if they choose to accept them at all. For a discussion of the NYU
case and the use of guidelines in the settlement, see supra Part II.A.1.
4 121Some educators and librarians fear that one particular statement in the Uniform
Preamble of the CONFU Guidelines will have an effect of drawing any innovations in fair use
back to the limits of the guidelines, thus making effective maximums of the CONFU
Guidelines by putting an onerous burden on users to justify their activities in light of the four
factors of fair use and from a frame of reference of the guidelines.
4 13 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
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the Classroom Guidelines. The court refused to accept it 4 14 The court, in fact,
rejected that prohibition, signaling an unwillingness to view even a narrow aspect
of the guidelines as a mandate. In sum, the Classroom Guidelines may have been
adopted as a maximum in the NYU settlement, and some of the guidelines may
include attempts to limit fair use, but no court has accepted those boundaries 4 15
4. Guidelines as Legislative History
The appearance of some guidelines in congressional reports, and even in a
"nonlegislative" report,4 16 has been cited as a source of authority for the
standards. Positive congressional action may well have considerable influence on
the decisionmaker seeking to identify and apply a standard when faced with a
fair-use problem. But appearance in legislative history obviously does not give
the guidelines the force of law, and may not even give them much credibility in
the interpretation of fair use under current doctrine. Legislative history, quite
simply, is no longer given the strong weight it may once have held in statutory
interpretation.417
Not only might legislative history play a diminishing role in current legal
doctrine, but a closer look at the legislative history regarding fair use suggests that
Congress may have been applauding the process of guideline development as
much as the content of the finished work.418 To the extent that Congress offered
compliments, it seemed as pleased with a resolution and a cooperative process as
much as with the substantive outcome. At no time did Congress scrutinize or
414 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("The fact that Congress has set forth a statement in its Classroom Guidelines that
anthologizing is prohibited does not require this court to paint with the broad brush plaintiffs
suggest").
415 Yet the perception of the guidelines as the limits of fair use continues. See Robert
Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator's Right to Photocopy Copyrighted Materialfor Classroom
Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271,289 (1993) (finding that the Classroom Guidelines "have the potential
for obstructing the fair-use analysis by creating a perception that anything outside the
Guidelines is unfair").
4 16 The Multimedia Guidelines were the subject of a "nonlegislative repore' from a
congressional committee. See supra text accompanying note 215-16.
4 17 See generally Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on
Legislative History: The Impact ofJustice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. L ON LEGIS. 369 (1999);
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1998); Robert C. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative
History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1996).
The dissent in the MDS decision used this argument against the Classroom Guidelines. See
supra text accompanying notes 259-65.
418 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) ('The Committee appreciates and commends
the efforts and the cooperative and reasonable spirit of the parties who achieved the agreed
guidelines on books and periodicals and on music.").
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question the content of the guidelines. If the guidelines are to serve the needs of
parties who agree to them, then Congress need not look closely at the terms. If the
guidelines are to become a surrogate for law, then congressional examination
would be helpful, if not essential. The lack of close examination of the guidelines'
content suggests that Congress was endorsing the effort, not the substance. 419
Nevertheless, some lingering references to the guidelines as legislative
history appear in some cases. The Kinko's decision placed considerable weight on
the fact that the Classroom Guidelines were a part of the legislative record. In
dismissing general criticism of the guidelines as a "concession forced on
educators," the court refused to dissect the processes leading to the guidelines and
concluded that "[t]he congressional record must speak for itself."420 Elevating the
guidelines to the level of congressional recognition had the effect of undermining
any effort to investigate the circumstances of their origins and the relative
representation of the interests in'the copyright debate, because: 'This court is in
no position to retrospectively evaluate the quality of debate and parsing of
privileges and responsibilities during Congress' or these groups'
deliberations." 421
Dissenters in the MDS case, by contrast, attacked reliance on the guidelines
as legislative history in support of fair-use interpretation 422 That opinion made
ample use of recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court undercutting the
value of legislative history for statutory interpretation and narrowing the
circumstances under which courts ought to look to legislative history at all.423
Moreover, the majority opinion in MDS acknowledged that Congress may well
have intended to accept a changing scope of allowable copying in light of
changing circumstances and technologies. Thus, the legislative history that
captures the sentiment of Congress in 1976 may be inconsistent with the larger
concept of a fluid and flexible fair use. With reliance on legislative history falling
out of favor, and with the guidelines revealing little of Congress's substantive
understanding of fair use, the persuasive authority of the various guidelines as an
indication of congressional intent seems to be of little significance.
4 19 The most recent example is the "Nonlegislative Report" about the Multimedia
Guidelines. The language of that short document borrows heavily from the text of the Uniform
Preamble to the CONFU Guidelines. See CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14 n.48, 31-
32. It ultimately provides only broad, general statements about fair use and the role of
guidelines, then applauds the efforts of the negotiators to reach agreement
420 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp, 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.10 (S.).N.Y.
1991).
421 Id.
4 22 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410-12 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
423 Id. at 1411.
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5. Guidelines as an Instrumentfor Judicial Deisionmaking
Anyone who has struggled with understanding the meaning of fair use in any
situation can certainly sympathize with judges who face the same problem and
must justify a conclusion in a published opinion. In retrospect the Classroom
Guidelines are relatively easy to apply post-hoe to facts that have already
transpired, especially in a mechanical manner that overlooks their "minimal"
character. Such is the way the guidelines are used in judicial rulings. Yet to apply
them after the fact, especially if the court already has applied the statutory factors,
the court avoids the struggle of faculty and others who must determine through
foresight whether some planned activity will be fair use 4 24
B. Guidelines and Their Parties
1. Guidelines as Agreements Not to Sue
Most of the discussion of possible characterizations of the fair-use guidelines
portrays them in their relationship to society at large, or at least to the members of
society who are affected by the relevant decisions surrounding fair use. But the
guidelines may also be considered as instruments that define relationships among
the parties themselves. In this regard, the guidelines may be viewed as private
compacts that have some binding quality on the named supporters, and not on all
educators or other vast groups.
The defendant in the MDS case, for example, argued to the Sixth Circuit that
the Classroom Guidelines are an agreement by the AAP on behalf of its members
not to sue a nonprofit educational institution that remains within the stated
standards.4 25 It may have been a self-serving description by a litigant seeking to
424 This article earlier makes the assertion that judges have used the guidelines as a crutch
to support a decision that is based on the four factors of the law itself. See supra Part III.E.
425 Kenneth D. Crews, Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc.: Notes
from rehearing en banc before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (1996), at http'/wAvw.
iupui.edu/-copyinfo/mdshrg.htrnl. This description also begs questions about the ability of the
AAP to act on behalf of its members. In all of the discussion of guidelines as "agreements," one
must look critically at the scope of subject matter to which any party has the authority to reach
agreement. In the case of the AAP, for example, it may or may not have authority to reach
agreement binding on its members; agreements in the name of the organization may be binding
only on the organization itself. On the other hand, an agreement by the AAP not to bring an
infringement action is a significant step with considerable consequence for its members.
Infringement litigation is expensive, but if well organized and strategically executed, the parties
can gain the greatest influence from successful litigation. Moreover, strategic planning should
help avoid initiating a lawsuit that has significant chance of not succeeding. To that end, the
AAP has organized and supported the major recent litigation of relevance to this study, such as
Princeton University Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996);
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); Basic Books, Inc v.
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avoid application of the guidelines and advance the chance of winning a case, but
the description is rational and perhaps even apt. An agreement that a set of
guidelines is a "minimum" standard of fair use is tantamount to an
acknowledgement that an infringement lawsuit against activities within the
standard will fail. That concession, however, is not the same as an agreement not
to sue. One may still bring an infringement case, regardless of how feeble the
chances of winning. To agree that the guidelines are minimal fair use is more akin
to calling them a "safe harbor," which already has been shown as a problematic
appellation.426 To call them agreements not to sue is to take the notion one step
further and to say that the parties have given up their right to test whether activity
within the guidelines may nevertheless be infringing. Nothing in the guidelines
themselves suggests that the parties really have forgone their right to go to court.
Given the strident avoidance of the "safe harbor" concept by some parties4 27 they
would most certainly reject any suggestion that they have further given up their
right to bring a case to court.
2. Guidelines as Agreement among the Parties Regarding Fair Use
An essential quality of the fair-use guidelines is that they have been offered as
a standard that may be adopted and employed by limitless persons and
organizations seeking to understand and apply fair use. They are not limited in
their application only to the parties who state their acceptance or endorsement at
the end of negotiations. 428 The use of guidelines in litigation demonstrates that
they are advocated as standards of general or universal applicability. Yet options
for understanding and applying fair use do exist. One can turn to the factors in the
statute and case analysis; less prominent interpretations of fair use are also
available.4 29 Consequently, the guidelines may not have the universal
applicability that they would appear to have. Thus, they may instead reflect a
private understanding of fair use that is applicable only to the guidelines'
endorsers.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and the New York University
case. For further background about the earliest of these cases and events leading to them, see
CREWS, supra note 50, at 43-55. Thus, an agreement by the AAP not to sue may, for all
practical purposes, be an agreement by most of its members also not to file the action.
426 See supra Part IV.A.2.
427 See supra text accompanying notes 400-402.
428 Patterson, supra note 374, at 282 (commenting on the Classroom Guidelines: "Private
agreements do not eviscerate constitutionally based rights granted by congressional statutes-at
least for those who are not parties to the agreement").
429 See, e.g., ALA MODEL POLICY, supra note 4.
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Of course, the parties would object strongly to this characterization.4 30 First,
it would confine the effectiveness of the guidelines to the specific parties. That the
guidelines would have some purported consequences for others who were not
parties to the negotiations or agreement is the essence of their perceived value.
The negotiators, quite simply, sought to define fair use for the broader public.43
1
Second, this characterization might make the guidelines actually binding on the
parties. The endorsing parties would probably want to avoid this result as well.
Few copyright owners have been prepared to call the guidelines a "safe
harbor."432 Fewer still would likely concede the right to bring an action against a
use within the guidelines. Similarly, few educators and librarians have been
willing to accept the guidelines as the limit of fair use; fewer still would likely
enter into a binding commitment to follow the guidelines.
This conception of guidelines also does not reflect the reality of the meeting
of the minds among the parties. The parties agreed on their interpretation of fair
use, and not on a licensing of rights. The distinction is critical. First, the parties
who negotiate and sign their names to any of the guidelines are often not
4 30 At least one court apparently rejected such a characterization. In reacting to testimony
from a copyright law professor, the Kinko's court made this observation:
There was testimony introduced at trial by Professor Peter Jaszi that the Guidelines was no
compromise but in fact a concession forced on educators. This testimony was admitted but, for
the reasons stated here, this court places limited reliance on it This is a likely claim by any party
to a compromise. A compromise is just that, one side gives up some of its demands in exchange
for concessions of the other party. This court is in no position to retrospectively evaluate the
quality of debate and parsing of privileges and responsibilities during Congress' or these
groups' deliberations. The congressional record must speak for itself
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
431 The assertion that private negotiators could establish a standard of fair use for the
broader public is perhaps pretentious, but essential if the guidelines are to have the influence
that the negotiators intended. In retrospect, one may question the wisdom of that objective.
Regardless of the intended or actual influence of the guidelines, the parties to them are the only
ones who actually manifested their assent to the terms. Developers of the CONFU Guidelines
even sought to extend that circle of parties in ways that forced a standoff during negotiations.
An early draft of the Multimedia Guidelines, for example, stated that the "participants" in the
negotiation agreed to various of its terms. The list of participants encompassed nearly any
organization whose representatives appeared at any meeting. To state that all such parties had
agreed to anything in the guidelines was simply an objective error. For the text of the
Multimedia Guidelines with language indicating agreement by the "participants," see
MULTIMEDIA COMMrTEE PRINT, supra note 4, at 1-2. The present author raised this concern at
the CONFU meeting of May 17, 1997, and urged that the word "endorser" replace the word
"participants" in such statements. Over strenuous objections from the lead supporters of the
Multimedia Guidelines, the assembled group accepted the changes. See CONFU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 50. This accomplishment at the CONFU meeting is hardly
braggadocio. After two and a half years of meetings, that word change may be this writer's
most meaningful influence on the CONFU Guidelines. See supra note 4.
43 2 See supra text accompanying notes 400-02.
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themselves either the users or the rightsholders of copyrighted materials that are
the subject of the guidelines. Therefore, the parties certainly do not have authority
to enter into license agreements. Second, the conduct of negotiations would
undoubtedly be considerably different if emphasis were on licensing and not fair
use. Most important, negotiated guidelines for fair use acknowledge some
potential variation from the defined standard. For example, the Classroom
Guidelines are explicitly minimum and not maximum standards,4 33 so the
guidelines themselves anticipate fair use beyond their own rigors. Such is the
nature of fair use. But it would be a strange license indeed that allowed a variable
and unspecified right of use.
C. Guidelines as a Substitution for Fair Use
Fair-use guidelines also have potential for offering a standard when the
individual seeking guidance abandons the four factors in the law-often in a state
of bewilderment or frustration. Many instructors and librarians, individuals who
are expected to follow fair use, find the statutory standard distinctly unsettling.
That lack of comfort with variability in the law was the essential motivation for
developing the guidelines in the first place. If the guidelines are not the law, they
may instead be a substitute for the law. They may be a reflection of activity
similar to fair use that is deemed to be workable and tolerable to the supporting
parties.434 The guidelines have become surrogates for a law that many individuals
simply find unwieldy or disconcerting.
1. The Proprietor's View: Tolerable Behavior
To the extent that the guidelines are endorsed by publishers, authors, and
other proprietor groups-especially if those groups seek to profit from their
copyrights-then the guidelines may be little more than a designation of activities
that the commercial interests are prepared to tolerate, regardless of whatever the
law allows. Such an approach to guidelines may bear some resemblance to fair
use and the four factors, but more likely the guidelines will circumscribe a zone of
activity that copyright proprietors are either unwilling or unable to enforce, or that
are not likely to generate reasonable revenue from future licensing.435 They may
433 See supra text accompanying note 45.
434 Bernard Zidar, Fair Use and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile
Coursepacks Consistent with Copyrightl 46 EMORY L.L 1363, 1406 (1997) ("The Classroom
Guidelines represent a balance, struck by the House and Senate conferees and approved by
Congress, between the benefit to society derived from allowing students to use certain materials
fairly and the benefit which would flow from protecting the copyright holder's monopoly.).
435 The notion of acceptable behavior and the safe harbor are closely related. See Zidar,
supra note 434, at 1406. Zidar states:
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also embody some quantum of activity that might be politically expedient to grant
in order to gain some support for the guidelines 436
Strong support for guidelines within the publishing industry suggests that
they have passed at least a test of tolerance.437 The publishing industry has the
extraordinary privilege of being a plaintiff in most copyright litigation that might
involve the guidelines.438 As the copyright owners, publishers are ordinarily able
to decide whether or not a case is proper or beneficial for its own interests. The
commercial publishers are also best positioned to relate the guidelines to effects
on their markets. They are understandably resistant to any fair-use guidelines that
interfere with current or prospective markets. While the fourth factor of the fair-
use statute emphasizes market effects,439 a commercial proprietor acting in its
own self-interest would not have any inclination to accept a fair-use standard that
would require abandonment of reasonable markets. Thus, the guidelines that have
strong approval from the publishing industry may be viewed as measures of fair
use that are acceptable to the industry simply because they do not interfere with
The fact that the Guidelines purport to represent a "safe harbor" indicates that use of
copyrighted materials in a manner which complies with the Guidelines does not inflict market
harm upon the copyright holder. Similarly, the ALA and Wisconsin policies were also drafted to
illustrate instances in which copying for classroom use was harmless to the copyright owner.
Id. For a discussion of the ALA and Wisconsin policies mentioned in the preceding citation, see
CREWS, supra note 50, at 47-53.
4 36 Copyright owners often concede certain activity as fair use for many different reasons.
For example, in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1986), West sought to claim copyright protection for its compilation of court rulings as
published in bound volumes of court reporters. To effect that claim of compilation copyright,
West needed to assert protection of its pagination in the reporters. See id. at 1219. Nevertheless,
West conceded without challenge that citing to the first page of any case would be fair use. Id.
at 1222. West no doubt had many reasons for making that concession. Among those reasons
might have been political expediency- to claim that right would be to assert that all references to
West cases are themselves infringements-making every judge who hands down a written
opinion a likely infringer. Such a claim is clearly not an effective way to win the judge's
support. Another reason is self-interest West's economic strength lies in the fact that its reports
are the standard tool for citing cases; to discourage citation to West publications would be to
undercut the company's economic viability.
4 37 An anecdotal example of the tolerance test was the unwillingness of a representative of
a motion picture studio to endorse the Multimedia Guidelines. During a public meeting of
CONFU, attended by this article's author, the representative explicitly declined to endorse any
guidelines that allowed any copying of any of its works.
4 38 A review of the cases examined in this article confirms that publishers are often the
plaintiffs. Textbook publishers sued Michigan Document Services, Inc., and Kinko's Graphics
Corporation. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Journal publishers sued Texaco Inc. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 60 F.3d 913
(2d Cir. 1995).
439 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
[Vol. 62:599
ILLUSION OF FAIR-USE GUIDELINES
activities that the industry could realistically control or enforce, or from which it
may derive appreciable profits.
One could also argue the opposite: an agreement with assent from educators
or librarians is suspect, because they are unlikely to accept an agreement that does
not meet either their expectations of fair use or their practical needs. This
perspective, however, is somewhat less persuasive, primarily because the
community of users is not positioned to bring litigation.440 Educators are the ones
who will endure the litigation as defendants. Educators also have few resources to
withstand litigation, and therefore are not as well situated to resist undesirable
guidelines through legal action.
2. The User's View. Acting in Good Faith
Good faith is a crucial concept for educators and librarians, not only because
of its ethical overtones for proper and lawful behavior, but also because good-
faith decisions about the exercise of fair use are sanctioned under the law in one
most important respect: the remittance of statutory damages. Statutory damages
are available to copyright owners who successfully prove infringement, 4 1 but
generally only if the work had been registered before the infringement
occurred. 442 The copyright owner may always seek recovery of damages or lost
profits, but may opt for statutory damages, 4 3 and may want to opt for them, if the
actual damages are modest or nominal. Statutory damages allow the court to
award up to $30,000 per work infringed.4" Statutory damages may reach as high
as $150,000 if the infringement was "willful." 445 On the other hand, statutory
damages may be remitted, if the court finds that the infiinger was "innocent" or
acted in good faith.446
440 An educator could conceivably bring an action seeking declaratory judgement that
activities are within fair use, but no such action by educators has been reported. Declaratory
judgment actions have been brought by some commercial parties, but only rarely. See, e.g., On
Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(seeking declaratory judgment that a system for viewing videotapes of motion pictures in hotel
rooms is not a public performance).
441 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
442 § 411.
443 § 504(a).
444 § 504(cX1).
445 § 504(c)(2).
446 Id. The statute directs:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages
to a sum of not less than $200.
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The general remittance provision applies to both nonprofit and for-profit
defendants who can prove that they were "not aware and had no reason to
believe" that the activities constituted copyright infiingement 447 In that event, the
statutory damages may drop to as low as $200, in the court's discretion. In the
case of an infringer who is an "employee or agent" of a nonprofit educational
institution, library, or archives, statutory damages may be eliminated altogether, if
the infringer can demonstrate that he or she "believed and had reasonable grounds
for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under
section 107."448 Congress was tacitly acknowledging that fair use is open to
interpretation, and that one could reasonably conclude that an activity was within
fair use, only to have the court rule otherwise. To relieve the tension of that
uncertainty, Congress eliminated one of the largest financial consequences of
infringement for educafors and librarians who apply fair use in a reasonable
manner. 449 That reasonable, balanced application is the essence of good faith.450
The Kinko's decision indirectly explored the interrelationship between
guidelines and good faith. The defendant Kinko's Graphics Corporation,
prepared a "Handbook!' for its employees, in which the company acknowledged
that the Classroom Guidelines would be of little assistance for application of fair
use, because "almost every case of college or university level copying will reach
beyond the scope of the limits."451 Although Kinko's apparently "exempted
itself' from the guidelines, the court was highly critical when it found that
Kinko's offered nothing in its place.452 The absence of guidance about fair use
undermined its search for "good faith":
Kinko's instructions to its workers possessed little of the nuance of the copyright
law. They provided no hypothetical situations nor any factual summary of the state of
the law presently. There was no mention of the facts of the Sony case, the Salinger
case, the Harper & Row case or others which may illustrate some of the complexities
of this doctrine. This can hardly be considered a "good faith" effort on Kinko's part to
448 Id
449 One commentator calls this provision "probably the single greatest source of
educators' mistaken belief that they are immune to lawsuit for infringement" Wagner, supra
note 236, at 18. Wagner is correct in emphasizing that the provision does not exonerate
educators; it only holds the possibility of limiting liability for statutory damages. Yet she argues
that Congress should repeal this protection for educators, asserting that educational institutions
are "giants" akin to "Fortune-500" corporations, and educators should be presumed to
understand copyright law and be denied any defense as "innocent infringer[s]." Id at 18-19.
450 One writer called this protection from statutory damages a "part of the Magna Carta
for educators" in the Copyright Act. Roger D. Billings, Jr., Off-the-Air Videorecording, Face-
to-Face Teaching, and the 1976 Copyright Act, 4 No. KY. L. REV. 225, 242 (1977).
451 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
452 Id.
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educate their employees. To the contrary, it appears more to be a way to "cover"
themselves while Kinko's remained willfully blind to the consequences of their
activity.45 3
To the Kinko's court, good faith may be found in guidance that does not
necessarily embody standard guidelines. Good faith may be found in general
explanations of the law and its general directions for how to respond to common
situations. Good faith may appear in summaries of major cases delivered in a
manner that can serve to educate the staff and move them toward compliance
with the law. Good faith does not mean that the employees of Kinko's-or the
faculty, librarians, or staff of a college or university-must ultimately behave
within the scope of fair use, but they must have reason to believe that they are
doing so. General explanations of the law can serve that objective4 54
Are guidelines therefore an instrument for establishing good faith? They
unquestionably can be. A good set of guidelines delivered to employees, faculty,
or anyone else in a position to make fair-use decisions may demonstrate the good
faith of the organization, and the application of the guidelines by the individual
can manifest that person's good faith as well. But the Kinko 's decision tells us that
a relevant set of guidelines is not the sole method for establishing good faith;
general discussion of fair use or alternative interpretations may serve the objective
.of good faith every bit as well.
Although a set of guidelines may be a valuable tool for establishing good
faith, the objective of finding good faith may reveal that many of the existing
guidelines are not well suited to serving that desired end. First, few courts would
likely conclude that any of the guidelines is not at least a good-faith attempt to
interpret fair use, even though reasonable analyses could differ widely on the
extent to which one may deviate from the guidelines and still remain within the
parameters of section 10T455 Yet many of the guidelines, notably the Classroom
Guidelines, reach far beyond the quest for good faith. They instead demarcate a
strict line, measured by counting words and instances of copying, in an effort to
define fair use4 56 They are, at their core, a rigid confine on the flexibility that
Congress intended to give the law. They also apply only to narrow situations and
offer little guidance for the diverse circumstances where fair use may apply. Good
faith, by contrast, may instead be better served by a more general understanding
of the law, as was sought by the court in the Kinko 's case.
4 53 Id.
454 For an example of a publication widely circulated at large universities, in part to serve
this objective, see CONSORTIUM FOR EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY FOR UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS,
FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS: A CRUCIAL ELEMENT iN EDUCATING AMERICA (1995).
4 55 The guidelines may also help establish good faith even though they may not ultimately
pass scrutiny under fair-use law. See supra Part IVA.1.
4 56 See supra text accompanying note 70-76.
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A second problem with existing guidelines and the quest for good faith is that
the concept of good faith embodied in the Copyright Act's remission of statutory
damages is vastly different from a meticulous definition of fair use. The Act's
notion of good faith is one meant to protect the well-meaning member of the
education or library commurqity who made a reasonable determination of fair use,
but instead was found by a court to be an infringer. This concept of good faith
assumes and anticipates that the behavior in question is ultimately not fair use 4 57
This statutory construct is not merely protection for socially beneficial pursuits of
education and libraries; it is protection for parties who seek innovative
applications of fair use for worthy purposes. It is protection for experimentation
and extension of the law to new needs. Detailed guidelines that attempt to define
fair use and that offer a sanctioned, minimalist view of fair use miss the point of
the "good faith" that Congress sought to protect and encourage. The use of rigid
guidelines to define "good faith" ultimately subverts congressional intent.
3. The User's View: An Appearance ofPropriety
Colleges, universities, and libraries often have need for adopting a policy on
the fair use of copyrighted works by employees, library patrons, and others.
Guidelines provide a useful tool in response to that need. First, the creation of
guidelines that have some external validation and provide a vague promise of
protection from liability greatly ease the process of developing a policy. An
organization can simply adopt the guidelines and avoid grappling with the law
itself. Second, regardless of the deficiencies in the guidelines as a measure of fair
use, adhering to standard guidelines can avoid questions about the
appropriateness of an alternative policy statement that one may develop.
Endorsement of the guidelines by various publishing groups-the likely plaintiffs
in a copyright infringement action-can also demonstrate that the adopting
organization at least intended to comply with standards acceptable to the party
claiming the infringement.
Well-established guidelines may have multiple uses in institutional
policymaking. First and foremost, the expectation may be that the guidelines will
be a force on behavior, discouraging unlawful activity and helping to find the path
of proper conduct. To that end, perhaps, guidelines have found their way into
policy manuals and other official documentation for educational institutions,
libraries, and other organizations. 458 As a formal policy standard for an
organization, a set of fair-use guidelines may appear to have the authority of
mandates on individual behavior. Yet a gulf too often exists between institutional
ideals and individual realities. The Classroom Guidelines are an important case in
457 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (referring to the user in question as an
"infringer").
458 See CREws, supra note 50, at 73-74.
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point. Since their publication in 1976, the Classroom Guidelines have been a
common foundation for formal policy at major universities throughout the United
States. 459 But their meticulous, quantitative measures of fair use are difficult and
impractical to apply, and in fact few faculty members actually adhere to them.
The result is an inherent tension between institutional expectations and faculty
response.
Does the tension really exist? The simple existence of a widely ignored
campus policy should manifest inherent tension, but ignorance of the policy may
be an accepted and expected result. Organizations often do not promote new
policies thoroughly among constituents, and they certainly do not rigorously
enforce policies applicable to routine behaviors or to activities that are within the
domain of academic freedom, such as a teacher's plans for handouts and other
photocopies. The daily decision to follow or not follow the policy is typically
within the individual professor's discretion and good judgement. Disparity
between policy and individual decisionmaking is even more certain when the
policy makes intrusive and impractical demands. If a differential between policy
and actual practice is common and unsurprising, why should policymakers within
the institution bother to make a policy at all? If a consciously made reason exists,
it may be deceptively simple: to protect the institution from any unlawful
activities of its employees.
The policy that fails to serve the individual instructor may still serve the
institution. Imagine this simple scenario: A professor is accused of making
photocopies for classroom handouts in excess of the Classroom Guidelines. Her
university will also be implicated and will undoubtedly face possible exposure on
an agency theory or on other grounds for vicarious liability. Although the
university may ultimately be unable to escape sharing legal liability for the deeds
of its employees, the university will be able to demonstrate its good-faith and its
official expectation of rigorous copyright compliance by pointing to the
Classroom Guidelines available to all faculty members in the official policy
manual.4 60 -
If such posturing by the university does not, in fact, exculpate the institution
from some or all liability, the existence of the policy can become the public
display of the university's intention to follow the law strictly and not to sanction
violations. The existence of the formal policy also becomes the safe fall-back
position in the event that the professor is held to have infringed copyright. The
university will not need to change its policy to a more demanding standard or
explain its previous position; it can instead emphasize the policy it had in place all
along and underscore the need for other faculty members to follow the policy it
had promulgated in the first place. Suggesting that the policy protects the
45 9 See supra note 50.
460 The settlement in New York University effectively had this result, by requiring faculty
members to comply with the Classroom Guidelines. The university is accordingly able to
distance itself from non-complying employees. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
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institution from its own employees has a ring of simple duplicity. Faculty
members, librarians, and staff would have plenty of reason to feel alienated.
All of these shortcomings are avoidable. A policy that the institution expects
to be violated should never become policy at all; all members of the academic
community would lose the opportunity for reasonable and honest guidance and a
chance to learn a workable copyright standard for common pursuits. Also, if the
institution adopts a policy that it expects to be ignored, it is hardly serving its own
interest in fostering a relationship of trust and respect with its faculty and staff.
Yet the institution that adopts, for example, the Classroom Guidelines, is most
likely not consciously intending either to put a stranglehold on the faculty or to set
them up for conflict within the organization. Instead, the decision to adopt the
Classroom Guidelines is usually the product of limited information about
alternative fair-use interpretations, combined with a misperception about the
relationship between guidelines and the law. Too often policymakers conclude
that the well-known guidelines are the only available choice and may even be
necessary to meet legal obligations. Such policymakers undoubtedly have sincere
intentions, but they may still have only limited awareness of their options and the
implications of the policymaking decisions.
This view of guidelines and policies invariably reeks of cynicism. Although
universities and other organizations may in fact be using standard guidelines for
purposes of seeking cover, the cynicism does not stem primarily from the
institutional propensity to be cautious or to adopt externally validated structures,
or simply to find the easily available solution to a policymaking challenge.
Instead, the real fault lies with the drafters of the Classroom Guidelines
themselves, for accepting a view of fair use that cannot be reasonably applied, and
certainly will not be applied by busy instructors who are seeking to fulfill the
demands of teaching, who function with tremendous autonomy, and who have the
discretion not to make use of a work if the barriers to its adoption in the classroom
are burdensome or are more interference than support. If the guidelines were
more pragmatic in their application and more accurate in the articulation of fair
use, the adoption of the guidelines by institutions would not generate needless
tension and cynicism.
D. Guidelines within the Academic Community
Most characterizations of the guidelines relate them to dynamics or interests
outside the educational institution. Either the guidelines are some reflection of
fair-use law, or an external force shaping the institution's activities, or they
manifest a relationship between the institution and the external copyright owners.
The guidelines may also serve a constructive purpose inside the institution. They
may be used by educational institutions as a standard for educating the academic
community about copyright and fair use, or they may be a standard for taking
disciplinary action against a faculty member, a student or other member of that
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community whose activities may be copyright infringements and could give rise
to liabilities.
Again, the standard fair-use guidelines fail in this attempt. As a tool for
educating the community, they overlook the actual law of fair use, and they often
set a standard that faculty cannot reasonably apply.46' As a result, a policy built
on most of the guidelines will not necessarily convey accurate information about
fair use462 and will not be well received by earnest faculty who may be looking
for meaningful information.463 As a disciplinary standard, they are similarly
flawed. An institution that may base internal reviews and discipline on the
confined standards of most guidelines would be engaged in policy action
stretching far beyond anything that the law might anticipate.4 64 To build the
guidelines into formal university policy, to which faculty may be held
accountable, is to suggest that the institution could-at least theoretically-be in
turn held accountable to enforce its own policy through disciplinary procedures.
V. A LEGAL THEORY OF FAIR-USE GUIDELINES
A. Relationship of Guidelines to Legal Theory
If existing fair-use guidelines bear little relationship to fair-use law, but
continue to persist and prevail in many communities, they must serve purposes
that the law has been unable to achieve. In many instances, individuals
unprepared to work with the flexibility of fair-use law often turn to standard
guidelines in quest of relative certainty or to expedite the decisions surrounding
461 See supra text accompanying notes 356-79.
462 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860,
2881-82 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512(eXl)(c) (Supp. IV 1998)), calls in part for
educational institutions to provide copyright information to "all users" of its computer network
systems as one condition of the university's potential ability to avoid copyright infringement
liability as a "service provider." In unusually assertive and specific language, the statute
specifies that the information must "accurately describe" the law and must "promote
compliance with" copyright laws. Id Given the shortcomings of the guidelines examined in this
article, one might reasonably consider whether distibuting them to the university community
might be insufficient to satisfy this requirement of distributing accurate information.
4 63 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
464 Generally speaking, the law has not required policing of employees to find and address
infringements. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (Supp. IV 1998). Nevertheless, an organization
seeking scrupulously to avoid liabilities may well choose to monitor activities in order to
identify and eradicate possible infringements, although such efforts have stirred serious
concerns about academic freedom and free speech. For example, Camegie Mellon University
recently reviewed websites on its servers and removed allegedly infringing music files. Kelly
McCollum, How Forcefully Should Universities Enforce Copyright Law on Audio Files?,
CHRON. HIGHERED., Nov. 19,1999, at A59.
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policymaking and implementation 4 65 The guidelines also offer some perceived
promise of preventing liability.466 Lawmaking and governmental bodies also
cling in various degrees to the concept of guidelines for fair use. Courts
occasionally reference the guidelines, and the CONFU report received support
from various federal agencies.467 However weak the tie may be between the
guidelines and the law, some tie exists. That connection between guidelines and
law may be described and critiqued in various terms.
Various theories from legal analysis may be applied to the circumstances
surrounding the origin and application of the guidelines in order to discern a
model for better understanding them. This part of the article will suggest that
concepts of normative and positive law may provide a framework for
understanding the legal significance of the guidelines4 68 Application of these
theories, however, will also demonstrate that while they may offer a meaningful
legal construct for understanding fair-use guidelines, these theories also reveal
further weaknesses in the guidelines.
B. New Legal Theoryfor Fair-Use Guidelines
1. Positivist Concept of Guidelines
A theory of positive law is rooted in the concept of law having authority to
impose a standard or a particular behavior on individuals4 69 The law can set an
expectation, and violations will be penalized. Professor Ronald Dworkin has been
a leading analyst of legal positivism,4 70 and one of his fundamental principles is
that the law, with its authoritative effects, can be identified by its pedigree.471 The
465 Some commentators continue to demand more certainty in the law. See, e.g., Trevor
Cox, Information and the Internet: Understanding the Emerging Legal Framework for
Contract and Copyright Law and Problems with International Enforcement, 11 TRANSNAT'L
LAw. 23, 48 (1998) ("A better approach would be to amend the United States Copyright Act to
establish guidelines for fair use over the Intemet and to provide basic examples for actions
which would not be a copyright infringement.').
46 6 See Tomas A. Lipinski, Designing and Using Web-Based Materials in Education: A
Web Page Legal Audit-Part I, Intellectual Property Issues, 137 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 9, 11
(1999) (recommends adopting the Multimedia Guidelines "to minimize potential liability").
467 See supra text accompanying notes 209-12.
46 8 According to one study, "legal positivism refuses to go away" despite steady criticism
of it. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELLL. REV. 1080, 1080 (1997).
46 9 Legal positivism also has been described as contending that "the nature of law is
contingent on human decision" and not necessarily on higher or moral principles. 'See iad at
1087.
470 See generally RONALD DWORKiN, A MATrEROFPRINCIPLE (1985).
471 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 HARV. L. REV. 909, 912 (1978). See also
Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1093 (asserting that under positivist theories the rule of law
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pedigree of positive copyright law is found in Congress, which has the power to
grant rights to authors. 472 Implicit in that power is the right to curtail the extent of
those rights by reserving rights-such as fair use-to the public. Assuming,
however, that Congress has enacted constitutionally the fair-use statute, the
legislative history also demonstrates beyond peradventure that Congress was not
willing to enact more specific terms. 473 Thus, the more detailed provisions of the
guidelines, developed outside of Congress, deviate from the source and policy of
copyright law. The guidelines fail the findamental test of positive law.
Supporters of the guidelines, however, are well aware that the guidelines are
hardly positive law with binding authority.474 Taking the guidelines to the courts,
therefore, has been an attempt to secure what Congress could not grant: a
pedigree for the guidelines 475 The text of the guidelines may well be rooted in
private negotiations, but their adoption by a court as a standard in a fair-use
decision would elevate the guidelines to a status with a new pedigree; they would
emerge from such a court ruling with the quality of being law.476 To date,
however, this effort has failed.477 The MDS decision referred to guidelines as a
"safe harbor" and not a legal standard.478 The court also belabored the effort to
rule against activity that was, by the court's reckoning, "light years" beyond the
guidelines 479 If the guidelines were law, any breach of their limits would be an
is "source-based"). Roger A. Shiner argues that under a positivist theory, "authority" is not the
same as "validity" of the law. He attributes validity to the "pedigree" of the law "by the rule of
recognition of the legal system." ROGER A. SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF
LEGAL THOUGHT 24 (1992). He adds this statement about authority. "If the law has authority,
then the demands that the law makes of us it has a right to make of us; its requirements are such
that we ought to conform to them." Id.
472 Specifically, the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant to "Authors" the
"Exclusive right" to their works. U.S. CONsT., art. I., § 8, cl. 8.473 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
474 On the other hand, the fair-use guidelines could be understood by legal positivists as
simply filling the gaps and resolving lingering ambiguities in the statutes from Congress:
"Modem legal positivists believe that problems of legal indeterminacy (the failure of rules to
guide decision-makers to correct answers) were minor difficulties in decision making that could
be resolved by institutional choices based on the competency of the decision maker to resolve
ambiguity in language." See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOvEMENTs: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCEA AT CENTUY'S END 49 (1995).
475 For example, a "source-based conception of law is necessarily informational." That is,
the authority of the law depends on its source and on information to justify the authority of that
sources. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1095.
476 Similarly, the effort to include guidelines in a congressional report also gives them the
appearance of a formal pedigree. For a discussion of such developments, see supra text
accompanying notes 215-16.
477 See supra Part I1I.
478 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir.
1996).
479 lt; see also supra text accompanying note 252.
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easy case of infiingement. Even more pointedly, the Kinko's decision rejected
important provisions of the Classroom Guidelines 480 Not only was that court not
adhering to the guidelines, but it was also free to reject them.
2. Normative Concept of Guidelines
If the guidelines are not positive law, they instead may be comprehended as a
"normative" conception of fair use.481 General theories of normative law relate to
what the law ought to be, rather than what it really may be or how individuals
may in fact behave in an environment affected by law.482 The Classroom
Guidelines, for example, articulate an agreed measure of fair use. The negotiators
developed the guidelines on a relatively rigorous schedule and at the behest of
members of Congress, who sought to avoid detailed legislation. This article has
already demonstrated repeatedly that the guidelines ultimately bear little
relationship to the law of fair use and the four statutory factors.4 83 Moreover, one
need not look far within the academic community to find that few, if any,
individuals are actually counting words on a page before making photocopies for
classroom distribution 4 84 By this standard, the guidelines are not a reflection of
either the law or actual practice. They may instead be a declaration of the law that
the parties believe ought to apply.4 85
Moreover, as a tool for transforming behavior, the guidelines have largely
failed. Few members of the academic community appear to accept the premise
that the guidelines, with their meticulous limits on fair use, are a viable statement
4 80 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
481 One study makes this description of a normative perspective of the law: "But the law
can also be studied to determine what legal principles and rules are justifiable or desirable."
MICHAELD. BAYLES, PRiNCiPLES OF LAW: A NORMATivE ANALYSIS 1 (1987).
482A normative theory also allows current analysis to examine critically the
appropriateness of applying outmoded law. See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46
DRAKE L. REV. 299, 319-20 (1997) (examining the Supreme Court's rejection of a doctrine of
affirmative action that had become obsolete).
483 A normative analysis would not necessarily be concerned about the divergence
between law and guidelines: "One can have a perfectly good explanation of why a court or
legislature adopted a law, but the law be quite unjustifiable." See BAYLES, supra note 481, at3.
484 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 236, at 12 ("Rather, the academic community has
ignored the Guidelines.).
485 Note particularly that the guidelines are a statement of fair use that the parties to them
believe other individuals "ought" to apply and follow. Again, the guidelines may have a
"positivist" appearance in that regard, but they lack an authoritative source. According to one
analysis, they therefore do not embody 'legitimate authority," but instead have "de facto
authority," which is further described as "an ill-formed expression." See SHINER, supra note
471, at 24.
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of the rule of law which they "ought" to follow.48 6 On the other hand, supporters
of the guidelines have been successful in persuading some members of the
academic community that the guidelines are the standard that "ought" to be
adopted in formal policy statements.4 87 Numerous colleges, universities, and
libraries have adopted some of the guidelines as formal policy statements, even if
they ultimately do not shape the behavior of individuals who are subject to the
policies. Policymakers, therefore, seem to believe that reliance on the guidelines
serves purposes other than guiding individual behavior. 488 Merely having a policy
premised on the guidelines may provide a defense against institutional liability, or
it may demonstrate good faith. If the institution is pursuing those goals, rather
than the goals of shaping behavior, supporters of the guidelines have succeeded in
imbuing the guidelines with a limited normative quality. The guidelines articulate
the standard that "ought" to be in policies, even if individuals are unconvinced
that they ought to follow that same standard4 89
3. Combined Theory
Neither positive nor normative theory seems to describe accurately or
satisfactorily the legal status of the guidelines, yet the guidelines oddly possess a
peculiar appearance of both normative and positive qualities. They are portrayed
initially as normative standards, and they are advocated later as positive
standards. 490 When the guidelines originate, with support from some members of
the educational community, the guidelines take on the appearance of fair-use
limitations that either reflect practices within the academic community or that are
acceptable to decisionmakers who have the authority to impose guidelines as
binding standards at educational institutions.4 91 Either of these perceptions of the
4 86 See supra note 484.
487 See supra note 50.
4 88 See supra notes 441-60.
4 89 According to one commentator with respect to the CONFU guidelines, "Ongoing
legislative or quasi-legislative attempts to deal with fair use issues perpetuate a paradigm,
however, similar to that implemented by shrink-wrap, that defines 'appropriate' use before the
normative dimensions of that use have been fully explored.' See Michael J. Madison, Legal-
Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1099 n.271
(1998).
490 One analysis of the Kinko 's decision seems to make exactly this point, apparently with
satisfaction of its appropriateness. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 14-15. While that writer is
critical of the Classroom Guidelines for higher education, she notes that educators did sign onto
the guidelines when they were first drafted, and educators have not taken the initiative in
decades to seek a renegotiation of them. Id Thus, the guidelines, by this analysis, have a
normative quality at their inception and then attain an authoritative quality due to inaction by
educators. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 14-15.
491 At least one study has struggled with the difficulty of works that "look legal" even
though they lack truly "positive" legal qualities. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1105.
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guidelines gives them the appearance of having normative qualities. If the
guidelines reflect actual practices, they are truly normative; if they are made
binding on the institutions and influence practices by imposition, they become
positive.
Nevertheless, given the wide adoption of the guidelines in formal policies, the
guidelines have the appearance of a normative standard with respect to actual
faculty practices.492 That appearance has been deceiving. It has been used as a
foundation-however unstable-for advocating that the guidelines should
therefore be integrated into the law, and accepted by the courts as positive law.
Although that effort has failed,493 strong supporters of the guidelines continue to
distribute information designed to lead readers to conclude that the courts have, in
fact, adopted the guidelines.4 94 The few references in court rulings are often taken
out of context and sometimes misinterpreted in order to lead readers to an invalid
conclusion that the guidelines are positive law. Accepting that the guidelines truly
have normative or positive qualities would be seriously misleading. Yet the
common perceptions of the guidelines, detailed in Part IV, reveal that they are
often characterized as accurate statements of law or of practice. The result is an
illusion-an illusion that the guidelines have a basis in fair-use law and enjoy the
force and respect that the law is due.
This normative and positive analysis further demonstrates that the creation
and dissemination of the guidelines is carefully managed to achieve the
appropriate illusion. Participation by educational institutions in the creation of the
guidelines serves the fundamental purpose of generating the illusion of normative
qualities. The appearance of normative qualities also gives them some credibility
when brought before courts in infringement cases. The appearance that the
guidelines are widely accepted in the educational community is a normative
quality that a jurist may well accept. Any reference to the guidelines by the court,
in turn, gives the guidelines the appearance of having positive qualities. Judicial
The Register of Copyrights also has called fair-use guidelines "a curious U.S. invention" but
implied that they have normative qualities by suggesting that guidelines "symbolize consensus"
among interested parties. David Lad, Private Use, Public Policy: Copyright and Home
Recording, 56 WILSON LIBR. BULL. 266,269 (1981).
492 For a study showing the widespread adoption of standard guidelines by research
universities, see CREWS, supra note 50, at 73-74.
493 For an analysis of the relevant cases, demonstrating that no court has adopted any of
the guidelines as a legal standard, see supra Part III.
4 9 4 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE STORES ET AL., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
COPYRIGHT FOR THE CAMPUS COMMUNnY 4 (1993). The questions and answers state:
Although some limited copying which does not fall within these [Classroom] guidelines
(and which is not expressly prohibited under Prohibitions A through F described below) may
still qualify as permissible conduct under the copyright law, copying which does comply with
these guidelines generally constitutes permissible conduct under the current copyright law.
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notice of the guidelines certainly does not make them positive law, but it has
facilitated the impression that they are positive law, particularly among the
educators, librarians, and others who are not prepared to distinguish enforceable
law from general statements in a court decision. The illusion of positive law thus
further reinforces the academic community's regard for the guidelines.
The result of this dynamic is a spiral of misperception and sanctioned
misconstruction of the law. The appearance of normative qualities leads to
bestowal of positive traits; the appearance of positive qualities makes the
guidelines more compelling for the academic community and more widely
adopted. Expanded adoption reinforces the normative aspects. Even if these
qualities are without merit and even vacuous, their illusory validity gives the
guidelines important meaning in the academic community that is unlikely to
invest scarce resources, and unlikely to muster specialized expertise, to analyze
legal subtleties. At the source of this illusion is the unwillingness of the academic
community to look critically at the guidelines, the failure of the courts to reject
them in the application of fair-use law, and the eagerness of proponents to
encourage development and dissemination of meticulous standards that have the
insidious effect of eroding and distorting fair use.
VI. THE FUTURE OF FAIR-USE GuIDELINES:
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless of the serious disconnect between the guidelines and the law,
guidelines nevertheless persist Existing guidelines will continue to arise in court
rulings and in institutional policies. They will appear in future books and other
resources about copyright-often with the implications that they are a meaningful
articulation of fair use law. Undoubtedly, the roster of existing guidelines, from
the Classroom Guidelines through CONFU, will also be put forth as a foundation
or model for the crafting of future standards. This article accordingly offers three
sets of observations drawn from the preceding analysis. The first set of
observations relates to the legal status of guidelines themselves. The second set of
observations identifies the functional differences between guidelines and the
law-observations that suggest how interested parties ought to respond to the
guidelines. The third set of observations will propose how the inevitable process
of crafting guidelines may be improved in the future in order to avoid the failures
of guidelines from the past.
A- Legal Status ofFair-Use Guidelines
The analyses of the origins of guidelines and the several cases examining
them, particularly the Classroom Guidelines, allow the following inferences and
lessons about the role and meaning of guidelines.
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None of the fair-use guidelines is law. None of the guidelines originates from
a source with authority to make law. Congress never has adopted any of the
guidelines into legislation, and no court has accepted them as a standard of fair
use applicable to any situation. Indeed, Congress and the courts have acted
carefully and explicitly to assure that they have not elevated any of the guidelines
to a lawfully binding standard.
The guidelines reflect a minimalistic view offair use. By their own explicit
statements, many of the guidelines are "minimum" measures of fair use.
Moreover, the substantive measure of fair use articulated in the guidelines is far
narrower than any limit of fair use established in any court ruling on facts
analogous to the guidelines. In the MDS decision, for example, the court found
infringement in a situation involving copying that was "light years" beyond the
guidelines 4 95 On the other hand, the guidelines often contain "prohibitions" that
users are expected not to exceed, even if otherwise staying within the rest of the
standards4 96 In that regard, the guidelines are maximum standards in the guise of
mininums.
The guidelines reflect a view of fair use to which proprietor groups are
prepared to acquiesce as either unequivocally within fair use or beyond the scope
of activity that is worth challenging. By winning the endorsement of publisher
groups and other proprietors with an interest in challenging some uses as
unlawful, the guidelines undoubtedly address a practical standard that reflects a
business strategy, rather than a legal reality. Publishers, in particular, likely have
little or no interest in supporting guidelines that would seriously threaten business
objectives, even if they honestly believe that the guidelines accurately describe
fair use.
The guidelines do not displace the importance of applying the four factors
from the statute. The law of fair use is ultimately founded on the four factors. 97
Just as the courts have made clear that they do not view the guidelines as a
substitute for the law, so should individuals working with fair use not abandon the
law and allow the guidelines to become a substitute. To do so, ironically, places
the user at risk of following a standard with no legal basis.
The guidelines are too rigorous to be a measure of "good-faith" behavior.
The U.S. Copyright Act provides important protection for some parties-notably
educators, librarians, and others who are typically the object of existing fair-use
guidelines-when those parties make decisions in good faith 498 Not only are the
guidelines usually far more rigorous and narrow than analogous case law would
suggest necessary, but they are also more rigorous than necessary to demonstrate
good faith. Most certainly, behavior strictly within the guidelines would likely be
495 See supra text accompanying note 252.
4 96 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
497 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
498 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
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viewed as good faith, but a good-faith reliance on the four factors would allow
greater flexibility for meeting unpredicted needs. Moreover, if the guidelines
evidence a standard that is gauged to meet a tolerance level of proprietors, it also
would likely bear little relationship to a good-faith application of fair use to new
and challenging circumstances.
The guidelines are nevertheless a compelling tool for educators who seek to
apply fair use and create policies. The guidelines have the appearance of having
an official status, and they are widely accepted by the publishing industry and
other proprietor groups who may be potential plaintiffs in copyright actions
against the educators. If the objective of an educator making policy is to avoid
litigation, adopting and following the guidelines certainly offers the prospect of
discouraging a lawsuit
The guidelines are compelling to courts. Courts struggle with the unsettled
nature of fair-use law. Judges attempting to reach decisions about fair use
undoubtedly must also perceive that the law is open to widely diverging
interpretations, and that any decision would therefore be subject to potentially
sharp criticism. Although the courts in all the cases examined here do reach
decisions based on the factors in the statute, those same courts are also drawn to
the guidelines for reasons similar to those of the educational institutions
developing a fair-use policy: the external validation of the guidelines by interest
groups gives them some demeanor of credibility. Accordingly, when a judicial
opinion demonstrates that activity not only violates the law but also the
guidelines, the court is finding some reinforcement for its ruling. If the guidelines
have an appearance of validation by interested parties, then the court might
perceive that the reinforcement has been previously accepted by the persons with
the greatest interest in the outcome of the ruling. In sum, courts are therefore
treating the guidelines as a crutch to bolster a ruling and to fend off post-decision
criticism.
Fair-use guidelines have had the effect of ossifying perceptions offair use
and denying the law its intended flexibility. To the extent that the guidelines
attract attention in discussions about fair use, they are in turn drawing attention
away from fair-use law itself. Worse, to the extent that the guidelines are seen as a
substitute for law or as a standard with legal authority, the guidelines are
suppressing all opportunity to comprehend and work with the law itself.
Examples of the encroachment of guidelines on the law abound. Perhaps the most
salient example is. the common expectation that fair use requires classroom
photocopying to be "spontaneous." 499 Spontaneity is a concept that may be
499 In the midst of writing this article, I gave a presentation on copyright issues at the
NERCOMP Annual Conference, held in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, on March 23, 1999.
(NERCOMP is formally known as the New England Regional Computing Program.) In the
context of developing a standard of fair use for an electronic reserve system, one conference
attendee asked about the need to comply with the "spontaneity requirement' of fair use-yet
one more example of the infiltration of the Classroom Guidelines into general understanding of
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relevant to the four factors, but certainly is not required. It is, however, required
under the Classroom Guidelines. Indeed, it has its origins in the drafting of the
Classroom Guidelines. Spontaneity is commonly asserted as a condition to fair
use; whenever it is so asserted the guidelines are once again infiltrating our
understanding of the law.
These observations, taken together, manifest a dubious role for fair-use
guidelines in current law. The intention of the drafters and negotiating parties may
well have been constructive and positive, and most certainly the ambitions and
expectations of the parties must have been centered on a hope for a meaningful
result. Whatever the subjective intent, however, the resulting guidelines have had
contrary and destructive effects. The guidelines have become a convenient
distraction from the responsibility of copyright owners, users, courts, and even
Congress to work with the law itself. Parties with an interest in supporting the
guidelines-especially publishers and others seeking a narrow application of fair
use-have advocated the guidelines in litigation, in widely distributed
publications, and in tacit demands and threats against educational institutions.
Whatever the drafters' intent, the guidelines themselves have been distorted and
imposed on the marketplace in a manner that undercuts the law of fair use itself.
B. Responding to the Guidelines
As new guidelines, with some measure of negotiated or official status,
emerge from CONFU or other future pursuits, individuals and institutions will
face the decision about whether to endorse, adopt, follow, or even regard the
offered guidelines in their analysis of fair use. Not only will colleges, universities,
publishers, and authors face such decisions, but so will congressional committees
likely be confronted with the decision to support or not support future guidelines,
just as a House committee did with the earlier guidelines in 1976 and 1981.
Supporters of new guidelines already have demonstrated their intent to seek that
imprimatur of law, by taking the Multimedia Guidelines to a House
subcommittee for its approval.500
How should this wide array of reviewers of fair-use guidelines make a
determination of support or non-support? Based on this analysis, reviewers of any
guidelines should consider the following traits of copyright law as compared to
the guidelines, and consider whether the guidelines are a real improvement.501
None of the fair-use guidelines has the force of law; only statutes and court
rulings have that authority. If an educator is looking for the standard to which he
fair-use law. I frequently receive the same question at numerous academic conferences around
the country.
500 See MULTIMEDiA COMMrrrE PRINT, supra note 4.
501 These comparisons of law and guidelines are based in part on an earlier publication by
the present author. See Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use and Higher Education: Are Guidelines the
Answer?, 83 ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 38.
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or she actually must adhere, only the law can offer that guidance. Guidelines
cannot. Guidelines are interpretations of the law and are absolutely not the only
interpretation possible. Guidelines, therefore, cannot give assurance that a user is
actually operating within the law.
The lav is actually a less complex measure of fair use than are most
guidelines. The law of fair use depends principally on four factors which are
summarized and described in many different publications.502 The guidelines often
depend on a multiplicity of variables and include many requirements and
prohibitions that are not found in the law. For example, the CONFU guidelines on
production of multimedia works restrict the length of time that a professor may
keep and use the finished work and require notices that the professor is exercising
fair use.503 No such obligations exist in the law. The guidelines further itemize a
long list of conditions related to quantity, purpose of use, and market effects.
504
The law offair use is flexible to meet changing needs and circumstances,
while the guidelines are rigid. Congress intended for the law to be flexible, and
court rulings have affirmed that generalizations about fair use are simply not
valid. For example, the measure of the amount of a work that may be copied is
highly fluid. By contrast, guidelines usually include rigorous quantity limits that
hardly begin to reflect the robust character of fair use. One court has ruled that
reprinting three hundred words from an earlier work was too much, while another
case allowed several thousand words.505 These decisions are not inconsistent;
they reveal that fair use depends on specific circumstances of each use.
Staying within fair-use law prevents infringement, but the guidelines do not
offer even a "safe harbor. " Most guidelines from the past and from CONFU are
by their own description "minimum" measures of fair use, implying that they will
protect compliant users from infringement liability. But representatives of many
copyright owners have refused steadfastly to call the guidelines a "safe harbor,"
reserving the right to bring infringement actions even against an individual or
institution that stays meticulously within the limits. If the guidelines are
admittedly not a "safe harbor," then they most assuredly are not any measure of
fair use at all.
Copyright law provides important protection for well-meaning faculty and
others who apply fair use, but guidelines offer no actual protection. When
members of university and library communities have "reasonable grounds" to
believe their activities are within fair use, the Copyright Act exonerates these
individuals and the institution from some of the monetary liability that may result
if the artivities are found to be an infringement. Congress structured the law to
5 02 See, for example, many of the works listed in supra note 7.
5 03 See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
5 04 See supra text accompanying notes 162-70.
5 05 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(quoting three hundred words was beyond fair use); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d
1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting seven thousand words was within fair use).
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encourage professors, librarians, and others within the non-profit educational
arena to pursue fair use in good faith. The reduction of damages should motivate
positive and constructive application of fair use, offer considerable peace of mind,
and discourage most threats of litigation. Congress granted an important
protection in recognition of lingering uneasiness and the importance of advancing
knowledge through a reasonable, balanced, and good-faith understanding of rights
and responsibilities. No set of guidelines can offer that same combination of
promises.
In the final analysis, the guidelines may actually have considerably less
significance than might appear on first look. One might logically wonder,
however, whether the community of educators and proprietors might not take
steps to enhance the import of guidelines. After all, for those persons who desire
greater certainty in their handling of fair use-although not necessarily in the law
itself-and do not prefer to make decisions based on the law of fair use, the
guidelines are a convenient recourse. They streamline the decision about the
content of a policy, while they actually compound the complexity of an
individual's decision.
C. Lessons for the Future Development of Guidelines
If fair-use guidelines serve some perceived practical purposes, and are
compelling to influential parties, new guidelines will undoubtedly be the subject
of future negotiation and development. This analysis of existing guidelines, while
revealing their serious flaws, also suggests several lessons for developing
improved guidelines in the future.
Fair-use guidelines should be rooted explicitly in fair-use law. Future
guidelines should begin with the framework of the factors in the statute and
address their meaning for the application at issue.506 For example, a new set of
guidelines on the subject of copying for electronic-reserve systems should be
drafted around the statutory factors. The guidelines should begin with the actual
law of fair use and summarize the procedural and implementation steps that one
may take to meet the factors. In the case of electronic reserves, guidelines could
address the "purpose" factor by noting, among other conditions, that the material
placed on reserve must be solely for use by students in a particular course at the
educational institution. The guidelines might list various other steps that one
might take to meet obligations with respect to that factor, allowing the user
implementing or adopting the guidelines to select from options that may be within
fair use.
50 6 One commentator urged that faculty should return to the law of fair use and not rely on
guidelines: "Universities, individually or together, should create a policy statement or faculty
guide that will provide educators with the information they need to make informed fair-use
determinations. The Guidelines may be a suitable harbor for some, but informed educators
should fully assert their statutory right of fair use." Kasunic, supra note 415, at 291.
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Fair-use guidelines must be flexible in their definition of the scope offair use.
Fair use in an inherently flexible doctrine, dependent on the specifics of the
relevant facts of each case. Courts established that principle from the origin of the
fair-use doctrine. Congress affirmed it in the enactment of the statute in 1976.
More recent court rulings have militated repeatedly against any bright-line rules.
Guidelines that attempt to isolate and identify a precise measure of fair use for
many different situations are overtly rejecting the fundamental flexibility of the
law.507 The Classroom Guidelines, the Multimedia Guidelines, and most of the
fair-use guidelines make that crucial error with emphasis. They attempt to find
and hit the bull's eye of a moving target
The target is also ethereal. Almost never does a court or any other authority
need to specify the boundary between fair and unfair uses. A court faced with
particular facts need only determine whether those facts are on one side of the line
or the other. The law does not need to define the line itself. Private parties should
also not seek to define a line that is unnecessary to identify and perhaps even
unknowable. The precise definition of fair use is akin to Heisenberg's
"uncertainty principle" from physics: one cannot know both its empirical
definition and its specific application simultaneously.508 Perhaps borrowing from
a slightly more familiar, and legal, doctrine: we cannot strictly define fair use, but
we can know it when we see it.509
Fair-use guidelines should be flexible in their means for adhering to
obligations under the law. The law of fair use is inherently flexible, and that
flexibility is essential for fair use to meet unpredictable needs. Not only is the
limit of fair use variable, but so are the means for addressing and satisfying the
four factors in the statute. Thus, guidelines that offer only one means for
addressing and meeting fair use subvert the essence of the law. Guidelines of the
past do exactly that by, for example, setting exact quantity limits and barring any
uses that may involve the making of anthologies or coursepacks. Moreover, the
flexibility that the guidelines attempt to preserve by labeling them as "minimum"
standards is also subverted whenever that language is stripped away, as it was in
the settlement of the case against NYU. Educational institutions and other
organizations that adopt the guidelines should be cautious about accepting
guidelines that erode opportunities for creative application of the law.
50 7 Kingsporm, supra note 1, at 122 ("Instead of a series of negotiated compromises, fair
use guidelines should be primarily a statement of principles, and secondarily a way to limit the
effects of technological limits on fair use.').
508 See generally ALASTAIR I.M. RAE, Uncertainty Principle, in 4 MACMLAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 1643 (1996) ('In its simplest formulation the uncertainty principle
states that it is impossible to exactly define both the position and the momentum of a particle at
the same time.")
509 Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (regarding
the effort to define pornography "I know it when I see it.").
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No governmental agency should support or endorse any of the guidelines that
do not meet prescribed standards for their development. Those standards could
begin with the recommendations on this list in this article. A congressional
committee, for example, should not lend its support to guidelines that are not
flexible and that are not explicitly founded on the law. Of all the government
agencies with an interest in the development of guidelines, the most important
and influential decisionmaker of all, of course, is Congress or a congressional
committee. That decisionmaker is often called upon to offer support for fair-use
guidelines. Yet, Congress especially must tread cautiously when reflecting on the
fair-use law it enacted more than two decades ago. Statements of congressional
intent long after passage of a law may appear weighty and influential, but they are
not likely to be accepted with great credulity by the citizens or the courts. Such ex
post facto declarations are instead more likely to stir confusion as the guidelines
often conflict with the letter or the spirit of the law itself. Similarly, statements
that are not well considered or that do not reflect diverse perspectives may carry
unintended influence on the marketplace of ideas.
The process of developing guidelines should include adversarialJustifications
and challenges of the guidelines based on law.5 10 In particular, government
agencies should not approve or support any fair-use guidelines without a public
opportunity for supporters and detractors to present arguments with respect to the
legal validity of the guidelines.511 At no point in the creation of any of the
guidelines was any interested party ever called upon to support any position with
a legal justification.512 At no point was any interested party called upon to be
accountable publicly to the law. Government agencies should hold public
510 That process already has occurred in some limited situations. To the extent that courts
have considered applying any of the guidelines in a ruling, presumably the appropriateness of
doing so has been the subject of briefs and oral argument. For example, in the rehearing en banc
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the MDS decision, the judges questioned critically
the appropriateness of applying the Classroom Guidelines to the copying at issue. In the final
decision, the court chose not to apply them. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996).
511 With respect to the early guidelines, from 1976 through 1981, administrative agencies
took no formal or public position. Members or subcommittees of Congress, however, did offer
general statements of support. Those statements actually focused on the process or idea of
guideline development, rather than on the legal validity of the content of the guidelines. By
contrast, some of the CONFU Guidelines have support from the U.S. Copyright Office and the
U.S. Patent.and Trademark Office. See CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 57. Under the
proposal offered here, the administrative agencies in particular would refiain from lending their
name or auspices to the finished guidelines without a more formal scrutiny.
512 At one point in the CONFU process, the present author gave a presentation to the
assembled group, showing the relationship of various elements of the draft electronic-reserve
guidelines to the factors in the fair-use statute. No other presentation even remotely comparable
ever occurred in any of the CONFU proceedings. Nevertheless, I now contend that that
presentation was still inadequate. I would urge that a future presentation be more formally
defined, with cited authorities, and leave a permanent record for later analysis and scrutiny.
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hearings and require written submission of documents that may approach legal
briefs before rendering a decision to support or not support guidelines. 513 One
might even speculate that the endorsement of the CONFU guidelines by the U.S.
Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office was beyond the
authority of those agencies to act.
Interested parties should not independently lead the effort to develop publicly
distributed fair-use guidelines.514 The convening of interested parties, not only to
articulate views, but to lead the effort to devise broad-based guidelines, has
proved to be seriously flawed.515 The result is a negotiated statement supported
only by the parties who choose to agree with the final analysis.516 A role for an
independent voice with the duty of keeping a focus on the law of fair use was
lacking from CONFU and all other efforts to develop most of the existing
513 This proposal would easily be burdensome to many interested parties who may be
unable to retain counsel for presenting a thorough and competitive argument for or against any
set of guidelines. I do not see an insurmountable concern with that argument. First, many parties
in the negotiation of guidelines have been represented by well-paid legal counsel. Second, law
professors and other attorneys have acted on behalf of various other parties to the negotiations.
Third, even if a critical viewpoint is seriously overwhelmed by sophisticated lawyers, the
government agency considering the views should be able to assess that inequality in reaching its
determination. Fourth, a possible outcome of such a process could be a determination by the
agency to take no position at all on the guidelines in question-to refrain from supporting or
rejecting them. The agency could well take such a neutral position when the representation is
clearly lopsided. One possible model for the reform of the process for creating future guidelines
is "negotiated rulemaking," which brings interested parties together with government officials
in an attempt to achieve consensus support for new regulations. See generally Soo-Hun Park,
Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaldng (1977) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, School of Law,
Indiana University, Bloomington (on file with the Indiana University Law School Library)).
514 Brian D. Wassom, Note, Copyright Implications of "Unconventional Linking" on the
World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and Inlining, 49 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 181, 249
(1998) (urging establishment of a governmental agency to lead the development of guidelines).
515 Naturally, parties with an interest in fair-use determinations can still develop
guidelines or interpretations for application to their own activities. Indeed, they should take
exactly those steps. Colleges and universities should develop interpretations for their own
needs. They may even share ideas about fair use with other institutions, and those groups may
choose to follow or reject the example. This article, however, is asserting that interested parties
of diverse perspective should not lead efforts to devise guidelines that will gain some
governmental support and have intended application to individuals or organizations that do not
voluntarily choose to follow them.
516 Klingspom, supra note 1, at 121. He states:
As CONFU's results show, consensus has become too unwieldy. The number of organized
interest groups demanding to be included in forming any proposal to amend the copyright laws,
combined with the speed of technological and market change, will only result in amendments
that are obsolete as soon as they are passed.
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guidelines.517 Without that voice, and an obligation to give it heed, the parties
again gravitated toward an "acceptable" result, and not a result founded in the
law.
VII. CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES
As guidelines encroach on the law of fair use and begin to displace its
principles, the guidelines become a subversion of the law. The law of fair use may
be deficient in many ways, and may well demand change. Congress can amend
the statute, and courts can interpret it, but private parties acting outside those
channels can only influence perception of the law. If distorting perceptions is the
goal, the guidelines have succeeded in great measure. In the marketplace of ideas,
where fair use enjoys daily application, the guidelines have shaped much of the
understanding of the law. Yet in shaping perceptions, the guidelines have
prevented accurate understandings of the law itself. The guidelines even have
created perversions of legal understanding and prevented interested parties-and
judges-from recognizing and meeting their rights and responsibilities under
copyright law.518
The stated intent of developers and proponents of guidelines, however, is
considerably different. Guidelines are put forth as a means for simplifying
application of an uncertain law. They are intended to bring a desired level of
certainty, reduce risks of infringement liability, and minimize transaction costs
associated with statutory interpretation for common needs.519 In these regards,
this article demonstrates that the guidelines largely have failed. Rather than serve
the needs of instructors, librarians, and other individuals, the guidelines have been
517 Retired federal judges or members of Congress, or other persons with solid credentials
for independent decisionmaking and without a vested interest in the outcome could serve in this
role. An agency, such as the Copyright Office or the Patent and Trademark Office, could
facilitate the effort through the selection and compensation of the person. If those agencies were
to take a more formal and rigorous approach toward supporting or not supporting the final
guidelines, see supra text accompanying notes 209-11, they should in the process bolster their
own independence and credibility sufficiently to select such "arbitrators" who will in turn
demonstrate competence and independence. Diverse interest groups could also select such
independent parties, without any involvement from government agencies, in a manner similar
to the common selection of arbitrators to settle numerous legal disagreements. A critical
difference, of course, is that arbitrators in common disputes render decisions applicable only to
the present parties. Under this proposal, the "arbitrators" would be shaping guidelines that
inevitably will become models that many individuals not present will choose or be expected to
follow.
5 18 Kasunic, supra note 415, at 289-90 (commenting with respect to the inhibiting force
of the guidelines: "This subverts Congress' intent in codifying fair use in section 107. If this
course continues, the Guidelines will undermine fair-use analysis and impede the primary
function of copyright law: to promote progres [sic] and benefit the public.").5 19 See generally Mary R. Barry, Multple Photocopying by Educators and the Fair Use
Doctrine: The Court's Role in Reducing Transaction Costs, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 394-95.
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a crutch for judicial rulings and an externally validated structure to ease the task
of policymaking-as distinguished from the responsibility of following the law.
One can only find failure in guidelines that have missed their constructive goals
and served destructive ends. The vast range of parties with an interest in proper
application of fair use have been poorly served by existing guidelines, and they
would be better served had the guidelines never existed. Better guidelines may be
possible in the future, but developers must break from the constructs of the past in
order to find a healthier and more productive vision of fair-use standards.
In the meantime, the influence of current guidelines should be resisted.
Instead, they are often embraced, principally by individuals who are
uncomfortable with the statute's flexibility. Proprietor groups who see guidelines
as an opportunity to constrain fair use and to dilute the flexibility that gives the
law its vitality have been accomplices. Whatever the intentions of drafters of
guidelines, they have been used by diverse parties to generate the appearance of
positive law. When publishers use them in litigation and urge their adoption in
fair-use decisions, the publishers are seeking to have the guidelines transformed
into positive law.
When publishers disseminate the guidelines widely to the community of
educators, librarians, and others parties seeking to apply fair use, they are
effectively deceiving that community into believing that the guidelines have
binding authority. When the user community accepts the guidelines in policy
statements, in settlement of litigation, or in other ways that purport to articulate a
legal standard, that community is mistakenly treating the guidelines as positive
law. When that community actually uses the guidelines and adheres to them, they
are reshaping the normative understanding of the law. The guidelines accordingly
assume a normative appearance.
These developments in the complex interrelationship between law and
guidelines destroy many of the essential objectives of fair use and of the
guidelines. The important flexibility of the law is sacrificed. Respect for the law
in the community of copyright owners and users is also diminished when the law
is interpreted to deviate from statutory language. The effort to craft future
informal standards-whether labeled "guidelines" or otherwise-is hindered
when the standards are later imposed as if they were binding on all citizens. The
fair-use guidelines of the past have created a dangerous illusion; the community
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of owners and users ought to return to the factors of the statute and consider anew
the role and structure of guidelines and the process of their development. 520
520 
'e desire to develop new fair-use guidelines continues. As this article goes to press,
Senators Hatch and Leahy have introduced a bill to amend section 110(2) of the Copyright Act,
regarding the use of works in distance education, based on a proposal from the United States
Copyright Office. See generally, Crews, supra note 176. The bill includes a directive that the
Copyright Office "convene a conference of interested parties... to develop guidelines for the
use of copyrighted works for digital distance education under the fair use doctrine." S. 487,
107th Cong. § 4(b) (2001). The opportunity may soon arise either for repeating the problems of
the past or for improving the process and outcome of formulating fair-use guidelines.
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